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Overview
At the start of 1997, state unemployment insurance (UI) programs
in the United States had combined trust fund balances of $38.6 billion,
and every state trust fund had a positive balance. During the recession
of 1990-1992, nearly all states fully financed their added benefit pay
outs from their own trust fund reserves. Just seven states needed loans
from the U.S. Treasury to pay benefits, and total borrowing was less
than $5.0 billion. Only two states, Connecticut and Massachusetts, had
serious funding problems during that recession.
The vast majority of states have not had major problems with UI
funding for more than a decade. The latest macroeconomic expansion
has lasted more than five full years, and some high-level public offi
cials have even suggested that the business cycle may be a thing of the
past. The macroeconomy at the end of 1996 was operating close to, or
at, full employment. More significantly, full employment was reached
without the usual problem of high and/or accelerating inflation. Many
states have reduced UI taxes in recent years, and such reductions were
especially frequent in early 1997.
This background could be used to argue that UI financing prob
lems will be less serious in the future than in the past. While future
recessions may be less serious, it is not a certainty; only time will tell.
To the extent that the recent past is not prologue, states could need
large UI trust fund reserves, perhaps even before the 21st century.
This book explores the financing of state UI programs, and it has
two general purposes. The first purpose is to assess recent financing
experiences and to examine UI funding historically. Chapter 1 intro
duces the reader to alternative financing strategies and discusses fund
adequacy. The chapter also reviews key federal statutes that affect UI
taxes and state trust funds. The last half of Chapter 1 reviews the his
tory of UI funding, with particular emphasis on the funding problems
of the 1970s and the 1980s and experiences during the 1990-1992
recession. It provides an interpretation of why financing problems
were so minor during the early 1990s. Finally, it reviews the slow pace
of post-recession trust fund building during 1993-1996 and reports the
results of a simulation analysis of potential future funding problems.
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The overall conclusion of Chapter 1 is that states will continue to need
to maintain large trust fund balances to forestall potential financing
problems during a future recession.
The second purpose of this book is to examine specific methods of
financing that could be important for states considering changes in
their UI tax statutes and/or their approach to trust fund management.
Chapters 2 and 3, respectively, study flexible trust fund financing and
tax-base indexing. One or both of these financing features are already
present in many states. Each feature has implications for the size of a
state©s desired trust fund balance and for the responsiveness of its reve
nues during both recessions and sustained economic expansions. Two
major conclusions from these chapters should be noted.
1. Flexible financing features such as so-called solvency taxes,
while used by many states, have only a limited macro impact.
Further, it does not appear that flexible financing has increased
significantly in importance over the past 20 years. The preva
lence and potential effects of flexible financing have not grown
since the late 1980s. Hence, the need for large reserves is no
less now than it was before the recession of 1990-1992. Chap
ter 2 also discusses the impact that flexible financing has on
maintaining family income and on providing for the built-in
(or automatic) stability of the macroeconomy. Both are tradi
tional UI objectives and both would be impaired by growth in
flexible financing.
2. Tax-base indexing (having a tax base that automatically rises
with the level of wages) has a number of favorable effects on
state UI financing. Especially in states that have an indexed
maximum weekly benefit, an indexed tax base helps to ensure
that, over the long run, revenues grow at the same rate as bene
fit payments. Having a balanced growth of revenues and pay
ments helps to ensure that trust fund balances also grow as
state economies expand.
Chapters 4 and 5 study two much more specialized methods of
financing: debt financing through state bond issues and the establish
ment of state UI reserve funds. State reserve funds are state-controlled,
state-administered, and supported by UI taxes. Both chapters are
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based on small samples of state experiences: only three states have
issued their own bonds to repay UI debts, and only four have estab
lished state reserve funds. Two major conclusions from these chapters
are that
1. Bond financing has disadvantages as well as advantages when
compared with debt financing with loans from the U.S. Trea
sury; the choice between the two involves much more than a
simple comparison of interest rates.
2. For states with reasonably large UI trust fund balances, the
creation of a state reserve fund allows for a proactive use of
reserves, such as financing worker training and/or supplement
ing the administrative budgets of employment security agen
cies.
Finally, Chapter 6 offers conclusions and some policy recommendations.
Two broad conclusions of this study should be emphasized. First,
states continue to need to rely heavily on advance funding, or forward
funding, to finance recession-related drawdowns of UI trust fund
reserves. The experiences of the 1990-1992 recession do not indicate
the scale of potential drawdowns during a future recession. Prudent
state policy would maintain UI trust fund balances that meet standard
actuarial definitions of fund adequacy. The federal government could
help the states in this area by providing active guidance on trust fund
adequacy. Second, individual states continue to experiment with UI
financing arrangements. Some of these experiments are worth emulat
ing, while others should be avoided. On balance, tax-base indexing
merits widespread adoption, as does the use of reserve funds by states
with high levels of reserves. The risks in relying on flexible financing
should be recognized. At the same time, issuing state bonds to finance
trust fund debts also entails risks. Ultimately, of course, individual
states will decide on the desirability of each UI financing arrangement.

Unemployment insurance is an important and long-standing social
insurance program in the United States. Created by the Social Security
Act of 1935, UI pays benefits to 15 to 20 million claimants in most
years, benefits financed mainly by payroll taxes levied on covered
employers. Employer contributions deposited into state trust fund
accounts at the U.S. Treasury are the source for cash benefit payments
to claimants.
Unemployment insurance is often described as having three pri
mary objectives. First among these is to "alleviate the hardships that
result from loss of wage income during unemployment" (Haber and
Murray 1966, p. 26). The cash benefits paid provide partial wage-loss
replacement and help to maintain the income and purchasing power of
eligible unemployed persons and their families. Payments typically
are made to individuals who have lost jobs through no fault of their
own, that is, those on layoff, and benefits are received for temporary
periods. The second objective is to help stabilize the macroeconomy
through the maintenance of aggregate consumer purchasing power dur
ing recessions, when the production of goods and services declines.
The third objective is to help stabilize employment by experience-rat
ing of individual, covered employers. Employers who, through layoffs
and other job separations, cause large payments in UI benefits then pay
higher UI taxes than employers who initiate fewer job separations.

THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
In the United States, unemployment insurance features a blend of
federal and state responsibilities. The states administer benefit pay
ments and tax collections and determine most of the statutory provi
sions related to those activities. There are also federal responsibilities,
the most important of which charges the U.S. Secretary of Labor with
ensuring the prompt and efficient administration of the UI program.

6

The History of State UI Financing

Three tiers of benefit payments are provided. Tier one is the regu
lar benefit program, which operates continuously and pays benefits for
up to 26 weeks in most states. Regular UI is financed by state-level
employer taxes. The second tier is the federal-state extended benefit
(or EB) program, which may pay up to an additional 13 weeks of bene
fits. This program, activated when states reach set rates of unemploy
ment, is financed equally by state and federal UI taxes. The third tier,
temporary benefits, becomes available through special federal legisla
tion during recessions. The most recent temporary program, Emer
gency Unemployment Compensation, paid benefits from November
1991 through April 1994. Traditionally, such benefits have been
financed completely from federal funds. This book is concerned with
state-level financing, that is, the financing of regular UI benefits plus
half of the EB benefits.
A unique feature of state UI financing in the United States is the
reliance on experience-rating to set contribution rates for covered
employers. Benefit payments are charged against individual employ
ers, and higher payouts result in increased state UI taxes.
UI programs try to achieve their three main objectives through stat
utory provisions and administrative procedures that specify coverage,
employer contributions, benefit eligibility, and trust fund management
practices. Coverage of wage and salary workers is nearly universal,
encompassing those who work for private employers, state and local
governments, and nonprofit organizations.
Regular state UI benefits for eligible unemployed workers are typi
cally available for up to 26 weeks. Most recipients are on temporary or
permanent layoff, but others (job leavers and unemployed labor force
reentrants) may also qualify for benefits under certain circumstances.
Weekly benefit rates reflect past earnings, typically earnings from the
highest calendar quarter of a 12-month "base period" that ended before
the onset of unemployment. In many states, base-period earnings
determine the maximum duration of benefits and the weekly amount.©
States also set the employer payroll taxes that finance UI pro
grams. The original authorizing legislation that established UI (Title
IX of the Social Security Act of 1935) provided for a federal unem
ployment tax (PUT) of 3.0 percent to be levied on the payrolls of cov
ered employers. Also authorized, however, was a tax credit offset
mechanism that allowed employers to take credit for up to 90 percent
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of the PUT (2.7 percent of payrolls) if the state established an accept
able UI program. One requirement for having an acceptable program
was that a state must establish an approved mechanism for taxing cov
ered employers according to their experiences in paying UI benefits.
The U.S. Secretary of Labor is responsible for judging the acceptabil
ity of each state©s UI system of experience-rating; the Secretary©s
responsibilities are discussed later in this chapter. In states with an
acceptable experience-rating, employers could pay UI taxes into their
state©s UI trust fund at a rate of less than 2.7 percent but receive the
full 2.7 percent PUT credit offset. That arrangement provided a strong
financial incentive for states to establish acceptable programs, and all
states did this in the late 1930s.
The other 10 percent of the original 3.0 percent PUT (or 0.3 per
cent of payrolls) remained a federal tax paid into separate federal trust
fund accounts. The proceeds of this tax were originally used to finance
UI program administration and the activities of state employment ser
vices. The federal component of UI taxes was (and continues to be)
levied at a single flat rate.
Experience-rating applies to the state taxes that finance regular
state UI benefits and the state©s share of EB benefits. Originally, UI
taxes were levied on total covered payrolls, but in 1940 the taxable
wage base was set at the first $3,000 of annual employee earnings, to
correspond to the taxable wage base under the Old Age and Survivors
Insurance (OASI), or social security, program.
The state UI trust funds that receive each state©s UI taxes are main
tained at the U.S. Department of the Treasury. Trust fund balances are
invested in the U.S. government debt and earn interest income for the
states.
When a state©s trust fund becomes depleted, there also are provi
sions governing whether it may borrow from the U.S. Treasury. Bor
rowing was widespread during the mid 1970s and again during the
early to mid 1980s. Since the early 1980s, the loans have carried inter
est charges if such debt is outstanding for more than a year. (The fed
eral statutes governing UI loans and debt repayment are discussed later
in this chapter and in Chapter 4. See also Miller, Pavosevich, and Vroman [1997] andVroman [1990]).
Such statutory and institutional arrangements governing federal
and state UI taxes have persisted from the 1930s to the present. The
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federal tax is now 0.8 percent of taxable payrolls, and it is levied on the
first $7,000 of each worker©s wages and salaries. Proceeds from the
PUT go to three federal trust funds, to finance such activities as UI pro
gram administration, the employment service, the federal share of EB
benefits, and a federal loan fund for states needing loans to pay UI ben
efits.
In 1985, the maximum PUT credit offset increased to 5.4 percent
and has remained at that rate to the present. Since 1985, each state has
been required to have a maximum experience-rated tax rate of at least
5.4 percent for the UI taxes that finance benefit payments. This implies
a gross potential (federal plus state) UI tax rate of at least 6.2 percent
for each state.
Under the Social Security Act, the U.S. Secretary of Labor is
responsible for the prompt and efficient administration of unemploy
ment insurance. The Secretary©s responsibility is given concrete mean
ing through a set of performance indicators which the states must meet.
There are more than 40 Secretarial "standards" and "desired levels of
achievement" pertaining to the administration of benefit payments, tax
collection, and fund management. To have an acceptable program,
states must achieve target levels of performance for these indicators or
risk losing the PUT tax credit offset. This represents a large potential
financial penalty, and it gives the federal government a strong lever for
influencing state UI program administration.
Certain federal requirements affecting state UI taxes and trust fund
management are relevant to the analysis presented in this book. Four
that are important for later chapters are the following:
1. A state is required to have a taxable wage base per employee
of at least $7,000, that is, it must be at least equal to the level
of the federal taxable wage base.
2. A state is required to have a maximum experience-rated tax
rate of at least 5.4 percent of taxable wages.
3. Monies held in the state trust fund account at the U.S. Treasury
can be withdrawn for a single purpose, to pay benefits to
claimants. This requirement is known as the "federal with
drawal standard." The withdrawal standard has influenced a
few states to establish their own reserve funds, in order to gain
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partial control over the use of UI tax revenues. Chapter 5
reviews the performance of such funds in three states.
4. States that secure loans from the U.S. Treasury must meet debt
repayment requirements. Chapter 4 studies state experiences
in direct bond issues as an alternative to the use of Treasury
loans.
Forty-one of 53 UI programs operated with tax bases above $7,000
in 1996. However, the 1996 tax bases exceeded $10,000 in only 20
states and exceeded $20,000 in just five states. For comparison, the
1996 Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI; social
security) tax base was $62,700. Due to generally low taxable wage
bases, taxable payrolls represented only 35.2 percent of UI covered
payrolls in 1995. The higher tax bases are found in the 18 programs
with indexed taxable wage bases.2 Chapter 3 explores the link between
the UI tax base and state trust fund adequacy.
In more than half the states, taxes flow into state trust funds from
two distinct sources. The first (and largest) source is the tax deter
mined by the state©s system of experience-rating individual employers.
States typically use three factors to set experience-rated taxes. First,
most states have a set of tax rate schedules with higher rates in effect
when trust fund balances are lower. Second, such states use an indica
tor of the overall trust fund balance on a specific computation date
(most often June 30th) to determine which rate schedule will be used in
the coming year. Third, these states assign rates to individual employ
ers by using an indicator based on each employer©s experience in caus
ing the payment of benefits. Higher payout rates lead to higher tax
rates. This institutional arrangement for taxation has been present
since the founding of the state UI programs.3
The second source of funds is often called a "solvency tax," and it
takes effect only when the state©s trust fund has reached such a low
level that there is serious risk of insolvency. A wide variety of sol
vency taxes now exists in the states. Some are levied at a single flat
rate on all employers, while others use an experience indicator to deter
mine individual employer rates. Some states have a single solvency
tax, while others have a schedule of such taxes with progressively
higher tax rates applying as the trust fund balance reaches progres
sively lower thresholds.
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Solvency taxes are part of a larger set of UI financing arrangements
collectively known as "flexible financing." Flexible financing may also
extend to a state©s UI tax base and to its benefit payments. An advan
tage of flexible financing, according to its proponents, is that the state
can then operate with a lower trust fund balance than it could if it relied
on the traditional method of UI financing. Flexible financing is exam
ined in some detail in Chapter 2.

FUNDING STRATEGIES AND CONCEPTS
Advance Funding
The revenues that finance state UI programs come mainly from
payroll taxes on covered employers. Taxes are deposited into state UI
trust fund accounts at the U.S. Treasury. These accounts are the source
for benefit payments.
The funding strategy followed by state UI programs is usually
characterized as "advance funding" or "forward funding. (A second
funding strategy, "pay-as-you-go," is discussed later in this section.)
Trust fund balances are built up before recessions, drawn on during
recessions, and then rebuilt during the subsequent recoveries. The
funding arrangement implies that the program acts as an automatic sta
bilizer of economic activity, that it makes larger benefit payments than
tax withdrawals during recessions and larger tax withdrawals than ben
efit payments during economic expansions.
This characterization of advance funding does not accurately
describe developments during the recessions of the mid 1970s and the
early 1980s. Pre-recession trust fund balances were not large in several
states and were too low to pay UI benefits to all eligible claimants.
Widespread, large-scale, and persistent state borrowing took place dur
ing both recessions. However, during the 1990-1992 downturn, state
trust fund reserves were generally sufficient to meet demands for bene
fit payments without states having to resort to large-scale borrowing.
The adequacy of a state©s reserves during a recession depends upon
four factors: 1) the absolute size of the" trust fund balance at the start of
the downturn, 2) the size of the state©s economy, 3) the recession-
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related demand for benefits, that is, the severity and duration of the
recession, and 4) the speed and size of response of taxes (and possibly
the response of UI benefits) when reserves are drawn down. A concept
that has proved useful for assessing state trust fund adequacy is the
"reserve ratio multiple" (RRM; also called the "high-cost multiple").
The reserve ratio multiple is an actuarial construct that incorpo
rates the first three of the preceding four factors (the trust fund balance,
the size of the state economy, and the benefit payout rate). The denom
inator in the RRM is the highest-cost benefit payout period in the
state©s history, measured as total benefit payouts over a 12-month
period and expressed as a percentage of covered wages for that period.
The interstate range of high-cost percentages extends from a low of
1.04 percent (in South Dakota between January and December 1964)
to a high of 4.37 percent (in Rhode Island between January and
December 1975). The highest-cost period for the United States as a
whole was 2.22 percent (between January and December 1975).
The numerator of the RRM, termed the reserve ratio, is the yearend trust fund balance divided by covered wages for the year and
expressed as a percentage. As the ratio of these two ratios, the reserve
ratio multiple is thus a measure whose numerator incorporates infor
mation on the UI trust fund balance and on the scale of a state©s econ
omy (as approximated by covered wages), while the denominator is a
measure of risk (the highest previous 12-month payout rate). In the
past, some have advocated that states build trust fund reserves to levels
that produce RRMs of 1.5, that is, levels equal to 18 months of benefits
paid out at the historically highest payout rate.
As a measure of trust fund adequacy, the RRM has its critics.
Many analysts consider the 1.5 value too conservative a standard and
that a prudent state could function with a much lower trust fund bal
ance and run little or no risk of fund insolvency.
Two specific criticisms of the RRM are often voiced. First, the
high-cost period in the denominator is often so far in the past (JanuaryDecember 1964 for South Dakota) that it may no longer be a relevant
indicator of the maximum payout risk. Second, the RRM is a static
concept and does not adequately account for the dynamic response of
taxes (and perhaps benefits) when trust funds are depleted. A quick
response can permit a state to function successfully with a smaller trust
fund than that suggested by an RRM of 1.5.
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While trust fund financing has been practiced since the beginning
of unemployment insurance, there is no consensus on what constitutes
an appropriate measure of trust fund adequacy. The recently disbanded
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC) exam
ined funding in its February 1995 report.4 Chapter 5 of the report ana
lyzes the funding situation at the end of 1993, using three solvency
standards. Table 5.3 in the report shows the number of states meeting
RRM solvency standards for multiples ranging from 0.25 to 1.75,
based on seven different measures of high costs: the highest 12-month
costs ever experienced, three involving the highest 12-month costs in
the past 10 years, and three involving the highest 12-month costs in the
past 20 years.
The ACUC recommended that states achieve an RRM of 1.0, with
a state©s high-cost rate measured as the average of the three highestcost 12-month periods in the past 20 years. The ACUC also recom
mended that the federal government offer specific financial incentives
to encourage states to meet advance funding goals, including paying
higher or "preferential" interest rates when large balances (measured as
RRMS) are achieved and lower interest rates on recession-related bor
rowing when pre-recession balances equal or exceed solvency stan
dards.5 If implemented, the ACUC©s recommendations would improve
the solvency of many state UI programs. It seems unlikely, however,
that federal legislation to encourage solvency will be proposed, much
less enacted, in the near future.
Pay-As-You-Go Funding
A second strategy for funding UI benefits is "pay-as-you-go" fund
ing. This strategy stresses the response of the funding mechanism dur
ing a recession-related drawdown.
There are two variants of pay-as-you-go funding. The first stresses
the automatic responses of taxes and benefits, responses triggered by
trust fund drawdowns. As the trust fund moves downward past set
thresholds, a state©s UI law automatically activates responses that raise
taxes and (perhaps) reduce benefits. Laws in Illinois and Pennsylvania
include provisions that activate automatic responses. In fact, one
forceful advocate of this funding strategy is a former director of the
Illinois UI agency.6
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The second variant can be called "ad-hoc pay-as-you-go." It relies
on a legislated response mechanism when the trust fund is low or in
deficit. There is no substantial written literature that advocates this
strategy, but it could be inferred if a state satisfied specific conditions:
i.e., 1) limited reserve build-up and a low RRM after a long period of
economic expansion and 2) the absence of automatic tax and benefit
response features. In effect, ad-hoc pay-as-you-go funding would
address the financing problem at the point in time when the problem is
most pressing.
When the primary objectives of state UI programs are considered,
the rationale for pay-as-you-go strategies seems questionable. Both
the temporary replacement of lost earnings for individuals and the
automatic macro stabilizing effect of UI are weakened if benefits are
reduced during a recession. It would also seem questionable to
increase employer taxes in the midst of a recession, when profits are
already depressed. However, the strategy does offer a rationale for
operating with lower trust fund balances than advanced funding
requires. The automatic variant of the pay-as-you-go strategy, flexible
financing, is examined further in Chapter 2.
In selecting the desired target level for a state©s trust fund, the big
gest unknown is the size of the trust fund outflow to expect in future
recessions. There is no easy answer to this question. Selecting the
highest-ever past rate of outflows may not be useful. For example,
decreases in manufacturing©s share of total employment and declining
unionization are now widespread throughout the United States. Both
unionized and nonunionized manufacturing workers and other union
ized workers claim UI benefits at above-average rates. This may
presage lower benefit-cost rates in the future. On the other hand, rely
ing solely on the experiences of the past 10 years likely means relying
on too short an interval.
The example of Michigan may be instructive for reviewing high
costs in past periods. During the 10 years from 1987 through 1996,
Michigan©s highest 12-month benefit-cost rate was 1.90 percent, in
1991. However, the past 10 years have been unusual in Michigan, a
state that continues to rely heavily on the cyclically volatile automobile
industry. During the 50 years from 1947 to 1996, there were seven
years when the cost rate was higher than 1.90 percent. The five years
with the highest percentage cost rates were 1982 (3.72), 1958 (3.69),
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1975 (2.87), 1980 (2.55), and 1961 (2.20). Each year is a recession
year with a higher payout rate than in 1991. Thus, the highest-ever
cost rate for Michigan was 3.72 percent, while the highest three-year
average for the past 20 years (1977 through 1996) was 2.75 percent.
Both cost rates are considerably higher than 1.90 percent, the highest
cost rate for 1987 through 1996. It seems clear that experiences cover
ing more than 10 years are needed to assess the likely recession-related
costs for a state.
Reserve ratio multiples as measures of adequacy imply large abso
lute levels of trust fund balances. The 1996 year-end trust fund bal
ances required in Michigan, based on a high-cost multiple of 1.0
combined with each of the preceding three high-cost rates (3.72, 2.75,
and 1.90) were $4.0 billion, $3.0 billion, and $2.1 billion, respectively.
The state©s actual balance was $1.8 billion. Because the absolute bal
ance is such a large number (nearly $2.0 billion), some might misinter
pret the degree of adequacy that it represents. Michigan©s economy
had roughly $110 billion in covered wages in 1996. A 2.0 percent cost
rate in 1997 would represent a one-year outflow from its trust fund of
about $2.2 billion. It is not difficult to imagine a situation in which the
$1.8 billion trust fund balance would drop to zero during the second
year of a recession.

MAJOR HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS
IN STATE TRUST FUNDS
Aggregate trust fund balances totaled $38.6 billion at the end of
1996. The aggregate balance had been $36.9 million at the end of
1989, just before the 1990-1992 recession. While the dollar value of
the 1996 balance was larger by $1.76 billion, it represented a smaller
percentage of total covered wages and a lower reserve ratio multiple
than the 1989 balance. The national RRM had been 0.87 at the end of
1989 but was only 0.64 seven years later.
This section reviews the history of UI financing, with particular
attention to the problems of the mid 1970s and early 1980s. Develop
ments during the 1990s are discussed in the following section (p. 21),
along with an assessment of UI trust fund adequacy at the end of 1996.
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Beginning with the establishment of UI in the late 1930s, there are
four distinct periods of trust fund financing. Sustained and large accu
mulations occurred during the earliest years. These accumulations
were the result of lower benefit costs than originally anticipated when
UI was established and of the effects of full employment during World
War II. The aggregate reserve ratio (the total net reserves as a percent
age of covered wages) reached its all-time peak, 10.4 percent, at the
end of 1945. Modest absolute growth in reserves continued through
the end of 1948, when the national total of $7.60 billion represented
7.91 percent of covered payrolls.
The trust fund accumulations of these years were also the product
of the strong macroeconomy associated with World War II. Aggregate
benefit payments, which had averaged about 1.5 percent of covered
payrolls during 1938-1940, averaged only about 0.5 percent of pay
rolls during 1941-1945, with especially low payout rates during 1943
and 1944. Despite large reductions in average tax rates (from 2.69 per
cent of payroll in 1938 to 1.50 percent in 1945), tax revenues exceeded
benefits in every year through 1945.
The second period can be called "the long slide." During the 32
years from 1948 to 1979, growth in UI trust fund reserves lagged sub
stantially behind growth in the economy. The aggregate reserve ratio
declined sharply, from 7.91 percent in 1948 to 0.91 percent in 1979.
Losses in reserves were concentrated during recessions, but accumula
tions during economic expansions were generally modest. Conse
quently, the aggregate reserve ratio was lower before each recession
than it had been before the previous recession. Even during the long
expansion of the 1960s, the growth in net reserves was no faster than
that of covered payrolls. Thus, the reserve ratio, which had been 3.57
percent at the end of 1959, was 3.46 percent at the end of 1969, despite
the fact that aggregate reserves had nearly doubled, growing from
$6.67 billion in 1959 to $12.64 billion in 1969.
Because state reserves were so large at the start of the 1948-1979
period, the decline in reserves did not present financing problems for
many states until the mid 1970s. Alaska, Michigan, and Pennsylvania
were the only states that borrowed from the U.S. Treasury to finance
benefits during the 1950s and 1960s. These loans were fully repaid by
the late 1960s.
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Substantial drawdowns of state trust funds occurred in the early
1970s. The first states to require loans were Connecticut, Vermont, and
Washington during 1972-1974, with reductions in defense-related pro
curement causing especially high unemployment in Connecticut and
Washington.
Large-scale borrowing from the U.S. Treasury first became wide
spread in 1975 as the 1974-1975 recession caused financing problems
for many states. Nearly half of all UI programs required loans during
1975-1978, and aggregate borrowing totaled $5.5 billion. Moreover,
the post-1975 recovery was not robust enough to restore trust fund bal
ances fully by the end of the 1970s. Several debtor states repaid their
loans slowly, and aggregate reserves totaled only $8.58 billion at the
end of 1979. This balance was about $2.3 billion less than it had been
at the end of 1973 and $4.1 billion less than at the end of 1969. The
reserve ratio at the end of 1979 was only 0.91 percent, roughly onefourth of the reserve ratio at the end of 1969 (3.46 percent) and only
about one-eighth of the reserve ratio at the end of 1948 (7.91 percent).
The second period of substantial state borrowing occurred during
the back-to-back recessions of the early 1980s. Because state pro
grams entered the 1980-1983 recessions with historically low reserves,
borrowing was even more widespread and on a larger scale during the
early 1980s than during the 1970s. Between 1980 and 1987, total bor
rowing was $24.2 billion, with four states Illinois, Michigan, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania responsible for over 60 percent of the total. Aggre
gate reserves reached a low point at the end of 1983, when the nation
wide total was actually negative: -$5.8 billion. Debtor states brought
in major tax increases and reduced benefits as they attempted to restore
trust funds to adequate levels.
The six years starting in 1984 witnessed large-scale trust fund
building, with the states adding more than $42 billion to net reserves,
about $7.0 billion per year. This yielded an aggregate balance of $36.9
billion at the end of 1989. Despite the growth in absolute reserve bal
ances, the aggregate reserve ratio in 1989 was only 1.92 percent,
slightly more than half of its 1969 level of 3.46 percent. Taking the
highest-ever national cost rate (2.22 percent during calendar-year
1975) as the high-cost rate gives a nationwide reserve ratio multiple of
0.87 for 1989; this 1989 multiple has not been reached during the
1990s.
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Thus, 1989 marks the end of the third historical period, a second
period of substantial trust fund accumulations. While the absolute
increases in reserves were impressive, the indicators of relative size did
not grow nearly so dramatically. Compared to the 1948 reserve ratio of
7.91 percent, the 1989 reserve ratio of 1.92 percent was about onefourth as large. Nonetheless, during the 1990-1992 recession, states
did not need the large-scale loans they had required during 1974-1978
and again during 1980-1987. Unlike the 1970s and 1980s, only seven
states borrowed during 1990-1995, and just two had loans that were
"large," i.e., more than 1 percent of covered wages.
Another contrast to earlier recessions is that the 1990-1992 down
turn was unusually mild in most areas of the country. As a conse
quence, the drawdowns on trust fund balances were unusually small:
Net reserves decreased by $11.0 billion during 1990-1992, compared
with $14.4 billion during 1980-1983. We shall return to this topic
later.
A third contrast between the 1990s and the 1980s is that there was
no substantial trust fund building during the economic expansion of
1993-1996. The four-year increase in aggregate net reserves was only
$12.8 billion, or $3.2 billion per year. This rate of accumulation is less
than half the annual rate during 1984-1989. As a consequence, the
aggregate reserve ratio for the economy only grew from 1.20 percent at
the end of 1992 to 1.43 percent at the end of 1996, and the RRM
increased only from 0.54 to 0.64. On a relative basis, national reserves
were about three-quarters as adequate at the end of 1996 as they had
been at the end of 1989.
The slow pace of reserve accumulation characteristic of the 1990s
marks this decade as the fourth period in the history of UI trust fund
reserves. Compared with the long period from 1948 to 1979, the pat
tern of recession-related reserve losses and subsequent accumulations
in the 1990s is broadly similar, but it is based on a single recessionrecovery episode. Trust funds declined during the recession but were
not restored to pre-recession levels during the subsequent economic
expansion. A repetition of this recession-recovery pattern could lead to
renewed large-scale borrowing. Since reserve ratios were so much
more modest at the end of 1989, compared with those of 1948, the next
recession may entail the large-scale borrowing that occurred during the
1970s and 1980s. The slow reserve accumulations during 1993-1996
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and the potential for large-scale borrowing during a future recession
are discussed in the next section of this chapter.
State borrowing from the U.S. Treasury is not necessarily to be
avoided at all times. Temporary loans for cash-flow purposes, because
of differing seasonal patterns of tax revenues and benefit payments, can
occasionally occur without causing large or persistent indebtedness.
Interest-free seasonal cash-flow loans have always been available to
the states. Loans secured but fully repaid before September 30th of the
same year are interest-free.
Since the early 1980s, however, longer-term indebtedness has car
ried interest charges. If the debt is outstanding on January 1st of two
consecutive years and has not been fully repaid by November 10th of
the second year, an automatic debt repayment process comes into
effect. On January 1st of the following year, 0.3 percent is added to the
federal part of each employer©s UI tax obligation, i.e., 1.1 percent
rather than 0.8 percent on the first $7,000 of earnings for each
employee. The proceeds of the 0.3 percent penalty tax are used to
repay the oldest part of a state©s debt. Even higher penalty tax rates
apply in later years.
Because federal UI penalty taxes are levied at a flat rate, a state
may prefer to make voluntary repayments with experience-rated state
UI taxes. These must be levied as new tax obligations (not as with
drawals from the state©s UI trust fund), and their yield must at least
equal the yield of the federal penalty tax. Voluntary repayment can
also be accomplished through a special assessment levied on top of
regular employer state UI taxes.
Before 1981, debt repayment provisions differed from current pro
visions in several ways. Two especially important contrasts should be
noted: 1) loans did not carry interest charges and 2) automatic debt
repayment through mandatory PUT penalty taxes was suspended by
emergency federal legislation. In short, debt burdens before 1981 were
lighter than at present. That the increase in the cost of indebtedness
helps shape state attitudes towards debt is shown by their debt repay
ment behavior. 7 Debts incurred in the 1970s were repaid slowly, but
post-1982 debts were repaid rapidly. Post-1982 debts were often held
for such short periods that no interest was due.
The faster pace of debt repayment since 1982 partly reflects the
states© willingness to cut benefit payments while their economies are
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still in recession. Thus, one consequence of trust fund inadequacy is
that legislation designed to improve fund adequacy typically includes
benefit reductions as well as tax increases.8 Another reason to encour
age the states to build large trust funds is to avoid recession-related
benefit reductions.
To help illustrate the link between a standard indicator of trust fund
adequacy and state borrowing, Table 1-1 displays summary data from
recent recessions of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. The top panel of
Table 1-1 shows reserve ratio multiples for the ends of the years just
before the onset of each of the four most recent recessions, plus the
multiples at the end of 1996. The back-to-back recessions of 1980 and
1981-1982 are treated as a single, very serious recession. The top
panel vividly illustrates the loss of reserve adequacy since the end of
1969. In 1969, only one state had an RRM below 1.0, and 35 had mul
tiples of 1.5 or larger. By 1979, 10 states had multiples that were nega
tive and 12 had multiples below 0.50, while only 2 states had multiples
of 1.5 or larger.
In Table 1-1, note how the reserve accumulations of 1984-1989
changed the distribution of multiples. While only 4 states had multi
ples above 1.5 in 1989, 17 others had multiples between 1.0 and 1.49.
The number of multiples that fell below 0.50 decreased from 22 in
1979 to 9 in 1989. When the multiples in the individual states are
examined, the increase in the aggregate RRM between 1979 and 1989
(from 0.41 to 0.87) shows the expected pattern.
The top panel of Table 1-1 also shows the decline in the distribu
tion of state RRMs between 1989 and 1996. In both years, nearly all
programs had multiples in the range of 0.0 to 1.49. In 1996, however,
eight fewer states had multiples between 1.0 and 1.49 (9 versus 17),
while while two more had multiples between 0.5 and 0.99 (24 versus
22) and seven more had multiples between 0.0 and 0.49 (16 versus 9).
More states had low multiples at the start of 1997 than seven years ear
lier.
Although it may be obvious to most readers, there is a strong asso
ciation between the level of a state©s RRM before a recession and the
likelihood of borrowing during a recession. The lower part of Table 11 illustrates this association with data on state borrowing from 19741979, 1980-1987, and 1990-1995. The first row for each period gives
the initial distribution of state RRMs before the onset of the recession.

Table 1-1 State UI Trust Fund Reserves and Borrowing3
Reserve ratio multiple interval
Time period
End of year
1969
1973
1979
1989
1996
State borrowing,
1974-1979
Initial RRMs
States with loans
States with "large"
loansb
State borrowing,
1980-1987
Initial RRMs
States with loans
States with "large"
loans

Negative

0.0-0.49

0.5-0.99

1.0-1.49

1.5-1.99

2.0 and
higher

Total number
of states

National
reserve
ratio
multiple

0
1
10
0
0

0
4
12
9
16

1
14
17
22
24

16
12
11
17
9

15
12
2
4
2

20
9
0
0
1

52
52
52
52
52

1.68
1.04
0.41
0.87
0.64

1
1

4
4

14
12

12
5

12
2

9
0

52
24

1

4

8

1

1

0

15

10
9

12
10

17
10

11
2

2
0

0
0

52
31

2

6

5

1

0

0

14

State borrowing,
1990-1995
52
0
4
17
22
9
0
Initial RRMs
7
043000
States with loans
States with "large"
0200002
loans
SOURCE: All data on trust fund reserves and loans are from the UI Service of the U.S. Department of Labor.
a The 52 programs are those of the 50 states plus the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. The Virgin Islands are excluded from the
table.
b "Large" loans are defined as the total borrowing over the indicated periods equal to 1 percent or more of total payrolls for a single yeai
in the periods indicated, 1975, 1984, and 1991, respectively.
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The second row shows how many states in each interval needed any
loan during the years indicated. The third row shows the number of
states needing large loans, "large" being defined as total borrowing dur
ing the entire period equal to 1 percent or more of the total covered
wages for one year in the period indicated.
During 1974-1979, 24 programs borrowed and 15 needed large
loans. The probability of a state needing a loan and needing a large
loan was much higher for states with low initial reserve ratio multiples.
All five states with multiples below 0.50 borrowed, and all five needed
large loans during 1974-1979. Of the 21 states with initial RRMs of
1.5 or larger, only two needed a loan, and just one needed a large loan.
Similar patterns appear for 1980-1987. Nineteen of the 22 states
with initial multiples below 0.5 borrowed, and eight needed large
loans. Only two states with multiples initially above 1.0 borrowed, and
just one needed a large loan. Thus, states with low initial multiples
borrowed the most.
Of course, because so many states had low and negative net
reserves at the end of 1979, the scale of borrowing during 1980-1987
was much larger than during 1974-1979. Loans during 1974-1979
were $5.5 billion, or 0.94 percent of U.S. total wages in 1975, com
pared with $24.2 billion during 1980-1987, or 1.77 percent of U.S.
total wages in 1984.
Relative to 1974-1979 and 1980-1997, borrowing during 19901995 was small. The seven states that needed loans borrowed only
$4.8 billion, or 0.22 percent of U.S. total wages in 1991. Note, how
ever, that borrowing was again concentrated in states with low initial
RRMs. The loan probabilities in the two lowest intervals during 19901995 were 0.44 in the 0.0-0.49 interval (4 of 9) and 0.14 in the 0.50.99 interval (3 of 22).
A vertical scan down the borrowing data of Table 1-1 shows a clear
pattern of decreasing loan probabilities within a given RRM interval.
For states falling in the 0.5-0.99 interval, the probability of borrowing
was 0.86 during 1974-1979 (12 of 14), 0.59 during 1980-1987 (10 of
17), and 0.14 during 1990-1995 (3 of 22). Another obvious pattern is
the monotonic relationship in grouped data between the initial RRM
and the probability of needing a UI loan. States can reduce the risk of
recession-related borrowing when they have higher initial reserve ratio
multiples.
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For additional insight into the lack of state borrowing during the
1990-1992 recession, Table 1-2 provides comparisons of the increases
in unemployment rates during recessions. It focuses on state-level
ratios of three-year unemployment rates and it also gives the national
medians and averages of three-year ratios. The main point is that statelevel increases in total unemployment rates (or TURs, as measured in
the Current Population Survey [CPS], the monthly household labor
force survey)9 were unusually small during 1990-1992. Nineteen
states actually had lower average TURs during 1990-1992 than during
1987-1989, that is, ratios below 1.00. The ratios exceeded 1.25 in just
16 states during 1990-1992, compared with 36, 32, and 37 states,
respectively, in the three earlier recessions. The concentration of states
with low increases (and even reductions) in unemployment rates dur
ing 1990-1992, relative to 1987-1989, underlies the low aggregate
unemployment ratio in Table 1-2.
A similar pattern appears in Table 1-3 when the changes in reserve
ratio multiples are compared across the four recessions. Relative to the
decreases in state-level multiples during 1990-1992, the decreases dur
ing the preceding three recessions were two to three times larger. The
national ratios decreased by 0.65 during 1969-1973, by 0.98 during
1973-1976, and by 0.62 during 1979-1983, but by only 0.33 during
1989-1992. During the four periods, the number of states in which the
decreases exceeded 0.75 were 21, 34, 16, and just 1, respectively. Both
Tables 1-2 and 1-3 clearly show that 1990-1992 was a much milder
recession than its three immediate predecessors. This must be kept in
mind in explaining why state UI trust fund borrowing was so infre
quent and on such a small scale during the 1990s.

TRUST FUND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE 1990s

Table 1-4 provides additional detail on individual state trust fund
developments during the 1990s, giving the net reserves and RRMs at
the end of 1989, 1992, and 1996. Trust fund levels and changes for
these years span the most recent episodes of recession and recovery.
To characterize the changes in state-level unemployment, the average
unemployment rates for 1990-1992 and 1987-1989 are shown as a

Table 1-2 Average State Unemployment Rate Ratios during Recent Recessions8
Ratio of three-year rates (number of states)
Below
0.75

0.75 to
0.999

1.00 to
1.249

1.25 to
1.499

1.50 to
1.749

1.75 to
1.999

2.00 and
above

State
median
ratio

Mean
U.S.
ratio

1971-1973 over
1967-1969

0

2

12

15

12

3

7

1.45

1.51

1974-1976 over
1971-1973

0

6

13

21

8

3

0

1.33

1.33

1981-1983 over
1977-1979

0

2

13

12

12

11

1

1.52

1.42

1990-1992 over
1987-1989

2

17

16

8

3

2

3

1.11

1.16

Ratio periods

SOURCE: Calculations performed at the Urban Institute using data from the U.S. Department of Labor. State unemployment rate esti
mates for several smaller states before 1976 were made at the Urban Institute.
a Calculations are shown for the 50 states plus the District of Columbia.

Table 1-3 Changes in Reserve Ratio Multiples during Recent Recessions3
Change in RRM (number of states)
Increase

0.00 to
-0.249

-0.25 to
-0.499

1969 to 1973

1

4

12

1973 to 1976

1

4

2

1979 to 1983

11

5

10

1989 to 1992

13

20

9

Year-end change

-0.75 to
-0.999

-1.00 to
1.499

-1.50
or more

State
median
change

Mean
U.S.
change

13

9

10

2

-0.66

-0.65

10

12

13

9

-0.92

-0.98

9

3

10

3

-0.49

-0.62

8

1

0

0

-0.20

-0.33

-0.50 to
-0.749

SOURCE: Calculations performed at the Urban Institute using data from the U.S. Department of Labor.
a Calculations are shown for the 50 states plus the District of Columbia.

Table 1-4 Net Reserves and Reserve Ratio Multiples by State, December 1989 to December 1996
Reserve Ratio Multiples
Net Reserves, Dec. 31 ($mill)
State3

1989

Levels

Changes

Ratio of
unemploy
ment rates,
1990-927
1987-89

Connecticut5

274

1992
-653

Maine0

206

35

112

0.94

0.15

0.42

-0.78

0.27

1.632

Massachusetts5

909

-380

915

0.45

-0.18

0.35

-0.63

0.53

2.236

New Hampshire

204

130

268

0.89

0.55

0.89

-0.34

0.34

2.400

Rhode Island

304

104

116

0.92

0.32

0.31

-0.60

-0.01

2.227

1.63

1.41

1.41

-0.21

-0.00

1.783

0.85

0.60

-0.21

-0.25

1.664

0.04

1.476

Vermont

1996

1989

1992

1996

1989-92

278

0.22

-0.50

0.18

-0.72

0.68

1.947

1992-96

197

181

218

New Jersey

2,795

2,440

2,029

1.06

New Yorkc

3,181

214

470

0.76

0.05

0.09

-0.71

Pennsylvania

1,616

808

2,032

0.55

0.25

0.53

-0.30

0.28

Puerto Rico

564

749

596

1.82

2.05

1.33

0.24

-0.72

1.297
NAd

28

47

42

2.67

3.21

2.45

0.54

-0.76

NA

-0.19

0.16

1.035

Virgin Islands
Illinois

1,268

848

1,639

0.47

0.28

0.44

Indiana

770

1,273

1.04

1.11

1.19

0.07

0.08

1.083

Michigan0

370

942
-72

1,831

0.13

-0.02

0.45

-0.15

0.47

1.116

Ohio

778

602

1,751

0.30

0.21

0.49

-0.09

0.28

1.037

1041

1195

1557

0.96

0.93

0.96

-0.03

0.03

1.007

Iowa

518

615

719

1.20

1.20

1.11

0.00

-0.09

0.943

Kansas

472

606

651

1.35

1.47

1.26

0.12

-0.21

0.943

Minnesota

359

224

513

0.52

0.27

0.48

-0.24

0.21

1.093

0.30

1.028

Wisconsin

Missouri0

372

3

308

0.50

0.00

0.30

-0.50

Nebraska

127

161

195

0.89

0.94

0.87

0.05

-0.07

0.671

North Dakota

45

50

50

0.70

0.65

0.49

-0.05

-0.16

0.909

South Dakota

45

50

50

1.46

1.26

0.92

-0.20

-0.34

0.811

207

258

1.24

1.18

1.10

-0.06

-0.08

1.685

76

219
-19

99

0.40

-0.09

0.41

-0.50

0.50

1.405

Florida

2,041

1,444

1,948

1.29

0.79

0.82

-0.50

0.03

1.345

Georgia

1,018

966

1,634

0.96

0.79

0.99

-0.18

0.20

1.032

598

146

691

0.75

0.17

0.67

-0.58

0.50

1.387

North Carolina

1,471

1,387

1,336

1.26

1.03

0.75

-0.23

-0.28

1.362

South Carolina

415

433

603

0.66

0.60

0.65

-0.06

0.05

1.154

Virginia

718

507

897

1.17

0.74

1.03

-0.43

0.29

1.366

West Virginia

146

141

157

0.41

0.35

0.33

-0.06

-0.02

1.019

Alabama

623

550

483

1.21

0.90

0.64

-0.31

-0.26

0.965

Kentucky

393

364

501

0.69

0.54

0.58

-0.15

0.04

0.877

Mississippi

388

345

553

1.67

1.26

1.55

-0.42

0.29

Delaware
Dist. of Columbia0

Maryland

0.916
(continued)

Table 1-4 (continued)
Reserve Ratio Multiples
Net Reserves, Dec. 31 ($mill)
State3
Tennessee

Changes

Levels

1989

1992

1996

1989

1992

1996

1989-92

657

603

827

0.90

0.69

0.72

-0.21

1992-96
0.03

Ratio of
unemploy
ment rates,
1990-927
1987-89
1.041

Arkansas

131

81

203

0.40

0.20

0.40

-0.20

0.20

0.934

Louisiana

306

601

1131

0.43

0.72

1.09

0.29

0.37

0.693

Oklahoma

323

419

564

1.34

1.53

1.71

0.19

0.18

0.910

Texas

989

586

642

0.73

0.36

0.30

-0.37

-0.06

0.902
1.037

Arizona

493

372

627

0.84

0.55

0.63

-0.29

0.08

Colorado

239

339

511

0.75

0.87

0.94

0.12

0.07

0.796

Idaho

220

240

266

1.37

1.16

0.94

-0.21

-0.22

0.967

Montana

80

96

126

0.63

0.62

0.67

-0.01

0.05

0.970
1.047

Nevada

321

234

348

1.12

0.65

0.64

-0.47

-0.01

New Mexico

174

239

386

1.48

1.69

2.06

0.21

0.37

0.857

Utah

239

342

524

1.25

1.40

1.46

0.15

0.06

0.885

54

110

147

0.71

1.23

1.39

0.52

0.16

0.756

180

232

194

0.93

1.06

0.78

0.12

-0.28

1.005

2,787

2,877

0.92

0.38

-0.48

-0.05

1.380

Wyoming
Alaska
California

5,419

0.43

Hawaii

340

362

211

1.75

1.68

0.95

-0.07

-0.73

1.058

Oregon

804

1055

941

1.35

1.47

0.94

0.12

-0.53

1.070

1,364

1,766

1,333

1.07

1.09

0.66

0.02

-0.43

0.937

0.64

-0.33

0.10

1.156

Washington
U.S.Total

36,871

25,847

38,632

0.87

SOURCE: Data are from the UI Service of the U.S. Department of Labor.
a Alphabetically within Census division.
b States needing large U.S. Treasury loans during 1990-1995.
c States needing small U.S. Treasury loans during 1990-1995.
d NA = data not available.
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ratio. States are arrayed by census division and then alphabetically
within each of the nine census divisions. Table 1-4 also identifies the
seven states needing UI trust fund loans during 1991-1995.
Four aspects of these data are noteworthy. First, state-level
changes in unemployment varied widely during the 1990-1992 down
turn. While the national average unemployment rate ratio was 1.156,
the state-level ratios ranged from 2.400 (New Hampshire) to 0.671
(Nebraska). Second, the highest unemployment rate ratios were found
in states on the Atlantic coast and in California. The New England and
Mid Atlantic states had especially large increases in their unemploy
ment rates; arranging the states geographically helps to emphasize this
point. Third, the decreases in reserves and reserve ratio multiples were
disproportionately large in the states with the largest increases in
unemployment. Of the nine states where multiples decreased by 0.50
or more between 1989 and 1992, eight had unemployment rate ratios
of 1.345 or higher. 10 Fourth, RRMs decreased in 22 states between the
end of 1992 and 1996, a period when trust fund building would have
been expected. If we take the RRM as a gauge of trust fund adequacy,
the position of those 22 states deteriorated.
The slow pace of reserve accumulation during 1993-1996 is note
worthy and deserves emphasis. One way is to highlight developments
in the 10 largest states, which accounted for 52 percent of taxable cov
ered employment and 56 percent of covered payrolls in 1996." Five of
the 10 had smaller reserve balances at the end of 1996 than at the end
of 1989, and eight had smaller reserve ratio multiples. 12 Weighted by
1996 payrolls, the average RRM for the 10 dropped from 0.72 at the
end of 1989 to 0.32 at the end of 1992 and then recovered to 0.41 at the
end of 1996. Compared with the national average RRM, their average
was 0.15 lower in 1989 (0.72 compared to 0.87) and 0.23 lower in
1996 (0.41 compared to 0.64). In 1996, only three of the 10 largest
states had multiples that exceeded 0.50, while four had multiples below
0.40. 13 These states were much more vulnerable to the risk of reces
sion-related financing problems at the start of 1997 than they had been
in 1990.
A second way to highlight the slow pace of reserve accumulation
during 1992-1996 is to ask the following question: How long would it
take to restore reserves to their 1989 level? Between 1992 and 1996,
the national reserve ratio multiple increased by only 0.10 (from 0.54 to
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0.64), or by an average of 0.025 per year. At that pace of accumula
tion, more than eight years would be required to achieve a national
multiple of 0.87 (the 1989 RRM). This would imply an economic
recovery lasting more than 12 years, or longer than any expansion
since the establishment of UI in the mid 1930s.
Given the strong pace of economic expansion during 1993-1996, a
substantial accumulation of reserves would have been anticipated.
Annual benefit payouts during 1993-1996 averaged $3.8 billion less
than during 1991-1992. Also, aggregate tax receipts increased sub
stantially; the three-year average for 1994-1996 of $21.8 billion was
42 percent higher than the 1989-1991 average of $15.4 billion. 14
What distinguishes the UI tax increases during the most recent
period of recovery is their comparatively modest size. The analogous
increases following the downturns of 1974-1975 and 1980-1982
exceeded 100 percent and 60 percent, respectively. Based on earlier
recessions, higher UI taxes would have been expected during 19941996.
While a detailed analysis of recent changes in UI tax laws lies
beyond the scope of this book, there have been UI tax reductions which
clearly slowed the pace of trust fund accumulations during 1993-1996.
Kansas and North Carolina were especially aggressive in lowering UI
taxes, but tax reductions have been widespread during the 1990s.
The slow pace of trust fund accumulations during 1993-1996 has
obvious implications for state UI solvency. In particular, it implies
that at the start of 1997, states were more vulnerable to the threat of
financing problems than they were seven years earlier, i.e., before the
onset of the 1990-1992 recession.
To examine risks of insolvency, a series of simulations was under
taken (details are provided in Appendix A). The simulations used the
relationship between decreases in state reserve ratio multiples and
increases in average unemployment rates that prevailed during the
1990-1992 recession. Historic patterns of increased state unemploy
ment rates were then fed into this relationship to provide projections of
trust fund drawdowns for recessions of differing severity.
Two conclusions emerged from the simulation analysis.
1. The absence of widespread financing problems during 19901992 is attributable to both the mild nature of the recession and
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to the comparatively large initial trust state fund balances. The
states may not be as lucky in the next recession, for unemploy
ment may be of greater magnitude.
2. More states needed loans when they entered recessions with
their 1996 year-end reserve balances than when they entered
with their 1989 reserve balances.
Based on 1993-1996 rates of trust fund accumulation, several states
will start the next recession with smaller balances than at the end of
1989. Other things being equal, the smaller balances caused by the
slow pace of accumulations during 1993-1996 will cause increased
borrowing during the next recession.
In conclusion, it is almost certain that states will enter the next
recession with lower trust fund reserves (reserves as a percentage of
payroll) than they had before the recession that began in December
1989. To the extent that tax increases and benefit reductions would
occur rapidly and in large amounts in a future recession, flexible
financing would lessen the need to maintain large reserves before a
recession. Chapter 2 examines flexible financing.

Notes
1. The most common arrangement bases weekly benefits on earnings during the
highest quarter of the base period, but the weekly benefit is limited to a range
defined by a minimum and maximum. A recipient©s total potential entitlement
typically reflects his or her earnings during the entire one-year base period, for
example, one-third of base-period earnings. The potential duration is then the
ratio of the potential entitlement to the weekly benefit. The details of monetary
eligibility provisions vary widely from state to state.
2. Of the 20 programs in which the taxable wage base exceeded $10,000 in 1996, 18
had indexed tax bases. The other two were Connecticut and Massachusetts.
3. For a recent analysis of experience-rating, particularly on its effects on employerinitiated worker turnover and inter-industry cross subsidies, see Vroman (1996).
4. See Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (1995), Chapters 2 and 5
and Appendix E.
5. These are recommendations 2 through 6 in Chapter 2 of the ACUC report. Sev
eral of the ACUC recommendations on financial incentives that would encourage
states to build large trust fund reserves can be found in Vroman (1990).
6. See, for example, the testimony of Ward (1987), director of the Illinois Depart
ment of Employment Security, before the Committee on Ways and Means of the
U.S. House of Representatives in December 1987. Her testimony stresses both
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11.
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13.
14.
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the automatic financing features in Illinois© 1987 UI law and the need for each
state to determine the level of reserves appropriate to its circumstances.
See Miller, Pavosevich, and Vroman (1997), Table 9.3, for a summary of annual
debt repayment patterns from 1972 to 1994.
Legislation of the early 1980s in the states with largest debts almost always
included both benefit reductions and tax increases. See Vroman (1986), Chapter 2.
The CPS estimates for small states are incomplete before 1976. Estimates made
at the Urban Institute have been used where CPS data were not available.
Missouri, the ninth state, had a ratio of only 1.028. The simple correlation between
the unemployment rate ratios of Table 1-4 and the 1989-1992 change in state
reserve ratio multiples was -0.627. The correlation was much higher (-0.907)
when states were weighted by the size of their labor forces.
The 10, ranked in descending order according to 1996 payrolls, are California,
New York, Texas, Illinois, Florida, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey,
and Massachusetts.
Note in Table 1-4 that only Ohio and Michigan had higher reserve ratio multiples
at the end of 1996 than at the end of 1989.
Note California, New York, Texas, and Massachusetts in Table 1-4.
Annual data on aggregate UI benefits and employer taxes from 1938 through 1996
appear in columns (10) and (8), respectively, of U.S. Department of Labor ET
Handbook 394 (1995) and in later updates to that handbook.

2 Flexible Financing
Because benefit payouts can change sharply from one year to the
next, UI programs must be prepared to finance potentially large draw
downs of reserves. Annual benefit payouts can more than double from
one year to the next, and high payouts can persist for several years.
Individual states have adopted different strategies for addressing these
uncertainties. Chapter 1 drew a major distinction between advance (or
forward) funding and pay-as-you-go funding. To the extent that payas-you-go implies a smaller fund balance prior to recessions, it also
implies a higher risk of borrowing during recessions and a greater need
for a strong revenue response to offset the effects of recession-related
increases in benefit payouts.
This chapter examines flexible financing. Its main concern is with
how the UI tax system responds to trust fund drawdowns; it does not
attempt to define all aspects of flexible financing. There are three pos
sible parts to a flexible financing strategy. First, and most important, is
the response of UI taxes to trust fund drawdowns. This includes both
the response caused by experience-rating and that caused by solvency
taxes that are automatically triggered when the state©s trust fund falls
below a designated threshold. The tax response can include the auto
matic triggering of employee taxes and/or changes in the taxable wage
base; it can also include changes in employer taxes. Second, when the
trust fund is depleted, the state might restrict benefit payouts, e.g.,
freeze the maximum weekly benefit. Third, motivated by the trust fund
drawdown, a state might respond with legislation that includes both tax
increases and benefit reductions. While the magnitude of a legislative
response could be measured after the fact, it cannot be forecast and
receives only limited attention in this chapter. All three responses act
to reduce the size of the trust fund drawdown during a recession.
Flexible financing is a broader concept than tax responsiveness.
However, most of this chapter©s analysis focuses on tax responsiveness
within its cyclical context. Tax-base indexation, a related topic, is
studied in Chapter 3. The cyclical responsiveness of UI taxes includes
both the speed and the magnitude of the response. Each receives atten
tion in this chapter.
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Ultimately, how UI taxes respond to a trust fund drawdown
depends on the state©s taxation capacity. This capacity, in turn,
depends on the taxable share of covered wages (the taxable wage pro
portion, TWP) and the maximum effective tax rate for the maximum
experience-rated tax rate schedule plus the state©s solvency taxes. That
product, UI taxes as a percentage of covered wages, is the maximum
annual rate of inflow that can occur under the given tax statutes. For
more than a decade, tax capacity has been decreasing in several states
as a direct consequence of state-level downtrends in the TWP, trends
that reflect slow adjustments of the tax base over time. In several large
states, the tax base has remained at $7,000 per worker since 1983 and
tax capacity has been on a downward trend since 1985. This chapter
also examines tax capacity.
Since the early 1980s, when the cost of borrowing from the U.S.
Treasury increased, states have assumed a larger role in ensuring trust
fund solvency. Having adequate taxation capacity is important for
ensuring solvency. This chapter traces changes in state-level UI taxes
and draws inferences about the evolution of UI taxation during this
time of increased state responsibility.
This chapter is divided into four sections: 1) experience-rated
taxes, 2) solvency taxes and other solvency measures, 3) the literature
on tax responsiveness, and 4) a summary of the findings and policy
implications. The analysis in the first two sections focuses heavily on
the statutes and on how these have changed over the past 30 years. The
analysis is useful for documenting what changes have occurred, but it
does not assess their importance. The general conclusion from the
empirical studies is that the quantitative importance of flexible financ
ing is rather small. During a serious downturn, flexible financing
would not be strong enough to prevent a need for large-scale borrowing
to pay UI benefits.

EXPERIENCE-RATING STATUTES

Experience-rating is often quite complicated, and mastering all its
nuances requires extensive study. This section focuses on a few key
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elements of state-level experience-rating, elements that can be traced in
readily available publications. 1
The four experience-rating features selected for emphasis here are
not exhaustive, but all are important in answering questions about flex
ible financing and tax responsiveness. 2 The four are 1) the computa
tion lag, 2) the range of tax rates in state tax rate schedules, 3) the
maximum tax rate schedule, and 4) tax capacity. If state systems were
evolving towards increased tax responsiveness, one would expect to
observe certain patterns of change.
The Computation Lag
To set tax rates for the coming tax year, a UI program examines the
overall status of a state©s trust fund and also uses the experience indica
tors for all rateable employers (those with enough years in operation to
qualify for experience-rating). The level of the trust fund determines
the tax schedule to be used. The date for making this determination is
called the "computation date." For nearly all states, the computation
date is either June 30th or July 1st. New rates typically become effec
tive on January 1st of the next year, but a few states change tax sched
ules on July 1st rather than January 1st.
Employers accrue UI tax obligations on a quarterly basis, and tax
payments are due one month after the end of each quarter. Except in
Massachusetts, payments for the first quarter are due on April 30th. 3
Employers must, therefore, be notified by the end of the first quarter if
they are to withhold the appropriate amount from their first-quarter
covered payrolls.
If June 30th is the computation date and January 1st is the new tax
date, 10 months elapse between the date that the tax schedule is set
(June 30th) and the date that the first payments for the next year are
received (April 30th). A recession could begin or could become con
siderably worse during those 10 months, leading to a reduced trust
fund balance and making the slated tax schedule and individual
employer experience-ratings less appropriate than on the preceding
June 30th. Ten additional months of benefit charging would occur,
including the first four months of the new year, months in which sea
sonal benefits are highest.
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States are aware of this situation. One possible response would be
to move the computation date back six months, to December 31st.
That would shorten the lag from 10 to 4 months and would still leave a
state the time to determine the necessary tax rates. Increased state
interest in flexible financing would, therefore, be expected to shorten
the computation lag.
Table 2-1 summarizes computation lags from 1966 to 1996. It
includes data for 1975 and 1986 (just before the period of large-scale
debt and borrowing of the mid 1970s and after most of the borrowing
of the early 1980s). The lags shown in Table 2-1 do not reflect the
four-month lag between the start of quarterly accruals and actual quar
terly tax payments. Thus, a June 30th computation date, coupled with
a January 1st effective date for the new tax schedule, appears in Table
2-1 as a six-month lag.
Table 2-1 shows remarkable stability in the distribution of compu
tation lags. For every year, almost all programs had lags of zero, three,
or six months, with about two-thirds of the states having a six-month
lag. Interestingly, there were more states with a zero lag in 1966 (10
states) than in 1996 (6 states). There is no evidence that any state has
shortened its computation lag. On the contrary, note that the average
lag was slightly longer in 1996 than it was in 1986, 1975, or 1966.
New schedules usually become effective on January 1st. Fortythree programs out of 51 used January 1st in 1966, while 48 of 53 used
January 1st in 1996. Two fewer states used July 1st as the start date for
the new tax year in 1996 than did in to 1966. Nothing in the data sug
gests that states have acted to reduce the lag between the computation
date and the date when new tax schedules take effect.
The Structure of Tax Rates: Minimums, Maximums, and Ranges
States can more effectively assign benefit charges to individual
employers when operative tax rates span a wider range of potential
rates. Having a wider range of rates within individual tax schedules
also adds to tax responsiveness, for it is then easier to raise employer
rates in response to less favorable individual experience indicators.4 A
wider range of rates moves a state©s tax system towards increased tax
responsiveness.5

Table 2-1 Computation Lags and New Tax Schedule Dates, 1966 to 1996a
Length of computation lag
(number of UI programs)

Date new tax schedules
take effect

Year

0 months

3 months

6 months

Other

Total
programs

Average
lag
(months)

1966

10

7

33

1

51

4.4

43

1

7

51

1975

8

7

35

1

51

4.6

44

1

6

51

Jan. 1

April 1

July 1

Total
programs

1986

8

7

33

4

52

4.5

47

0

5

52

1996

6

7

37

3

53

4.8

49

0

4

53

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, 1966 and 1975; National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation and Workers© Compensa
tion, 1986 and 1996.
a The counts show the number of UI programs with the indicated features in each year. Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands are not
included in 1966 and 1975. Puerto Rico is not included in 1986.
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Because state UI programs operate within a federal-state statutory
framework, several aspects of UI taxes levied by the states must con
form with federal requirements. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsi
bility Act of 1983, or TEFRA (Public Law 97-248), contained several
provisions for financing UI. What is most important for the discussion
here is that the maximum PUT credit offset was increased from 2.7 per
cent to 5.4 percent effective January 1, 1985. Thus, from that date, to
have a federally approved experience-rating system, a state UI program
had to have a maximum experience-rated tax rate of at least 5.4 percent.
To put the effects of TEFRA into perspective, Tables 2-2, 2-3, and
2-4 give tax rate information for 1966 to 1996, showing the distribu
tions of minimum tax rates, maximum tax rates, and the range of rates
on January 1st. The data in these tables reflect the actual tax rate
schedules in effect in the indicated years. Three-year intervals are
shown for 1966 to 1978 and two-year intervals thereafter. Because of
the change mandated by TEFRA, tax rates are given for 1984, 1985,
and 1986.
As background to the discussion, keep in mind that UI trust funds
had major drawdowns during 1975-1977 and again during 1980-1983.
Net reserves also decreased during 1990-1992 but by much smaller
relative amounts. The years 1962-1969 and 1984-1989 saw large
increases in trust fund balances. 6
The tax rate distribution remained stable between 1966 and 1972.
The average minimum tax rate was 0.4 to 0.6 percent, while the aver
age maximum rate was 3.5 to 3.6 percent, and the average range of
rates was about 3.0 percent. About three-quarters of the programs had
a range of tax rates between 2.1 and 4.0 percent.
From 1972 to 1984, the distribution of minimum rates, maximum
rates, and ranges increased markedly; by 1984, the respective national
averages were 1.3 percent, 6.1 percent, and 4.8 percent. These
increases reflect responses to the financing problems of the mid 1970s
and early 1980s.
The effects of TEFRA on maximum tax rates are obvious in Table
2-3. Twenty states had a maximum rate below 5.4 percent in 1984. In
1985, no state had a maximum rate below 5.4 percent, and the average
maximum rate increased from 6.1 percent to 7.0 percent. Further, the
average range of tax rates went from 4.8 percent to 6.0 percent (Table
2-4).

Table 2-2 Distribution of Minimum UI Tax Rates, 1966 to 1996 (number of states)3
2.1 to
1.6 to
1.1 to
0.7 to
0.3 to
0.1 to
2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
0.6%
0.2%
0
Year
0
2
8
8
11
12
9
1966
0
1
3
7
13
15
12
1969
1
3
5
7
10
18
6
1972
2
2
8
8
8
11
7
1975
3
2
10
4
11
9
3
1978
2
6
7
8
9
10
5
1980
4
3
7
10
9
12
2
1982
7
6
7
10
9
7
1
1984
5
6
6
10
8
10
4
1985
5
7
7
7
12
11
3
1986
2
6
7
7
14
12
4
1988
0
4
4
5
17
18
4
1990
3
2
4
6
15
15
6
1992
5
3
3
7
15
13
7
1994
3
3
4
5
16
13
8
1996

2.6%
and above
2
1
2
6
11
6
6
6
4
1
1
1
2
0
1

State
average (%)
0.6
0.4
0.6
0.9
1.2
1.0
1.1
1.3
1.0
0.9
0.8
0.6
0.7
0.6
0.6

SOURCE: Data from 1966 to 1984 are taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance
Laws, various issues. Data from 1986 to 1996 are taken from National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation and Workers©
Compensation, Highlights of State Unemployment Compensation Laws, various issues.
a State averages are the unweighted averages for 52 or 53 programs, i.e., they include the Virgin Islands from 1978 onward.

Table 2-3 Distribution of Maximum UI Tax Rates, 1966 to 1996 (number of states)3
7.5 to
5.5 to
4.1 to
2.8 to
6.5 to
9.0%
7.4%
6.4%
5.4%
4.0%
Year
5.3%
2.7%
0
10
0
1966
1
0
23
18
1
0
1
27
15
1969
0
8
0
1972
1
0
13
27
11
0
2
0
1975
1
0
16
25
8
2
1
1978
2
6
16
21
5
2
4
12
1
13
2
19
1980
8
2
0
5
1982
6
15
16
8
9
13
7
0
1984
9
3
13
11
9
15
0
0
1985
0
12
17
8
0
1986
8
0
0
12
18
5
9
0
0
1988
0
22
9
1990
7
9
0
0
0
10
7
21
0
1992
9
0
0
15
7
18
0
1994
8
0
0
11
17
16
0
1996
6
0
0

State
9.1% and
average (%)
above
3.5
0
3.5
0
3.6
0
3.9
0
4.4
0
4.8
0
1
5.2
6.1
4
7.0
5
7.1
8
7.0
9
6.7
6
6.8
6
7.0
5
6.9
3
Insurance
Unemployment
State
of
Provisions
SOURCE: Data from 1966 to 1984 are taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Significant
Laws, various issues. Data from 1986 to 1996 are taken from National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation and Workers©
Compensation, Highlights of State Unemployment Compensation Laws, various issues.
a State averages are the unweighted averages for 52 or 53 programs, i.e., they include the Virgin Islands from 1978 onward.

Table 2-4 Distribution of the Range of UI Tax Rates, 1966 to 1996 (number of states)"
6.1
5.1 to
4.1 to
3.1 to.
2.1 to
0.1 to
8.0%
to
6.0%
5.0%
4.0%
3.0%
2.0%
0
Year
0
2
3
14
26
6
1
1966
0
2
3
16
26
5
0
1969
0
1
4
19
22
5
1
1972
0
1
6
17
17
9
2
1975
3
4
5
17
14
5
5
1978
4
6
11
15
12
2
3
1980
8
5
12
13
7
4
3
1982
15
6
6
15
4
1
4
1984
14
11
11
5
2
0
0
1985
17
12
11
2
2
0
0
1986
14
16
7
4
1
0
0
1988
11
18
10
2
1
0
0
1990
13
16
12
1
1
0
0
1992
11
20
10
0
0
0
0
1994
15
20
10
0
0
0
0
1996

8.1%
and above
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
2
10
9
11
11
10
12
8

State
average (%)
2.9
3.1
3.0
2.9
3.2
3.8
4.1
4.8
6.0
6.2
6.2
6.2
6.1
6.3
6.3

SOURCE: Data from 1966 to 1984 are taken from U.S. Department of Labor, Significant Provisions of State Unemployment Insurance
Laws, various issues. Data from 1986 to 1996 are taken from National Foundation for Unemployment Compensation and Workers©
Compensation, Highlights of State Unemployment Compensation Laws, various issues.
a State averages are the unweighted averages for 52 or 53 programs, i.e., they include the Virgin Islands from 1978 onward.
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Since 1985, the structure of UI tax rates has been very stable. The
average maximum rate has been between 6.7 percent and 7.1 percent in
all subsequent years (Table 2-3). Minimum rates declined somewhat
after 1985, and the range of rates has remained stable. Beginning with
1985, the average range was between 6.0 percent and 6.3 percent.
After TEFRA came into effect, the range of state-level tax rates has
been consistently about twice that for 1966-1972. Compared to 25 or
30 years ago, there is now a much wider range of rates over which
experience-rating can operate. All states had a range of tax rates of at
least 4.1 percent in 1996, and eight had ranges that exceeded 8.0 per
cent. TEFRA has clearly improved the effectiveness with which state
experience-rating systems rate individual employers. This increased
effectiveness in assigning appropriate rates also implies an increased
ability for average tax rates (on taxable payrolls) to respond to trust
fund drawdowns.
Two added points about the tax rate distributions should be noted.
First, there is always a concentration of states at the minimum accept
able maximum tax rate, which has been 5.4 percent since 1985 (Table
2-3). However, only about half of all state maximums have been in the
range of 5.4 to 6.4 percent in recent years. States vary in how they set
maximum rates.7 Second, there was only a modest increase in maxi
mum rates after the 1990-1992 recession. The average maximum
increased from 6.7 percent in 1990 to 7.0 percent in 1994 and then
decreased to 6.9 percent in 1996.
The increases in the maximum tax rates and in the range of tax
rates after 1984 increase the UI financing system©s cyclical responsiveness to trust fund drawdowns. Quite simply, a wider range of higher
tax rates can be imposed as state trust fund balances decline and indi
vidual employer-experience measures deteriorate. This increases the
cyclical variability of the average tax rate on taxable payrolls.
Maximum Tax Rate Schedules and Tax Capacity
The tax rate distributions summarized in Tables 2-2, 2-3, and 2-4
are for the tax schedules used between 1966 and 1996. In many states,
UI tax statutes provide for several tax rate schedules. The schedule for
a given year is based on the statewide trust fund balance on the compu
tation date; successively lower balances trigger successively higher tax
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rate schedules. In other words, the experience-rating mechanism that
sets individual employer tax rates uses both the statewide fund balance
(to select the appropriate tax schedule) and each employer©s experience
(reserve ratio or benefit ratio, depending on the state©s experience-rat
ing system8) to set tax rates for individual employers.
To get an idea of UI taxes that could potentially be collected, one
must examine the top tax rate schedules and their tax rates. Movement
to the top schedule would increase a state©s tax revenues. Taxation at
the top schedule, in conjunction with the taxable wage proportion (the
TWP, or taxable wages as a fraction of total covered wages), shows the
maximum potential revenues that could be collected through a state©s
experience-rating mechanism. Thus, there is interest in the top tax
schedules both to show UI tax responsiveness and to assess tax capac
ity for a state.
A UI program©s ability to raise revenues depends on both experi
ence-rated taxes and solvency taxes. A complete assessment of tax
responsiveness and tax capacity would consider both types of taxes.
The following discussion focuses on experience-rated taxes.
It should also be noted that multiple tax rate schedules, although
contemplated in UI tax statutes, are not always used in practice. Mas
sachusetts, in the 1990s, provides a vivid example. The current set of
eight tax rate schedules was to have come into effect in 1992. For each
of the five years from 1992 to 1996, however, the schedule used was
lower than the one indicated in the tax statute. Massachusetts enacted
special legislation to override the statute. The following analysis
assumes, however, that maximum tax rate schedules actually would be
imposed if fund balances were depleted to the point where the trigger
mechanism called for the top schedule.
Table 2-5 shows the maximum tax rates for the top experience-rat
ing schedules and the factors that determine tax capacity for 1986 and
1996. Tax capacity (potential tax revenue as a percentage of total
wages) reflects both the TWP and the average tax rate when taxes are
levied according to the top schedule. The average rate depends on the
tax rates in the top schedule and on the distribution of employers (and
their taxable wages) across individual rate categories. The average
rates shown in Table 2-5 are simple averages of the minimum and the
maximum for the top tax rate schedule.

Table 2-5 Tax Capacity for the Top Experience-Rated Tax Schedules, 1986 and 1996

State

TWP

Alabama

0.460

Alaska3

0.681

Arizona

0.405

Arkansas

0.477

California

0.353

Colorado

0.415

Connecticut

0.324

Delaware

0.402

District of Columbia

0.351

Florida

0.428

Georgia

0.412

Hawaii3

0.686

Idaho3

0.693

Illinois

0.378

Indiana

0.372

Iowaa

0.582

1986
Max.
Avg.
tax rate tax rate
(%)
(%)

5.4
6.5
5.4
6.0
5.4
5.4
6.4
7.0
5.4
5.4
5.7
5.4
6.8
6.6
5.4
7.0

1996
Max.
Avg.
tax rate tax rate
(%)
(%)

Tax capacity

Tax
capacity

TWP

2.95

1.36

0.352

6.8

3.73

1.31

-0.05

3.75

2.55

0.654

6.5

3.75

2.45

-0.10

^.0

4.15

1.68

0.316

5.4

4.15

1.31

-0.37

-22.0

3.05

1.45

0.426

6.0

3.05

1.30

-0.16

-10.7

3.35

1.18

0.250

5.4

3.35

0.84

-0.35

-29.2

3.05

1.27

0.383

5.4

2.75

1.05

-0.21

-16.8

3.95

1.28

0.305

6.9

4.45

1.36

0.08

6.1

8.0

4.05

1.22

-0.21

-14.9

Tax
capacity

Change

%
change
-3.4

3.55

1.43

0.300

3.10

1.09

0.267

7.4

4.65

1.24

0.15

14.1

2.75

1.18

0.319

5.4

2.75

0.88

-0.30

-25.5

3.21

1.32

0.331

8.1

4.08

1.35

0.03

2.3

0.711

5.4

3.90

2.77

0.03

3.26

-0.10

1.1
-2.9

4.00

2.74

4.85

3.36

0.673

6.8

4.85

3.40

1.29

0.303

6.6

3.40

1.03

-0.26

-19.8

3.35

1.25

0.293

5.7

3.55

1.04

-0.21

-16.5

3.75

2.18

0.531

9.0

4.50

2.39

0.21

9.5

Kansas

0.483

5.4

2.71

1.31

0.416

6.4

3.20

1.33

0.02

1.6

Kentucky

0.443

5.50

2.44

0.349

10.0

5.50

1.92

-0.52

-21.2

Louisiana

0.396

3.15

1.25

0.339

6.0

3.15

1.07

-0.18

-14.4

Maine

0.445

10.0
6.0
6.5
6.0
7.2
9.0
7.5
6.4
7.8
6.4
5.4
5.4
6.5
6.2
5.4
6.4
5.7
5.0
5.4

4.45

1.98

0.330

7.5

4.95

1.63

-0.35

-17.5
4.9

Maryland

0.373

Massachusetts

0.385

Michigan

0.394

Minnesota3

0.471

Mississippi

0.465

Missouri

0.406

Montana2

0.714

Nebraska

0.421

Nevada3

0.590

New Hampshire

0.408

New Jersey3

0.456

New Mexico3

0.549

New York

0..322

North Carolina3

0.515

North Dakota3

0.567

Ohio

0.390

4.40

1.64

0.316

8.9

5.45

1.72

0.08

5.10

1.96

0.358

9.3

6.35

2.27

0.31

15.8

4.50

1.77

0.308

9.0

4.65

1.43

-0.34

-19.2

4.25

2.00

0.477

9.0

4.80

2.29

0.29

14.4
-21.5

1.51

0.365

6.4

3.25

1.19

-0.33

3.90

1.58

0.333

7.8

3.90

1.30

-0.28

4.05

2.89

0.686

6.4

4.05

2.78

-0.11

-18.0
-3.9

2.75

1.16

0.326

5.4

2.75

0.90

-0.26

-22.6

-0.28

-14.7

3.25

3.25

1.92

0.579

5.4

2.83

1.64

4.65

1.90

0.308

6.5

3.28

1.01

-0.89

^6.8

3.70

1.69

0.458

6.9

4.00

1.83

0.14

4.05

2.22

0.541

5.4

4.05

2.19

-0.03

8.6
-1.5
^9.4

4.25

1.37

0.213

5.4

3.25

0.69

-0.68

2.90

1.49

0.455

5.7

2.85

1.30

-0.20

-13.2

2.75

1.56

0.548

5.4

2.95

1.62

0.06

3.7

2.80

1.09

0.334

6.5

3.30

1.10

0.01

0.9

Table 2-5 (continued)
1986

State

TWP

Oklahoma3

0.462

Oregon3

0.629

Pennsylvania

0.402

Puerto Rico

0.588

Rhode Island3

0.554

South Carolina

0.436

South Dakota

0.465

Tennessee

0.414

Texas

0.377

Utah3

0.576

Vermont

0.469

Virginia

0.392

Virgin Islands3

0.778

Washington3

0.532

West Virginia

0.423

Wisconsin

0.500

1996
Max.
Avg.
tax rate tax rate
(%)
(%)

Tax capacity

Max.
tax rate
(%)

Avg.
tax rate
(%)

Tax
capacity

TWP

6.2
5.4
9.2
5.4
8.4
5.4
10.5
10.0
6.0
8.0
8.4
6.2
9.0
5.4
7.5
6.7

3.35

1.55

0.457

9.2

4.75

2.17

0.62

3.80

2.39

0.607

5.4

3.80

2.31

-0.08

40.3
-3.5

0.297

9.2

5.35

1.59

-0.56

-26.1

-0.61

Tax
capacity

Change

%
change

5.35

2.15

4.18

2.45

0.466

5.4

3.95

1.84

5.35

2.96

0.556

8.3

5.20

2.89

-0.07

-25.0
-2.5

3.35

1.46

0.327

5.4

3.32

1.09

-0.37

-25.7

6.00

2.79

0.364

9.5

5.50

2.00

-0.79

-28.2

5.25

2.17

0.306

10.0

5.25

1.61

-0.57

-26.1

3.05

1.15

0.337

6.0

3.00

1.01

-0.14

4.15

2.39

0.575

8.0

4.15

2.39

0.00

-12.1
-0.2

4.85

2.27

0.351

8.4

4.85

1.70

-0.57

-25.2

3.45

1.35

0.315

6.4

3.35

1.06

-0.30

-22.0

4.55

3.54

0.590

9.0

4.55

2.68

-0.86

-24.2

3.94

2.10

0.584

5.4

3.88

2.27

0.17

8.1

4.50

1.90

0.357

7.5

4.50

1.61

-0.30

-15.6

3.35

1.68

0.392

8.9

4.59

1.80

0.12

7.3

Wyoming3

0.508

8.5

4.88

2.48

0.485

8.8

4.55

2.21

-0.27

-10.9

National

0.408

6.4

3.72

1.52

0.342

6.8

3.85

1.32

-0.20

-13.3

Indexed states

0.523

6.3

3.75

1.96

0.519

6.8

3.94

2.05

0.09

4.3

3.82

1.17

-0.27

-18.5

6.5
1.44
6.8
3.72
0.306
0.386
Nonindexed states
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws.
a States with indexed tax bases.
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Other things being equal, experience-rated UI taxes will be poten
tially more responsive to a trust fund drawdown when three elements
are greater. First, the response will be greater when the TWP is greater.
The TWP declined for most state UI programs (48 of 53) between
1986 and 1996 (Table 2-5). Nationwide, the decline was from 0.408 to
0.342, or 16.2 percent. For 28 states, the TWP not only declined, but
its 1996 value was at least 15 percent less than its 1986 value. Note
that the average TWP in 1986 for the 18 states with indexed taxable
wage bases was practically the same as in 1996 (0.523 versus 0.519),9
while the average for the other programs declined from 0.386 to 0.306,
or by 20.7 percent.
A second element influencing the experience-rated tax response is
the maximum tax rate for the top tax schedule. Between 1986 and
1996, the maximum rate increased in 19 UI programs, declined in 3,
and remained unchanged in the remaining 31. The average tax rate for
the top schedule (the simple average of the minimum and the maxi
mum rates) increased in 18 programs, decreased in 14, and remained
unchanged in 21. The average change nationwide was a modest
increase of 0.13 percentage points (from 3.72 percent of taxable wages
in 1986 to 3.85 percent in 1996), or 3.5 percent. The average percent
age change in the top average tax rate was slightly larger for UI pro
grams with indexed tax bases (from 3.75 to 3.94, or 5.2 percent) than
for nonindexed programs (3.72 to 3.82, or 2.9 percent). Overall, the
average tax rate for the top tax schedule changed little.
The third element in tax responsiveness is the trigger that activates
the highest tax rate schedule. If the trigger increases relative to cov
ered wages, the state will move to the highest schedule more quickly
when a recession-related drawdown occurs. States vary in how they
set the trigger (for example, as an absolute level of the trust fund, as a
reserve ratio, or as a reserve ratio multiple). Comparisons of 1986 and
1996 for the 39 programs with triggers expressed as reserve ratio mul
tiples or reserve ratios show higher triggers in 4 programs, lower trig
gers in 11, and no change in the remaining 24. 10 On average, triggers
moved modestly towards a slower response of the top tax schedule.
Given these three elements of experience-rated tax responsiveness,
overall responsiveness was smaller in 1996 than in 1986, mainly
because taxable wages grew more slowly than covered wages during
that period. The decline in the TWP was substantial, over 16 percent
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nationwide, but the average rate for the top tax schedule increased only
slightly, and the average trigger threshold for the top schedule
decreased slightly. Individual states had different combinations of
these changes. Over half the states showed little or no change in the
average rate for the top tax rate schedule or for the trigger for the top
rate. Thus, while tax responsiveness cannot be quantified, the trend
was towards decreased responsiveness, due to the decline in TWP in so
many programs.
Table 2-5 also shows that tax capacity for experience-rated taxes
(defined as the TWP times the average tax rate for the top tax rate
schedule and expressed as a percentage of covered wages) fell between
1986 and 1996 for most UI programs, 11 primarily due to widespread
decreases in the TWP. For nonindexed states, the average TWP
decreased from 0.386 in 1986 to 0.306 in 1996. Nationwide, the aver
age rate for the top tax schedule increased, but only modestly.
The two right-hand columns in Table 2-5 focus on changes in tax
capacity between 1986 and 1996. The average national decline was
13.3 percent (from 1.52 to 1.32, or 0.20 percentage points). Thirty pro
grams had declines of at least 10.0 percent, while only four had
increases of 10.0 percent or more. Between 1986 and 1996, the maxi
mum revenue-generating capacity of the experience-rated portion of
the UI tax system fell by about 13 percent.
Another interesting feature of Table 2-5 is the contrast in levels and
trends in tax capacity for indexed and nonindexed states. There were
18 indexed programs during the decade covered by the table. Indexed
programs had a higher average tax capacity than nonindexed programs
in 1986 (1.96 versus 1.44 percent of total wages) and again in 1996
(2.05 versus 1.17 percent). During 1986-1996, indexed programs
maintained their tax capacity, but tax capacity fell still further in the
nonindexed programs: average tax capacity rose by 4.3 percent in
indexed programs but fell by 18.5 percent in nonindexed ones. (Chap
ter 3 examines indexation in more detail.)
This analysis of the experience-rating statutes in effect from 1966
to 1996 provides four main findings.
1. The lag between the computation date and the date that new
tax rates become effective did not change measurably over the
past 30 years.
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2. During that period, the maximum tax rates and the range of tax
rates actually in effect rose substantially. The rise in each
stems mainly from the TEFRA requirement that the maximum
experience-rated tax rate be at least 5.4 percent as of 1985.
Post-1984 increases improved the ability of UI taxes to
respond to trust fund drawdowns. However, since 1986, the
distribution of both the maximums and the range of rates has
been remarkably stable.
3. The share of total taxable wages fell markedly during the past
decade, which has reduced both tax responsiveness and tax
capacity since 1986.
4. During the past decade, the maximum experience-rated tax
rates, the average tax rate on the top tax schedule, and the top
tax schedule triggers have not changed much on average.
Clearly, while these three elements can limit tax responsiveness, they do not add to it.
Any conclusion about what the four findings mean when taken
together must be tentative, but it is likely that the wider range of rates is
the most important, and the decline in the TWP is next in importance.
The first and fourth points above are likely of minor importance. On
balance, when 1986-1996 is compared to earlier periods, it would
appear that tax responsiveness has increased. However, between 1986
and 1996, tax responsiveness decreased because the range of rates
remained stable while the TWP decreased. Since the TWP did not fall
in indexed programs, the increase in their tax responsiveness around
1985 was not eroded between the 1986 and 1996.
There are three findings on the tax capacity of experience-rated
taxes for 1986-1996.
1.

Average tax capacity fell over the period.

2. That decline was concentrated in states with nonindexed tax
bases.
3. The tax capacity of programs having indexed taxable wage
bases consistently exceeded that of nonindexed programs.
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In 1996, the differential was 0.88 percentage points, or 75 percent
(2.05 percent of covered wages versus 1.17 percent). States with
indexed programs were much more successful in sustaining their abil
ity to generate tax revenues between 1986 and 1996, a decade in which
their economies grew.

SOLVENCY PROVISIONS IN STATE UI LAWS
Several states now have UI statutes with provisions that automati
cally raise taxes and/or reduce benefits whenever the trust fund balance
falls below a certain threshold. These provisions, often called "sol
vency provisions," operate in addition to experience-rating. In reserveratio states, which typically have several tax rate schedules, the sol
vency tax may be a direct extension of the progression of taxes across
the regular tax rate schedules 12 or it may be separate. In benefit-ratio
states, solvency taxes often operate apart from experience-rated taxes.
The origins and evolution of solvency provisions vary. Some
states created ad hoc arrangements, intended as temporary fixes, when
their trust funds were inadequate. Others have made solvency provi
sions permanent features of their UI statutes. At least two states, Illi
nois and Pennsylvania, overhauled their tax and benefit statutes in the
late 1980s. Both intended to reduce the average trust fund balance over
the business cycle and add flexibility. Recession-related drawdowns
were to be countered by automatic tax increases and benefit reductions
as the fund balance fell past certain thresholds. This section does not
examine the motivations of individual states; it simply documents vari
ous solvency features.
There is general acknowledgment that states have increased their
reliance on solvency taxes and on other provisions for flexible financ
ing, especially since 1980. Several events in the early 1980s may have
caused this shift. First, during the back-to-back recessions of 19801983, 31 states borrowed from the federal loan account to pay benefits.
Second, federal loan policy became significantly tighter. Deferrals of
FUTA credit reductions (for loan repayments) were eliminated in
1980, 13 and interest-free loans (except for very short-term loans) were
eliminated in 1982. At the time that borrowing became less attractive
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to states, sentiment grew, strongly voiced by the employer community,
that large trust fund balances might not be desirable. That sentiment
has also motivated states to make their financing systems more respon
sive.
Since 1980, many state legislatures, faced with insolvent UI trust
fund accounts, moved to make their UI tax and/or benefit flows more
responsive during recessions. Four solvency provisions that can make
a UI program more responsive are 1) solvency taxes levied on employ
ers, 2) changes in the taxable wage base, 3) employee taxes, and 4)
benefit freezes and/or reductions. The common element in all four is a
trigger that comes into operation when the trust fund balance falls
below a set threshold (or thresholds). Usually, the trigger is both
clearly defined in the statute and automatic, but its activation requires a
decision in a few states. 14
Solvency taxes on employers are the most frequent solvency provi
sion, and flexible benefit provisions are the second most frequent.
Flexible employee taxes and flexible tax bases are less common. (The
flexible tax base, as the term is used in this chapter, refers to a tax base
that responds to changes in the trust fund balance. Tax-base indexing,
that it, tying the tax base to average wages in the state, is examined in
Chapter 3.)
Table 2-6 shows the states that have solvency taxes, the potential
range of added tax rates, and the actual rates in effect during 1988 and
1996. The table also shows the first year a state had a solvency provi
sion, and, for a few states, the last year a solvency tax was authorized.
Most states with a solvency tax established the tax in the 1980s; of the
36 states listed in Table 2-6, 23 began the tax in the 1980s, 9 in the
1970s, and 3 in the 1990s. States that had a solvency tax before 1980
usually had financing problems during the recessions of the early-tomid 1970s, e.g., five northeastern states and Michigan. 15 Six states
have allowed their solvency tax to lapse.
Solvency taxes on employers were authorized in 31 states in 1988
and in 30 states in 1996. Fourteen states collected revenues from their
solvency taxes in 1988 and 1996. Note that the maximum potential
solvency tax rate exceeded 1.0 percent of taxable wages for 18 pro
grams in 1988 and for 20 programs in 1996. In both years, about half
the states with an active solvency tax levied the tax at a flat rate, while

Table 2-6 Evolution of UI Solvency Taxes

State
Alabama
Alaska
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Georgia
Hawaii
Illinois
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri

First
year
1984
1981
1975
1985
1990
1974
1961
1980
1985
1977
1982
1983
1993
1989
1972
1983
1985
1983

Last
year
1990

1992
1991

1994

Solvency Taxes in 1988
Rates in
Range of
rates (%)
1988 (%)
Present
0.0
0.0-0.7
X
0.4-1.1
0.26-0.83
X
0.4
0.1-0.5
X
0.2-0.81
0.0
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

0.0-1.0
1.1-2.5
0.9
0.0-3.24
-0.5 to 2.4
0.0-0.6
0.0-1.8

0.7
1.1-1.5
0.0
0.0-3.24
0.0
0.4
0.0

X
X
X
X

0.0-2.0
0.0-1.2
1.0
0.0-1.8

0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0

Solvency Taxes in 1996
Rates in
Range of
1996 (%)
Present
rates (%)
X
X
X
X
X
X

0.4-1.1
-0.1 to 0.8
0.2-0.81
0.0-1.1
0.0-1.5
0.7-2.5

0.0
0.4
0.0
0.0
1.5
0.7

X

0.0-2.7

0.0-2.7

X
X
X
X
X
X

0.0-0.6
0.0-1.8
0.4
0.1-2.0
0.0-2.0
0.0-1.35

0.4
0.01-0.21
0.4
0.6
0.0
0.0

X

0.0-1.8

0.0-1.8
(continued)

Table 2-6 (continued)

State
Nebraska
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New York
North Carolina
Ohio
Oklahoma
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Virginia
Virgin Islands
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

First
year
1996
1976
1984
1973
1984
1972
1984
1979
1975
1985?
1984

Last
year

1984
1982
1983
1985
1981
1982
1989

1989

1991

Solvency Taxes in 1988
Range of
Rates in
Present
rates (%)
1988 (%)
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X
X

0.5
0.0-1.6
O.-l.O
0.0-1.14
0.0-2.55
0.0-2.3
0.5
0.2-1.95
0.35-1.05
0.1-1.5
0.0-0.7
0.0-2.0
0.2
0.5-1.0
0.0-3.1
0.-1.7

0.0
0.0
1.0
0.0-1.14
0.9-2.6
0.0
0.5
0.2-1.8
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.63-2.0
0.0
0.0
1.0
0.0-1.7

Solvency Taxes in 1996
Range of
Rates in
Present
rates (%)
1996 (%)
X
0.0-1.08
0.0
X
0.5
0.0
X
0.0-0.69
0.0
0.1-1.7
X
0.7-1.7
X
0.0-1.14
0.0
X
0.0-2.55
0.6-2.0
X
0.0-3.07
0.0
X
-0.01 to 1.61 0.07-0.43
X
0.3
0.0
X
0.35-1.05
0.0
X
0.1-1.5
0.0
X
X
X

0.0-2.0
0.2
0.5-1.0

0.18
0.0
0.0

X
X

0.0-0.9
0.0-1.25

0.0-0.9
0.0

States with solvency
30
31
taxes
States with taxes
14
14
activated
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, National Foundation for Unemployment
Corporation and Workers© Compensation, Highlights of State Unemployment, and Commerce Clearing House summaries of UI laws in
individual states.
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about half used a range of rates. Thus, between 1988 and 1996 there
was no trend in the number of states with solvency taxes.
Many states added solvency taxes as part of more comprehensive
law reforms dealing with insolvency. Those taxes remain in place and
serve to decrease the degree of counter-cyclicality in the UI system.
For instance, after having severe solvency problems in the early 1980s,
Minnesota raised the trigger for its highest tax-schedule in 1988 from
$80 million to $200 million, in effect activating the top schedule earlier
in the face of a trust fund drawdown. Minnesota also added a solvency
tax that can change quarterly, adding 10 percent to scheduled tax rates
when the trust fund falls below $150 million and 15 percent (up to 1.35
percentage points for employers at the maximum tax rate) when the
fund falls below $75 million. In short, when Minnesota©s trust fund
balance falls below $75 million, there is a 15 percent add-on to experi
ence-rated tax rates.
Other solvency features are summarized in Table 2-7. Variable
employee taxes and flexible tax bases are not common. Only three
states (Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) had a variable employee
tax in 1996 16 and three (the District of Columbia, Louisiana, and Mis
souri) had trust-fund-activated flexible tax bases. Several others used
one of these features in earlier years but have allowed it to lapse.
Flexible benefits are more common. Fourteen states enacted some
form of flexible benefits between 1983 and 1996, and 11 were still
using them in 1996. All states but Delaware target high-wage claim
ants. Typically, the maximum weekly benefit amount (the WBA) can
be frozen or even reduced if the trust fund drops below a given level or
levels. Twelve of the 14 states freeze or reduce benefits. Two vary the
wage replacement rate (benefits as a proportion of lost wages), but
Pennsylvania does not reduce benefits for low-wage claimants. Minne
sota raises the replacement rate when its trust fund is depleted.
In 11 of the 14 states, the benefit trigger is either the absolute level
of the state©s trust fund or its trust fund balance measured as a ratio to
covered wages (in Pennsylvania, as a ratio to benefit payouts). Other
elements of the triggers are almost always related to financing vari
ables, for example, employer tax rates (four states) or outstanding Title
XII loans (Vermont). The trigger for three states has more than one
indicator, with the Illinois trigger having three separate elements. 17

Table 2-7 UI Flexible Financing Features Other Than Solvency Taxes on Employers

First
year

Last
year

Reduce
replacementrate

Freeze
max.
WBA

Flexible employee tax or
flexible tax base

Flex, benefit
trigger

Flexible benefit features
Reduce
max.
WBA

Reserve
or reserve All
ratio other

First
year

Last Employee
year
tax

Alabama

1938

1990

Alaska

1955

State

Delaware

1988
1989

1991

X

1991

1994

1996

X

1988

1991

X

1984

1986

X

X

Hawaii
Illinois

X
X

XXX

District of Columbia
Georgia

Tax
base

X

XX

Iowa
Kentucky

1987

Louisiana

1996

X

Maine

1992

XX

Minnesota

1983

X

XX
X

1996

X

Missouri

1985

X

Montana

1975

1977

New Jersey

1938

Note b

xa

X

x
X
X
(continued)

Table 2-7 (continued)
Flex, benefit
trigger

Flexible, benefit features
First
year

Last
year

North Carolina

1984

1987

North Dakota

1991

State

Reduce
replacement rate

Freeze
max.
WBA

Reduce
max.
WBA

Reserve
or reserve All
ratio other

X

X

X

X

1984

Pennsylvania

1990

Vermont

1987

Washington

1985

X
X

X

Active in 1996

1992

1995

1990

1988
2

Tax
base

X
X

X

X

1984

Employee
tax

X

West Virginia
Wyoming

Last
year

X

X
1993

First
year

X

Ohio
Oklahoma

Flexible employee tax or
flexible tax base

X

X

X

7

5

7

6

1991

X
3

3

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor, Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws, National Foundation for Unemployment
Corporation and Workers© Compensation, Highlights of State Unemployment, and Commerce Clearing House summaries of UI laws in
individual states.
a Replacement rate is increased when trust fund balance falls below a set threshold.
b Employee tax diverted to Health Care Subsidy Fund from April 1996 through December 1997.
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Although flexible benefits were authorized in 11 states in 1996,
only one state (Maine) actually paid reduced benefits; trust fund bal
ances exceeded trigger thresholds in the other 10. The fact that 14
states had an active solvency tax in 1996 indicates that benefit reduc
tion features have lower thresholds than solvency taxes.
Forty-two UI programs have used at least one of the four solvency
provisions shown in Tables 2-6 and 2-7. During 1996, 16 states had at
least one active solvency provision, and 14 levied solvency taxes on
employers.
According to such standard macroeconomic indicators as the over
all unemployment rate, the economy was operating at or close to full
employment in 1996: the unemployment rate for persons aged 16 and
older was 5.4 percent of the labor force. If solvency taxes were acti
vated in a year of full employment, how much added revenue would be
generated from such taxes if the unemployment rate were much higher
and trust funds were lower? One might have expected that four full
years after 1992 the year of highest unemployment during the last
recession very few states would still be relying on solvency taxes.
Presumably such taxes would be active only when funds were depleted
by recession-related drawdowns. Since the recession of the early
1990s was mild in most areas of the country, the term "solvency tax"
seems something of a misnomer.
In fact, many states have used solvency taxes more as a supplement
to experience-rated taxes than as separate tax that is activated only in
the event of a recession. Between 1988 and 1996, the number of UI
programs that had solvency taxes varied from 29 to 32. Perhaps even
more revealing is that the number of states with active solvency taxes
ranged from a low of 10 in 1990 and 1991 to a high of 15 in 1994. On
average, 11 UI programs had active solvency taxes from 1989 through
1992. During 1993-1996, after recession-related trust fund draw
downs, an average of 14 programs had active solvency taxes. These
findings suggest that solvency taxes were only of modest importance
during the last recession.
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This section summarizes three empirical analyses of flexible
financing. The first is a three-part study on tax responsiveness, using
data going back to 1950 and covering 51 UI programs (Miller,
Pavosevich, and Vroman 1997). The second is a simulation analysis of
solvency taxes in six states. It uses simulation models that depict
important aspects of the labor market, UI benefits, taxes, interest
income, and trust fund balances in each state (Vroman 1990). The
third is a model-based simulation of the UI financing system in Penn
sylvania, following that state©s adoption of flexible financing in 1988
(Worden and Vroman 199la). All three studies use annual data.
Empirical Measures of Tax Responsiveness
The first analysis, of tax responsiveness, used data from 1950 to
1994 is TO gauge the response of contributions to increased benefit out
flows, we used one-, two-, and three-year responsiveness measures.
Second, we looked at tax responsiveness in 1970 and 1990 for a subset
of states that had recessions in both years. Third, we fitted regressions
to estimate possible changes in tax responsiveness.
Since many states have added flexible financing in recent years,
this analysis tested whether tax responsiveness increased measurably,
particularly after the loan policy changes of the early 1980s. An
important limitation is that the economy has had only one, fairly mild,
recession since 1980-1983. There simply is not enough of a record
from which to draw inferences.
Measures of tax responsiveness were based on annual data from
1950 through 1994. Recessions were identified on a state-by-state
basis, rather than nationally, to capture differences in the timing of
business cycles across states and differences in local economic down
turns. Recessions were defined as periods when the increase in the
benefit-cost rate (benefits as a percentage of total wages) from the base
year to the trough year was at least 35 percent. The beginning year of
the recession was identified as the first year in which benefits rose by
20 percent or more over the previous year (which then became the base
year). To avoid overlapping response measures, recessions that began
within three years of the previous recession were eliminated. The
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number of periods meeting all criteria totaled 303, or about 6 per state.
Forty-seven occurred after 1982.
One-year, two-year, and three-year tax responses were then con
structed for each recession. The one-year response is the ratio of the
change in taxes divided by the change in benefits, with a lag of one
year. The two-year response divided the sum of two years of tax
changes by two-year benefit changes, again with a one-year lag
between the first year of increased benefits and the first year of tax
changes. The three-year response was similarly measured. 19
Measuring tax responsiveness accurately presents some prob
lems. First, benefit-cost rates frequently fluctuate, even when there is
no recession; thus, tax rates are never fully in equilibrium. Second, the
year-to-year pattern of benefit increases, (for example, slow buildup
versus steep increase) has an effect on the measured response, except
for the one-year measure. For example, for a given cumulative
increase in benefits, the three-year measure would be higher for a
recession in which the first year had the greatest increase than for one
in which the increases started modestly and then gradually became
greater. Third, the use of annual data obscures the precise timing of
benefit increases.
Note that tax responses incorporate three elements experience
rating, solvency taxes, and legislative responses and all affect tax rev
enues. Solvency taxes and legislative responses are likely to be pro
portionately more important for the two-year measure and especially
important for the three-year measure.
When the individual state measures were examined, they revealed
a wide range of values, including many outside the expected range of
0.0 to 1.0. In particular, there were many negative responses. It was
assumed that extreme values are due to measurement problems, and
extreme values were eliminated before any analysis took place. A
recession was included only if all three measures fell within the range
of acceptable values (including some negative values for the one-year
and two-year measures). This restriction reduced the number of reces
sions to 236, with 33 occurring after 1982.
The first analysis examined the simple averages of tax responsiveness measures across states for 1952-1968, 1969-1981, and 19821991 (Table 2-8). There were no controls for state size or for other fac
tors.
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Table 2-8 Averages of Tax Responsiveness Measures
Beginning
year

Number of
downturns

R2,

Rl,
One-year
response

Two-year
response

R3,
Three-year
response

1952-68

88

0.11

0.31

0.43

1969-81

115

0.14

0.36

0.54

1982-91

33

0.15

0.34

0.62

Four observations can be made about these averages. First, the
period from 1952-1968 had the lowest average responsiveness for all
three measures. Second, the 1982-1991 period had a clear edge over
the 1969-1981 period only for the three-year measure and even fell
slightly below it for the two-year measure. Third, the differences in
responsiveness were the clearest between the first two periods, which
suggests that most of the increase in responsiveness occurred during
the 1970s and not the 1980s. Finally, the biggest gains in responsiveness were in the three-year measure.
The second analysis of tax responsiveness measures compared the
1990 recession to the 1970 recession. The 1970 recession predated
the widespread financing problems experienced by the states in the
mid 1970s and early-to-mid 1980s. A key difference between the
1970 and 1990 recessions was that aggregate reserves, as a percentage
of total payroll, were almost twice as large in 1969 than in 1989 (see
Table 1-1).
Twenty-three states met the criteria in both periods, and respon
siveness measures for the two recessions were compared for each state.
Among the states for which all three response measures were higher in
one period than in the other, nine states were more responsive in 1970
than in 1990, and seven states were more responsive in 1990 than in
1970.
An important point to note is that the two recessions were signifi
cantly different in magnitude for many states, which may affect the
comparisons (see Tables 1-2 and 1-3). Of the 12 states where there
was both a clear difference in the severity of the two recessions and a
clear difference in responsiveness, the financing systems in eight were
more responsive in the milder of the two recessions.
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The third analysis fitted a set of pooled regressions to control for
factors that might affect measured responsiveness. All three responsiveness measures (Rl, R2, and R3) were used as dependent variables.
The explanatory variables included the reserve ratio at the beginning of
the recession, the change in the benefit-cost rate for each year of the
recession, and dummies for fixed state effects. Time effects were mea
sured with two binary variables, one for after 1969 and one for years
after 1982 (see Miller, Pavosevich, and Vroman [1997], Table 9.8).
The regressions show that responsiveness is clearly related to
reserve levels, with greater responsiveness occurring in states having
lower reserve ratios. The magnitude of this effect, however, is not very
large. A 1-percentage-point drop in the reserve ratio had estimated
effects that ranged from a 3-percentage-point increase in the one-year
responsiveness measure to a 5- to 6-percentage-point increase in the
three-year responsiveness measure.
None of the time dummies proved significant. The largest time
coefficients, in fact, were negative, possibly indicating a reduction in
tax responsiveness over time, after controlling for reserve levels.
The regressions and the other two analyses suggest that tax respon
siveness has not increased since the early 1980s.
A Six-State Simulation Analysis of Solvency Taxes
In an earlier book, I examined the effectiveness of solvency taxes
in preventing trust fund indebtedness in six large states. 20 My
approach used state-level simulation models and paired simulations for
1988 to 1997. Within each pair, solvency taxes were either turned on
and off. The simulations emphasized different experiences, based on
each state©s own unemployment and on national unemployment during
the 1970s and the 1980s. Tax receipts, trust fund balances, and bor
rowing were noted for each simulation, and the differences between
pairs showed the estimated effects of solvency taxes.
Four features were identified that affect the performance or effec
tiveness of solvency taxes: 1) the threshold trust fund level that acti
vates the tax, 2) the range of statutory tax rates, 3) the proportion of
employers affected, and 4) the possibility of negative as well as posi
tive adjustments in solvency tax rate. Across the six states, the trust
fund thresholds ranged from a high of 3.75 percent of covered wages in
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Michigan to a low of a zero fund balance in New Jersey. The range of
maximum statutory tax rate increases ranged from lows of 0.7 percent
in New Jersey and 0.8 percent in California to highs of 3.0 percent in
Michigan and 3.4 percent in Ohio. 21 When activated, a solvency tax
may apply to all employers or only to selected employers, who are
identified by the level of their reserve ratio or benefit ratio. Four states
levied solvency taxes on all employers, while two taxed only selected
employers. Four states used solvency taxes only to increase UI reve
nues, while two (Florida and Texas) lowered as well as increased total
revenues using solvency taxes, i.e., their solvency taxes can have nega
tive tax rates when trust fund balances are high.22
To examine the importance of solvency taxes, simulations were
conducted in which solvency taxes were removed from each state©s tax
rate structure. The different scenarios included a baseline for each
state in which the state©s unemployment rate (the TUR) was main
tained at a steady 5.5 percent from 1988 to 1997. No state required
loans from the U.S. Treasury for either of its baseline simulations. In
all six states where there were differences between the baselines when
solvency taxes were on or off, the differences were small (see Vroman
[1990], Table 4-7).
When the states were analyzed in terms of the unemployment rates
during the 1970s and 1980s, the absence of solvency taxes increased
the volume of borrowing and reduced the ending (1997) trust fund bal
ance, except in Florida. However, decreases in total borrowing and
increases in end balances were generally small. In New Jersey, which
had the lowest solvency tax trigger (a zero fund balance), no simula
tion showed an effect. The greatest effect of solvency taxes was found
in Ohio when, under the simulation, the state experienced a repetition
of state TURs and national TURs from the 1980s. The removal of
Ohio©s solvency taxes raised total borrowing by more than $1.0 billion
under both TUR paths and caused the 1997 trust fund balance to be
nearly $2.0 billion lower. The effect on loans and the 1997 end bal
ances was smaller in other states, with the effect in Michigan consis
tently second in magnitude to that in Ohio.23
Probably the most important finding of the simulations was that
solvency taxes did not prevent insolvency in any of the six states.
There were 24 non-baseline simulations (six states, with national and
state TURs from the 1970s and 1980s), and states needed loans in 7 of
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the 24. For all seven simulations, borrowing occurred both when the
solvency tax was on and when it was off. The solvency tax modestly
reduced the volume of borrowing, but it did not prevent indebtedness.
Solvency taxes proved of limited importance for the six states. In
Ohio, where the effect was largest, borrowing was reduced by $1.1 to
$1.3 billion and the end balance increased by $1.2 to $1.9 billion over
the 10 years. The results indicate a serious recession would require
discretionary action or stronger solvency tax provisions to increase the
total response of UI taxes and to reduce the volume of borrowing. If
solvency taxes are to have greater effect than that found in these simu
lations, they would need to include a more aggressive combination of
higher trigger thresholds, a wider potential range of tax rates, and
application to all employers.
Flexible Financing in Pennsylvania
During the late 1980s, UI officials in Illinois and Pennsylvania
advocated flexible financing for their programs. A quantitative analy
sis of the Illinois 1987 law conducted at the Urban Institute, however,
concluded that most of the improvement in solvency was achieved by
two "permanent" provisions that are not really flexible. In the first, a
fund-building tax of 0.4 percent was levied on employers. This tax has
remained in place and used the same tax rate through 1996. In the sec
ond, the average weekly wage (AWW) used to make indexed increases
to the maximum weekly benefit was redefined. The redefined AWW
was 20 percent lower than the actual statewide AWW. There were
other flexibility features in the Illinois law (including a provision to
freeze the maximum WBA, as indicated in Table 2-7), but their effects
on trust fund revenues and benefit outlays were distinctly secondary
when compared to the two "permanent" revisions. Thus, it seems more
accurate to consider Pennsylvania©s 1988 law as the best example of a
flexible financing law.
An analysis by Worden and Vroman (199la) simulated the impact
of flexible financing provisions in Pennsylvania©s 1988 law. The law
was designed to increase the automatic responsiveness of taxes and
benefits, thus reducing the need for borrowing during recessions. The
1988 law followed earlier solvency laws in 1980 and 1983 and a his
tory of large-scale borrowing from the U.S. Treasury. 24 Of the 37 state
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UI programs that borrowed sometime during the 1970s and 1980s,
Pennsylvania©s $5.5 billion total was the largest.
Pennsylvania©s 1988 solvency provisions provided for additional
employer taxes, variable employee taxes, and benefit reductions. All
adjustments to taxes and benefits are activated by a single trigger. That
trigger is calculated as the ratio of the fund balance at the end of the
current fiscal year (June 30th) to the average benefit amount for the
current and the two previous fiscal years, with the ratio measured as a
percentage.
There are two flexible employer taxes. An employer surcharge is
imposed as a flat amount that can assume seven different values. Trig
ger ratio percentages of 150 or larger (trigger-level seven) cause a tax
reduction. The largest surcharge is levied when the trigger percentage
falls below 50 (trigger-level one). Employers are also subject to gradu
ated "additional contributions" when the trigger percentage falls below
95. There is also a trigger-activated employee surcharge with a range
of possible values from 0.0 to 0.2 percent of total covered wages.
Finally, weekly benefits (for claimants paid above half the maximum
WBA) drop by 5 percent whenever the trigger ratio falls below 50.
Pennsylvania©s flexible financing provisions specify effects as fixed
dollar amounts. Thus, as economic growth occurs, the size of these
effects automatically declines relative to statewide macroeconomic
variables such as covered employment and total wages.
The effects of these automatic provisions were studied using a sim
ulation model that included detailed equations for determining UI
taxes and UI benefits. 25 Model simulations were conducted for the
years 1991 to 1999. The analysis specified a series of unemployment/
inflation scenarios and simulated benefits, taxes, and trust fund bal
ances with the flexible financing provisions first off and then on. The
simulations also used state unemployment rates from earlier periods
and specified successively higher rates of unemployment. Simulations
with differing inflation rates were also conducted.
Each simulation tracked total benefit outlays, tax receipts, borrow
ing from the U.S. Treasury, and the trust fund end balance for the nine
years. Differences in total borrowing were noted for paired simula
tions that differed only in the flexible financing provisions being on or
off. For each pair, the simulation with flexible financing on had a
higher time path for the trust fund balance and less total borrowing.

Topics in Unemployment Insurance Financing

69

However, the most serious recessions caused large-scale borrowing to
occur even in the simulations with flexible financing on.
Perhaps the most interesting results were produced by a series of
simulations that raised the average total unemployment rate by incre
ments of 0.5 percentage points. Total benefit outlays grew consistently
for increments to the TUR. However, the added taxes and reduced
benefits reached their upper limits, causing the fund balance to fall fur
ther and cumulative borrowing to rise, despite flexible financing. Even
when all provisions were fully turned on, benefit outflows exceeded
taxes by wide margins.
The distribution of sacrifices by workers and by employers were
sensitive to the assumed rate of inflation.26 At low rates of inflation,
the burden of flexible financing was roughly 50:50, with most of the
employee share arising from employee taxes. At higher rates of infla
tion, the employee share rose to more than half, with employee taxes
still accounting for most of the increased employee share. This finding
is a direct consequence of the limitation on employer taxes caused by
the fixed tax base. The tax base for employees, however, is unlimited.
Additional simulations suggest that indexing both the employer tax
base and other solvency provisions (rather than using fixed absolute
dollar amounts) would substantially improve the effectiveness of flexi
ble financing in preventing indebtedness and in reducing the scale of
insolvency.
Four of the principal findings of the simulations are straightfor
ward.
1. Pennsylvania©s flexible financing provisions reduced its scale
of borrowing but did not prevent insolvency.
2. Flexible financing was more effective in small downturns than
in more serious recessions (measured in terms of the increase
in the average total rate of unemployment for 1991-1999).
3. Inflation weakened the effectiveness of flexible financing in
the later years of the period simulated.
4. Indexing the employer tax base and the trigger would remedy
most of the effects of high inflation.
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However, flexible financing could not forestall large-scale borrowing
during periods of high unemployment, even when the system was fully
indexed. Tax increases and/or benefit reductions would require more
"bite" to prevent large-scale indebtedness during a major recession.
Pennsylvania benefited from its flexible financing during the
1990-1992 recession. Following two consecutive years of 1.5 percent
employer tax reductions (1990 and 1991) under the highest of the
seven trigger thresholds, there were five consecutive years of higher
taxes. The thresholds were number five in 1992, number three in 1993
and 1994, number four in 1995, and number five in 1996. 27 The maxi
mum solvency taxes levied during 1993 and 1994 raised the employer
levy by 14.74 percent, while employees paid a 0.15 percent employee
payroll tax on total wages. By the end of 1996, the state©s trust fund
stood at $2.03 billion. Its reserve ratio for 1996 was 1.78 percent,
essentially the-same as at the end of 1990, a year that flexible financing
actually reduced employer taxes.
The downturn of the early 1990s was comparatively mild in Penn
sylvania. The state©s TUR averaged 7.2 percent during 1991-1993,
compared with an average of 5.0 percent during 1988-1990. Benefit
payouts during 1991-1993 averaged $1.57 billion, or 1.65 percent of
covered wages. Average payouts during 1991-1993 were about 70
percent higher than during 1988-1990; however, payouts during 19911993 were not especially high by historic standards. From 1970
through 1989, benefit payout rates exceeded 1.65 percent in 7 years
and exceeded 1.50 percent in 11 years. The 1991-1993 downturn was
comparatively mild in terms of Pennsylvania©s history.
On the other hand, note that Pennsylvania did not need to draw on
the full potential of its flexible financing system for a single year dur
ing 1992-1996. In the face of a single, albeit mild, recession, flexible
financing successfully accomplished its purpose in Pennsylvania.

SOME FINAL COMMENTS ON FLEXIBLE FINANCING
In deciding whether to follow a funding strategy with a strong ele
ment of flexible financing, it is important for a state to look at the trade
offs. The chief argument in favor of flexible financing is that trust fund
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reserves can be kept low and the risk of borrowing can simultaneously
be minimized. The negative aspects of large balances have been
stressed, in recent years, especially by employers. Some state officials
also judge that the "opportunity cost" of holding balances exceeds the
interest earnings on reserves. For any given level of benefit payouts, a
state may prefer to hold smaller trust fund balances than it would have
in the past, on the grounds that the rate of return is higher for funds
held by employers.28 Second, large trust fund balances may lead to
pressures for liberalizing benefits or for diverting UI taxes to other
uses. Either use of the trust fund is easier to argue politically if the
fund balance is perceived to be larger than necessary. 29
It is clear that, in the aggregate, states now have smaller desired
trust fund levels than in the past. Although pre-recession balances in
1989 were high relative to those of the 1970s, they were only about
half of 1969 balances. 30 (This is an appropriate comparison because
both 1969 and 1989 fell at the end of long periods of economic growth,
and that growth presumably allowed state trust funds to rise to desired
levels.)
A second impetus towards flexible financing is that, even if a state
chooses to have a low trust fund balance, there are disincentives that
encourage a state to avoid or minimize borrowing. Since 1982, interest
has been charged on loans (except those repaid the year they are
made). The interest must be paid from sources outside the trust fund,
either from a separate tax or from a state©s general revenues. A further
disincentive is the automatic repayment provision in the FUTA tax, a
provision which is activated after two years of borrowing. The FUTA
tax repays the loan through a flat surcharge on the low federal tax base,
rather than through the experience-rated state UI tax.
The chief argument against flexible financing is that the timing of
benefit decreases and tax increases hurts both claimants and employ
ers. Claimants suffer reduced benefits at a time when their need is
greatest. Businesses undergo tax increases before they have fully
recovered from the recession. The traditional rationale for forward or
advance funding rests on the argument that such adjustments should
not be occurring at such times or should, at least, be minimized.
Two additional arguments against relying on flexible financing
should also be noted. First, a state may implement flexible financing
but the provisions may not be strong enough to prevent insolvency.
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Flexible tax provisions, for example, simply may not generate enough
additional revenue in time to counteract the effects of a serious reces
sion. The simulations reported above indicate that this is the case for
Pennsylvania, even though the state did not have financing problems
during or after the 1990-1992 downturn. Second, there may not
enough political will to let strong flexible financing operate as
intended. When the time comes, the state©s executive and/or its legisla
ture might decide to nullify the automatic response to satisfy prefer
ences of claimants or businesses, or both. Without a large trust fund
reserve, a state may find it needs large-scale loans. The result may be a
legislated, discretionary, pay-as-you-go response brought in during a
crisis, rather than the automatic pay-as-you-go response advocated by
proponents of flexible financing.
From a national perspective, even if individual states find flexible
financing an attractive option, its widespread use would be cause for
concern. In national terms, the main problem with flexible financing is
that it reduces the counter-cyclical performance of the UI system. One
of the original objectives of the UI system was that it act as an auto
matic stabilizer of the macroeconomy, primarily by maintaining con
sumer purchasing power. Flexible benefit provisions undercut this
stabilizing effect. Taxes that respond too quickly may cut business
spending at the wrong time and harm the recovery. The long-term
decline in the proportion of the unemployed who receive benefits has
already diminished the stabilizing role of the UI. The increased use of
flexible financing would further erode UI©s stabilizing role.
During the 1950s, when UI trust fund balances were much more
substantial, there was a great deal of debate about and experimentation
with ways to make tax rates more counter-cyclical. In the past 10 or.15
years, a time of relatively low trust fund balances, there has been a sig
nificant shift in the opposite direction, towards a more immediate
recovery of benefit costs through flexible financing.
In any event, it appears that the shift towards flexible financing is
not yet of sufficient importance to have a large quantitative effect. This
conclusion emerges both from an analysis of UI statutes and from the
empirical studies reviewed in this chapter.
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Notes
1. The two main sources used throughout this chapter are Comparison of State
Unemployment Insurance Laws (U.S. Department of Labor 1996) and Highlights
of State Unemployment Compensation Laws (National Foundation for Unemploy
ment Compensation and Workers© Compensation 1996). The Comparison and its
predecessors has been published for roughly 50 years, while Highlights has been
available since 1982. Both use information assembled by the staff of the UI Ser
vice, with the Highlights being less comprehensive but more readily accessible.
2. Other experience-rating features of potential interest include the number of expe
rience-rating schedules, the range of triggers that the schedules encompass, and
the average distance between schedules (the change in the tax rate for an
employer in a given experience-rating category when the rate moves from one
schedule to the next). Changes in noncharging (benefit payments not assigned to
an individual employer) and ineffective charging (failure to assign a benefit
charge because the employer is already paying the maximum tax rate) could also
be important.
3. Payments in Massachusetts are due on the fifteenth of the month following the
end of each quarter.
4. In a reserve-ratio state, this would mean a lower reserve ratio (reserves as a per
centage of covered payrolls), while in a benefit-ratio state this would be a higher
benefit ratio (charged benefits as a percentage of covered payrolls).
5. Note that a second effect arises from moving to a higher tax schedule once the
fund balance decreases.
6. Aggregate net reserves decreased from $10.5 billion (at the end of 1974) to $1.0
billion (at the end of 1977) and from $8.6 billion (at the end of 1979) to -$5.8 bil
lion (at the end of 1983). The most recent drawdown, shown in Table 1-4, was
from $36.9 billion (at the end of 1989) to $25.8 billion (at the end of 1992).
7. An even wider range of maximum rates would appear if the maximums from the
highest state tax rate schedules were shown rather than the actual rates in effect.
8. For completeness, note that benefit-wage ratios are used in two states (Delaware
and Oklahoma) and payroll declines are used in one state (Alaska). These experi
ence-rating systems operate much like benefit-ratio systems.
9. All five states in which the TWP was higher in 1996 than in 1986 have indexed
tax bases.
10. For other programs, the trigger changed in ways that left the direction of the
change unclear. In Kansas, for example, the 1986 top schedule trigger was a fund
balance reserve ratio of less than 1.5 percent. In 1996, however, Kansas had no
explicit trigger for its top schedule because it no longer had a set of explicit sched
ules. Employers with a negative balance were taxed up to a top rate of 6.4 per
cent, while the top rate was 5.4 percent for others.
11. The estimate of tax capacity for 1996 uses the TWP from 1995. Since the TWP
has shown a downward trend in nonindexed states, the 1996 estimates overstate
the tax capacity of most states.
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12. In California, the solvency tax is levied as an additional 15 percent on the highest
experience-rated schedule.
13. Prior to 1980, federal legislation had twice prevented automatic tax increases in
states with long-term trust fund debts. The increases would have raised the fed
eral tax component of UI taxes in these states (see Vroman [1986], Chapter 1).
14. New Hampshire has an emergency tax of 0.5 percent that can be activated when
the UI commissioner determines that an emergency exists.
15. Eight of the nine that brought in solvency taxes in the 1970s also borrowed from
the U.S. Treasury during the 1970s, and five had loans that equaled or exceeded
1.0 percent of covered payrolls in 1975 (Connecticut, Hawaii, Michigan, Pennsyl
vania, and Rhode Island). See Vroman (1986), Table 3-1.
16. Note that New Jersey©s employee tax was diverted to another purpose from April
1996 through December 1997.
17. The three elements of the Illinois trigger are the level of the trust fund, the average
employer tax rates, and the growth in the payment of initial claims.,
18. This analysis is described in Miller, Pavosevich, and Vroman (1997). Mike Miller
and Robert Pavosevich of the U.S. Labor Department©s UI Service did the analy
sis.
19. In formulas:
Rl = (Tax, - TaxM ) / (BenM - Ben,_2).
R2 = [(Tax,+1 -TaxM ) + (Tax,-TaxM )] / [(Ben, - Ben,_2) + (BenM - Ben,_2)].
R3 = [(Tax,+2 - TaxM ) + (Tax,+1 - TaxM ) + (Tax, - TaxM )] / [(Ben,+1 - Ben,_2)
+ (Ben, - Ben,_2) + (Ben,_j - Ben,_2)].
"Tax" represents annual UI tax receipts; "Ben" stands for annual benefit pay
ments; and the subscripts refer to periods measured from the current year.
20. See Vroman (1990), pp. 106-111. The six states were New Jersey, Michigan,
Ohio, Florida, Texas, and California.
21. The maximum solvency rates for both the Ohio and Michigan simulations were
higher than shown in Table 2-6. The higher solvency tax rates that had applied
before 1988 were used in the simulations. Thus, for both states, the maximum
effects of solvency taxes would be smaller if the analysis were repeated using the
solvency taxes of 1996.
22. The solvency tax in Florida was its fund balance adjustment factor, part of the
variable adjustment factor in the state©s tax structure. Unlike the other states, the
tax is part of experience-rated taxes in Florida.
23. This consistent one-two ranking for Ohio and Michigan also appeared when taxes
and other financing variables were measured in absolute levels and as percentages
of covered wages.
24. Pennsylvania©s earlier law is described in Vroman (1986), Chapter 2.
25. The model©s equations are shown in Worden and Vroman (1991a), Appendix A.
26. Sacrifices by workers have two potential components: increased employee taxes
and reduced benefits to claimants.
27. See Worden and Vroman (1991a) for the detailed tax and benefit provisions which
were activated under each of the seven thresholds.
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28. There is no significant research showing comparative rate of return calculations to
buttress the presumption that rates of return are higher on employer-controlled
assets, but the presumption is probably correct. Arguments to reduce UI taxes on
employers that emphasized this differential would be weakened if UI trust funds
were invested in a broader range of assets than federal government debt.
29. Again, rhetoric and casual observation provide much of the basis for this asser
tion. It would be useful to investigate the issue in a formal statistical (regression)
framework.
30. See Table 1-1. See also Miller, Pavosevich, and Vroman (1997), Table 9.1.

3 Tax-Base Indexing
Eighteen UI programs tie the taxable wage base to the average
weekly wage in covered employment. This chapter focuses on the
experiences of those states and compares them with the remaining
states, in which the tax-base changes must be explicitly legislated.
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first describes the main
features of tax-base indexing. The second studies some effects of taxbase indexing with an emphasis on two groupings of the states, those
with indexed tax bases and those with fixed tax bases. The second sec
tion includes comparative analyses of trends in tax capacity and tax
rates, as well as analyses of performance over time and during the
recessionary phase of the business cycle.

AN OVERVIEW OF TAX-BASE INDEXING
Persistent growth in money wages is a ubiquitous feature of market
economies. During the 1990s, money wage growth has been low by
historical standards, but the average weekly wage in Ul-covered
employment has grown in each year. From 1990 through 1996, the
annual percentage growth in the AWW for taxable covered employers
ranged from a low of 1.5 percent (1993) to a high of 5.6 percent
(1992). The cumulative growth in the AWW during those years was
28.1 percent, or from $428.02 in 1989 to $548.17 in 1996.
Roughly two-thirds of state UI programs set their taxable wage
base through discretionary action, raising it only periodically, and typi
cally setting the tax base only slightly higher than the minimum base
mandated by the federal tax base conformity requirement. The feder
ally mandated taxable wage base has been $7,000 since 1983. In 1996,
12 states had tax bases of $7,000, 20 had tax bases between $7,001 and
$10,000, and 21 had tax bases above $10,000.
Low tax bases are characteristic of many large states. Taxable cov
ered employment exceeded 3.0 million in seven states during 1995.
Three of the seven (California, Florida, and New York) had tax bases of
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$7,000 in 1996, while the other four (Illinois, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and
Texas) had tax bases of either $8,000 or $9,000.
Low taxable wage bases are strongly associated with low taxable
wage proportions. For the 12 states with $7,000 tax bases in 1996, the
average TWP was 0.270, compared with the national average of 0.342.
These 12 UI programs accounted for 33.9 percent of covered wages in
1996. For states in which the 1996 tax bases ranged from $7,001 to
$10,000, the TWP averaged 0.328, while the TWP averaged 0.472 for
states where the tax base exceeded $10,000. The latter two groups
accounted for 42.6 percent and 23.6 percent of covered wages, respec
tively. States with high taxable wage bases had much higher TWPs,
but they were generally smaller states and accounted for about 40 per
cent of all UI programs (21 of 53) but only 23.6 percent of covered
wages. As shown below, states with high tax bases are disproportion
ately the states with indexed tax bases.
Theoretically, a state could achieve a high taxable wage base either
through discretionary action or through tax-base indexing. In practice,
states with fixed tax bases have not raised their bases in line with the
growth in average wages. Taxable wages have persistently tended to
grow more slowly than total covered wages, and the TWP has tended
to decline in most states. For example, between 1989 and 1996, total
wages for taxable covered employers grew by 40.7 percent. Over the
same period, taxable wages grew by only 25.1 percent. Nationwide,
the TWP declined from 0.385 in 1989 to 0.342 in 1996.
The decrease in the TWP between 1989 and 1996 is a continuation
of a long-term trend that goes back to 1940. Annual changes in the
TWP were negative in 49 of the 56 years between 1941 and 1996. The
federal taxable wage base increased three times during that time, from
$3,000 to $4,200 in 1972, to $6,000 in 1978, and to $7,000 in 1983.
Three of the years when the TWP increased were years when the fed
eral tax base was raised: the increases in the TWP were 0.064 in 1972,
0.046 in 1978, and 0.024 in 1983. The four other years when TWP
increased were 1945, 1976, 1993, and 1994. Those increases were all
small, 1 and for 1976, 1993, and 1994 they reflect recession-related state
action that raised tax bases in several states. The increases were large
enough to offset the persistent tendency for TWP to decrease. 2 Fixed
tax bases in the majority of states have been the most important factor
causing the long-term decline in the TWP. The nationwide decrease
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was from 0.928 in 1940 to 0.342 in 1996. In 1996, only about onethird of covered wages were taxable. In New York, a high-wage state
with a $7,000 tax base, the TWP was only 0.213 in 1996.
Increases in prices and wages have two important effects on UI
programs. The discussion to this point has emphasized only the effect
on the TWP when a state has a fixed tax base or adjusts its tax base
only through legislation. Legislated adjustments have generally been
too small to keep the TWP constant. Over time, UI programs must
raise revenues from ever-declining proportions of covered wages.
The second important effect of rising wages is to erode benefit
payment levels relative to pre-unemployment wages. All states limit
the maximum weekly benefit amount. If the maximum WBA is not
periodically adjusted upward, an increasing share of recipients will be
paid the maximum, and the average benefit replacement rate (average
weekly benefits as a proportion of average weekly wages) will fall over
time. National data and data from individual states, however, show
that UI replacement rates have been remarkably stable. The national
average replacement rate was 0.361 for the 27 years between 1970 and
1996. The annual replacement rate was between 0.354 and 0.372 for
all but three of those years. Over the same time, the TWP decreased
from 0.477 to 0.342, despite three increases in the federal taxable wage
base.
Fifty-two of the 53 UI programs follow one of three approaches in
adjusting the maximum weekly benefit and taxable wage base. During
1996, there were 17 UI programs in which both the tax base and the
maximum WBA were explicitly tied, through indexing, to average
wages; 19 programs with indexed changes in the maximum WBA but
not the tax base; and 16 in which neither was indexed. The remaining
program (Alaska) indexed its UI tax base but not its maximum WBA.
The shares of overall covered wages for these programs in 1995 were
as follows: both the tax base and the maximum WBA indexed, 0.167;
the tax base nonindexed but the maximum WBA indexed, 0.384; nei
ther indexed, 0.447; and the tax base indexed but the maximum WBA
fixed, 0.002. Thus, roughly 83 percent of covered wages were found in
states without an indexed tax base. The 18 states with an indexed tax
base accounted for only 16.9 percent-of covered wages. States with
indexed maximum WBAs accounted for 55.1 percent of covered
wages. On average, tax-base indexing was present in small states.
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Twice as many programs use indexed maximum WBAs as use
indexed tax bases, 36 versus 18 in 1996. The indexing of the maxi
mum WBAs also occurred earlier. The first state to index its maximum
WBA was Kansas, in the early 1950s. By 1966, 15 UI programs had
indexed maximum WBAs and just one (Hawaii) had an indexed tax
base. The numbers increased to 30 and 3, respectively, in 1975. By
1986, there were 35 states with indexed maximum WBAs and 18 with
indexed tax bases. Thus, most states with an indexed maximum WBA
adopted the provision between the mid 1950s and mid 1970s, but the
adoption of indexed tax bases occurred mainly between the mid 1970s
and the mid 1980s. Since the mid 1980s, the prevalence of either kind
of indexing has not changed in any important way. 3
The number of UI programs with indexed tax bases has remained
constant at 18 since 1986, with no state adding or discontinuing
indexing. Details of these states© indexing provisions are shown in
Table 3-1. Note that both Montana and Washington experimented
with fixed annual tax base increases before adopting explicit index
ing formulas that tie the tax base to lagged average wages. Most
states that have adopted indexing did so between 1975 and 1986.
Often, this was part of solvency legislation motivated by the trust
fund financing problems of 1975-1977 or 1980-1983. Each state that
adopted tax-base indexing has retained it.
The 18 states with indexed tax bases are generally small and gener
ally lie west of the Mississippi River. Their programs accounted for
16.9 percent of covered wages and 17.7 percent of covered employ
ment in 1996. Employment in those states averaged 931,000 in 1996,
compared with 2,227,000 in nonindexed states. Only four (Minnesota,
New Jersey, North Carolina, and Washington) had total employment
that exceeded 1,787,000, the national average for state-level covered
employment, in 1996. Fourteen states with indexing lie west of the
Mississippi River. However, because California and Texas have not
indexed their tax bases, the 14 represent only about 29 percent of
employment in the 24 western states.4 Indexing is less common in the
East, and the four states with indexed tax bases (out of 29 programs)
accounted for only 11 percent of Ul-covered employment in 1996.
The percentage of indexing ranges from 100 percent of annual
wages (Hawaii and Idaho) to 50 percent (North Carolina and Okla
homa). Six programs have changed their percentage, with increases

Table 3-1 Tax-Base Indexing in Individual States through 1996

Alaska

First
year
1981

Hawaii

1965

Idaho
Iowa
Minnesota
Montana

1976
1978
1982
1979

Nevada
New Jersey
New Mexico
North Carolina

1975
1976
1978
1984

North Dakota
Oklahoma
Oregon
Rhode Island

1979
1986
1976
1980

Indexing
Years
% of
in effect
annual wage
1983-96
75
1981-82
60
1977-96
100
1965-76
90
1976-96
100
1978-96
66.7
1982-96
60
1986-96
80
1979-853
75
66.7
53.8
65
50
60
70
50
80
70

1975-96
1976-96
1978-96
1995-96
1984-94
1979-96
1986-96
1976-96
1980-96

Taxable wage
proportion (TWP)

1996
Lag
(months)
18

Tax
base
24,400

Tax base
rank
2

1986
0.681

1996
0.654

TWP
rank,
1995
4

18

25,800

1

0.686

0.711

1

24
12
12
12

21,600
14,700
15,800
15,800

3
12
11
10

0.693
0.582
0.471
0.714

0.673
0.531
0.477
0.686

3
13
15
2

12
24
18
12

16,600
18,000
13,900
11,600

9
6
14
17

0.590
0.456
0.549
0.515

0.579
0.458
0.541
0.455

8
17
12
19

18
12
24
12

13,900
10,900
20,000
17,000

15
19
5
8

0.567
0.462
0.629
0.554

0.548
0.457
0.607
0.556

11
18
5
10
(continued)

Table 3-1 (continued)

Utah

First
year
1977

Virgin Islands

1985

Washington

1971

Indexing
%of
Years
annual wage
in effect
75
1985-96
100
1 977-8 l b
60
1995-96
100
1985-94
1989-96
80
1971-88C

Taxable wage
proportion (TWP)

1996
Lag
(months)
18

Tax
base
17,200

Tax base
rank
7

1986
0.576

1996
0.575

TWP
rank,
1995
9

18

13,900

13

0.778

0.590

6

24

20,300

4

0.532

0.584

7

Wyoming
1984
55
1984-96
24
12,100
16
0.508
0.485
14
©Maximum increase in tax base limited to $200 per year from 1979 to 1985.
b Tax base frozen at $12,000 from 1981 to 1983 and increased to $13,300 in 1984.
c Tax base increased by $1,200 in 1972, by $600 per year from 1973 to 1984, and by 15 percent above the previous year©s value from
1986 to 1988.
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occurring in Alaska, Hawaii, and Montana but decreases occurring in
North Carolina, Utah, and the Virgin Islands. Two of those decreases
occurred in 1995. The lags between changes in the average annual
wages of the reference period and the tax base increase range from 12
to 24 months.
Indexing has raised taxable wage bases considerably above the
federal taxable wage base. The lowest tax base for the 18 programs in
1986 was $10,900 in Oklahoma. The 1996 tax base equaled or
exceeded $20,000 in five indexed states (Alaska, Hawaii, Idaho, Ore
gon, and Washington), while it was between $15,000 and $19,900 in
another five (Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Utah).
The 17 highest UI tax bases in 1995 were in indexed states, while the
tax base in the remaining indexed state (Oklahoma) ranked 19th.
Recall from the earlier discussion that 21 states had tax bases
above $10,000 in 1996. The three nonindexed states in this group and
their tax bases were Connecticut ($11,000), Massachusetts ($10,800),
and Wisconsin ($10,500). In the early 1990s, Connecticut and Massa
chusetts had financing problems that led to increases in their taxable
wage bases. Because of those increases, Connecticut©s 1996 tax base
was the only one in a nonindexed state that exceeded the tax base of
any of the 18 indexed states, and that was only by $100 ($11,000 ver
sus Oklahoma©s $10,900). In short, indexing has been the means
whereby individual states have achieved high tax bases.
The high tax bases in the indexed states are associated with high
taxable wage proportions. In 1996, the TWPs in these states ranged
from 0.711 to 0.455, compared with the national average of 0.342 and
an average of 0.306 in nonindexed states. Note also that the lowest
TWPs among the indexed states were found in Oklahoma and North
Carolina, states whose indexing percentages were lowest, at 50 percent
of lagged average annual earnings. The average TWP across the
indexed states was 0.519 in 1996, essentially identical to the average
percentage of 0.523 in 1986 (see Table 2-5).
The final column in Table 3-1 shows the 1995 rankings of TWPs
across the 53 UI programs. Of the 19 highest rankings, 18 were in
states with indexed tax bases.5 The 1996 TWP rankings are similar.
Indexing the tax base has resulted in high TWPs.
For most states in Table 3-1, the TWPs for 1986 and 1996 are quite
similar. Decreases occurred in North Carolina and the Virgin Islands,
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two states that reduced their indexing percentages in 1995. The large
change in Washington can be attributed to use of a system for changing
the tax base between 1986 and 1988 that differed from the one used in
later years. The indexing percentage was effectively lower than 80 per
cent in 1986, but since there were 15 percent annual tax-base increases
during 1986-1988, one would expect a higher TWP after 1988.
For 11 of the remaining 15 states in Table 3-1, the TWP was lower
in 1996 than in 1986. This may reflect growing inequality in earnings
during the period when workers towards the top of the wage distribu
tion range realized above average wage gains. This inference is consis
tent with other data on annual earnings but cannot be verified here
since the TWP estimates are based on aggregate (rather than on micro)
data.
Recall from Table 2-5 that the TWP in nonindexed states fell mark
edly between 1986 and 1996, from 0.386 to 0.306. By 1996, the aver
age TWP in nonindexed states averaged only 0.590 of the average
TWP in indexed ones. The implications this has for tax capacity, effec
tive UI tax rates, and maintaining trust fund reserves are examined in
the next section.
To summarize, 18 states have indexed taxable wage bases. Sixteen
of the 18 adopted indexation between 1975 and 1986. The percentage
of indexing the tax base as a percentage of lagged average annual
wages ranges from 50 percent to 100 percent across those jurisdic
tions. Between 1986 and 1996, the taxable wage proportion remained
virtually unchanged in the indexed states, but it dropped markedly in
the nonindexed states.

SOME EFFECTS OF TAX-BASE INDEXING
An indexed tax base can affect a UI program©s financing, both in
the long run and during recessions. This section investigates four
issues: 1) UI tax capacity, 2) the distribution of tax rates along tax rate
schedules, 3) maintaining reserves in the long run, and 4) maintaining
reserves during recessions. The analysis focuses on the period after
1986, a period with no change in the number of indexed and nonin
dexed programs.
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Maintaining Tax Capacity
Tax capacity, as defined in Chapter 2, is the product of the taxable
wage proportion and the average tax rate for the top tax rate schedule.
Besides the taxes implied by a state©s top experience-rating schedule,
about half the states also have solvency taxes. The contribution of sol
vency taxes to a UI program©s total tax capacity is the product of the
TWP and the average rate for its solvency tax. Since solvency taxes
are often levied at a single rate, their contribution to total tax capacity
is easy to calculate.
Total tax capacity is defined by the following expression:
Eq. 3-1
where

TCap = TWP(TRTop + TRSolv),
TCap is tax capacity,
TWP is the taxable wage proportion,
TRTop is the average tax rate on the top tax schedule, and
TRSolv is the average tax rate for the solvency tax.

The tax rates in Eq. 3-1 are often expressed as percentages, as in Tables
2-2 through 2-5.
There is an ambiguity in expression Eq. 3-1 that merits discussion.
The average tax rate for the top tax schedule (TRTop) depends both on
the progression of rates between the minimum and the maximum rates
and on the distribution of employers and their taxable wages across
individual tax rate categories. The distribution of employers changes
at different stages of the business cycle. After a recession, a higher
fraction of taxable wages will be concentrated near the maximum rate,
but after a long expansion, more will be concentrated towards the min
imum rate. Moving to a higher schedule will cause the average tax rate
to increase, not only because higher rates are in effect for each experi
ence category but also because relatively more taxable wages will be
located in categories near the maximum tax rate.
The difficulty can be avoided if states use array allocations to set
employer rates along a given tax rate schedule. Each schedule has a
fixed number of categories (for example, 20 in Washington), but tax
able wages in each category are equalized (5 percent in Washington).
Employers are ranked on the state©s experience indicator (benefit ratios
in Washington). Cumulative distributions (from low to high) then
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determine the tax rate for each employer. Within each rate category,
employers are taxed at a single tax rate. Because the percentages of
taxable wages in each category are controlled, the average tax rate
across all categories is also known, regardless of the distribution of
employer-experience indicators. Using array allocations allows a state
to make more accurate revenue projections because the average tax rate
can be projected with a high degree of accuracy. 6
In states that do not use array allocations, the assessment of tax
capacity can be inaccurate because the average tax rate for the top
schedule is not precisely determined. The estimates shown in Table
2-5, for example, probably understate the tax capacity for experiencerated taxes, because the procedure did not allow the average tax rate
for the top schedule to increase relative to the simple average of the
minimum and maximum rates.
Regardless of this shortcoming, it is clear that a decrease in the
TWP reduces a state©s tax capacity. Between 1986 and 1996, the TWP
fell in nonindexed states while it remained constant in indexed states.
Nor did the average statutory rate for the top experience-rated schedule
increase much between 1986 and 1996. Thus, for experience-rated
taxes, tax capacity did not decline in indexed states, but it did decline
in nonindexed states.
Table 3-2 shows state-level estimates of total tax capacity in 1986
and 1996, including solvency taxes. The columns for each year show
the four separate elements of Eq. 3-1 for total capacity. Table 3-2 also
shows the maximum tax rate from the top tax schedule. In each state
with a solvency tax, the tax was assumed to be turned on. Where a
range of solvency rates is possible, the average solvency tax rate is esti
mated the same way as the average experience-rated tax rate as the
simple average of the minimum and maximum solvency tax rates. The
states are identified according to the presence or absence of tax-base
indexing.
The measures of total tax capacity shown in Table 3-2 closely
resemble those in Table 2-5. In other words, most of the UI tax capac
ity is generated by experience-rated taxes. The national tax rate aver
ages in 1986 were 3.72 percent for experience-rated taxes in the top
schedule and 0.64 percent for solvency taxes. Solvency taxes
accounted for just under 15 percent of total tax capacity in 1986 and
for about 14 percent in 1996.

Table 3-2 Total Tax Capacity for the Top Rated Tax Schedules Plus Solvency Taxes, 1986 and 1996
1996
1986
schedule
Top
Top schedule
Top
Top
Avg. solv. tax Total tax
Max.
Max.
Avg. solv. tax Total tax
rate capacity
rate
rate
rate
rate capacity
rate
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
TWP
(%)
TWP
(%)
(%)
State
Alabama
Alaska3
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii3
Idaho3
Illinois
Indiana
Iowaa
Kansas

0.460
0.681
0.405
0.477
0.353
0.415
0.324
0.402
0.351
0.428
0.412
0.686
0.693
0.378
0.372
0.582
0.483

5.4
6.5
5.4
6.0
5.4
5.4
6.4
7.0
5.4
5.4
5.7
5.4
6.8
6.6
5.4
7.0
5.4

2.95
3.75
4.15
3.05
3.35
3.05
3.95
3.55
3.10
2.75
3.21
4.00
4.85
3.40
3.35
3.75
2.71

0.70
0.75
1.00
0.50
1.00
2.00
0.90
1.62
1.20
0.60

1.68
3.06
1.68
1.93
1.36
1.27
1.60
2.23
1.40
1.18
1.99
3.57
3.36
1.51
1.25
2.18
1.31

0.352
0.654
0.316
0.426
0.250
0.383
0.305
0.300
0.267
0.319
0.331
0.711
0.673
0.303
0.293
0.531
0.416

6.8
6.5
5.4
6.0
5.4
5.4
6.9
8.0
7.4
5.4
8.1
5.4
6.8
6.6
5.7
9.0
6.4

3.73
3.75
4.15
3.05
3.35
2.75
4.45
4.05
4.65
2.75
4.08
3.90
4.85
3.40
3.55
4.50
3.20

0.75
0.80
0.50
0.55
1.50
2.00

1.35

0.60

1.31
2.94
1.31
1.64
0.96
1.26
1.81
1.82
1.24
0.88
1.80
2.77
3.26
1.21
1.04
2.39
1.33

Table 3-2 (continued)
1986
Top schedule
Max.
Avg.
rate
rate
State
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana3
Nebraska
Nevada3
New Hampshire
New Jersey3
New Mexico3
New York
North Carolina3

Top
solv. tax Total tax
rate capacity

TWP
0.443
0.396
0.445
0.373
0.385
0.394
0.471
0.465
0.406
0.714
0.421
0.590
0.408
0.456
0.549
0.322
0.515

1996
Top schedule
Max.
Avg.
rate
rate

Top
solv. tax Total tax
rate capacity

TWP
10.0
6.0
6.5
6.0
7.2
9.0
7.5
6.4
7.8
6.4
5.4
5.4
6.5
6.2
5.4
6.4
5.7

5.50
3.15
4.45
4.40
5.10
4.50
4.25
3.25
3.90
4.05
2.75
3.25
4.65
3.70
4.05
4.25
2.90

0.90

1.00
0.60
1.00
0.90

0.50
0.80
1.00
0.57

2.44
1.60
1.98
1.64
1.96
2.17
2.28
1.98
1.95
2.89
1.16
1.92
2.10
2.05
2.22
1.69
1.79

0.349
0.339
0.330
0.316
0.358
0.308
0.477
0.365
0.333
0.686
0.326
0.579
0.308
0.458
0.541
0.213
0.455

10.0
6.0
7.5
8.9
9.3
9.0
9.0
6.4
7.8
6.4
5.4
5.4
6.5
6.9
5.4
5.4
5.7

5.50
3.15
4.95
5.45
6.35
4.65
4.80
3.25
3.90
4.05
2.75
2.83
3.28
4.00
4.05
3.25
2.85

0.90
0.40
2.00
1.00
0.68
0.90
0.54
0.50
0.35
1.20
0.57

1.92
1.37
1.77
2.35
2.27
1.74
2.61
1.19
1.60
2.78
1.07
1.64
1.16
1.99
2.19
0.95
1.56

0.567
North Dakota3
0.390
Ohio
0.462
Oklahoma8
0.629
Oregon3
0.402
Pennsylvania
0.588
Puerto Rico
0.554
Rhode Island3
0.436
South Carolina
0.465
South Dakota
0.414
Tennessee
0.377
Texas
0.576
Utah3
0.469
Vermont
0.392
Virginia
0.778
Virgin Islands3
0.532
Washington3
0.423
West Virginia
0.500
Wisconsin
0.508
Wyoming3
0.408
U.S. total
0.523
Indexed states
0.386
Nonindexed states
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor,
3 State with indexed tax base.

0.548
1.56
2.75
5.0
0.334
1.72
1.60
5.4
2.80
0.457
2.08
1.15
6.2
3.35
0.607
2.39
5.4
3.80
0.297
2.35
0.50
5.35
9.2
0.466
2.45
4.18
5.4
0.556
3.56
1.08
8.4
5.35
0.327
1.77
0.70
5.4
3.35
0.364
3.16
0.80
6.00
10.5
0.306
2.32
5.25
0.35
10.0
0.337
1.53
1.00
3.05
6.0
0.575
2.39
4.15
8.0
0.351
2.27
4.85
8.4
0.315
1.43
0.20
3.45
6.2
0.590
4.12
0.75
4.55
9.0
0.584
2.10
3.94
5.4
0.357
2.56
4.50
1.55
7.5
0.392
2.10
0.85
6.7
3.35
0.485
2.48
4.88
8.5
0.342
0.64
1.77
6.4
3.72
0.519
2.21
0.50
3.75
6.3
0.306
1.69
3.72
0.66
6.5
Comparison of State Unemployment Insurance Laws.

5.4
6.5
9.2
5.4
9.2
5.4
8.3
5.4
9.5
10.0
6.0
8.0
8.4
6.4
9.0
5.4
7.5
8.9
8.8
6.8
6.8
6.8

2.95
3.30
4.75
3.80
5.35
3.95
5.20
3.32
5.50
5.25
3.00
4.15
4.85
3.35
4.55
3.88
4.50
4.59
4.55
3.85
3.94
3.82

1.28
1.53
0.80
0.30
0.70
0.80
1.00

0.20
0.75

0.45
0.62
0.62
0.35
0.68

1.62
1.53
2.87
2.31
1.83
1.84
3.06
1.31
2.29
1.61
1.35
2.39
1.70
1.12
3.13
2.27
1.61
1.97
2.51
1.53
2.23
1.38
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Total tax capacity in 1986 was noticeably higher in states with
indexed taxable wage bases. The overall average was 2.21 percent of
total wages in indexed states and 1.69 percent in nonindexed states.
On average, total tax capacity was about 24 percent lower in nonin
dexed states. By 1996, the average difference in total tax capacity for
indexed and nonindexed states had grown to 38 percent. (The average
tax rate was 2.23 percent for indexed states but 1.38 percent for nonin
dexed states.)
Note also that the average maximum solvency tax had fallen in
indexed states but remained essentially unchanged in nonindexed
states. In other words, from 1986 to 1996, when the number of
indexed and nonindexed states did not change, indexed states main
tained their total tax capacity, but nonindexed states did not. The latter
were somewhat more exposed to the risks of recession-related indebt
edness in 1996 than they had been a decade earlier.
The Distribution of Actual versus Statutory Tax Rates

Since the mid 1980s, UI benefit costs have fallen below long-term
averages. From 1986 through 1995, for example, benefits averaged
0.894 percent of covered wages. The average cost rate for the preced
ing 10 years was 1.197 percent, and for the preceding 40 years (1946
through 1985), 1.128 percent. Thus, from 1986 through 1995, UI costs
were about 25 percent below those of the preceding decade and 20 per
cent below those of the preceding four decades.
The effect of experience-rating during a period of below-average
costs should be to reduce average effective tax rates. However, the past
decade was also a period when the federal taxable wage base remained
at $7,000, and the TWP fell in nearly all nonindexed states. Those
states raised revenues from an ever-smaller share of total wages, which
undoubtedly acted to restrain reductions in their average tax rates.
Table 3-3 summarizes tax rate developments from 1986-1996.
The table shows five data items for both 1986 and 1996: 1) the average
statutory tax rate, 2) the average effective tax rate (on taxable wages),
3) the ratio of the average effective tax rate to the average statutory
rate, 4) the taxable wage proportion (TWP), and 5) taxes as a percent
age of total wages. Each state with an indexed tax base is identified

Table 3-3 Statutory Tax Rates, Effective Tax Rates, and Taxable Wage Proportions, 1986 and 1996
1986
Effective
rate/
Avg.
Effective
stat. rate tax rate stat. rate

Alaska3
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
District of Columbia
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii3
Idaho3
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa3
Kansas
Kentucky

0.258
0.720

TWP
0.352
0.654

Taxes/total
wages (%)
0.34
1.77

2.95
3.20

2.22
2.86

0.753
0.894

TWP
0.460
0.681

2.75
3.55
2.85
2.85
3.95
5.55
4.00
2.75
4.35
2.80

1.54
2.37
2.34
2.08
2.32
3.06
2.97
1.10
1.61
1.68

0.560
0.668
0.821
0.730
0.587
0.551
0.743
0.400
0.370
0.600

0.405
0.477
0.353
0.415
0.324
0.402
0.351
0.428
0.412
0.686

0.62
1.13
0.83
0.86
0.75
1.23
1.04
0.47
0.66
1.15

4.15
3.05
3.35
2.75
4.45
4.05
4.65
2.75
4.08
3.90

1.65
1.94
3.76
1.04
4.04
2.42
2.95
1.56
1.36
2.05

0.398
0.636
1.122
0.378
0.908
0.598
0.634
0.567
0.333
0.526

0.316
0.426
0.250
0.383
0.305
0.300
0.267
0.319
0.331
0.711

0.52
0.83
0.94
0.40
1.23
0.73
0.79
0.50
0.45
1.46

3.65

2.98

0.816

0.693

2.07

4.85

1.79

0.369

0.673

1.20

4.05
2.85
4.50

3.99
1.44
3.19

0.985
0.505
0.709

0.378
0.372
0.582

1.51
0.54
1.86

3.40
3.55
4.50

2.56
1.29
0.96

0.753
0.363
0.213

0.303
0.293
0.531

0.78
0.38
0.51

3.23
5.50

2.00
3.22

0.619
0.585

0.483
0.443

0.97
1.43

3.20
5.50

0.30
2.06

0.094
0.375

0.416
0.349

0.12
0.72

State
Alabama

Taxes/total
wages

1996
Effective
rate/
Effective
Avg.
stat. rate tax rate stat. rate

1.02
1.95

3.73
3.75

0.96
2.70

Table 3-3 (continued)
1986
Effective
Avg.
Effective
rate/
stat. rate tax rate stat. rate
State
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota3
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana3
Nebraska
Nevada3
New Hampshire
New Jersey3

Taxes/total
wages

1996
Effective
Avg.
Effective
rate/
stat. rate tax rate stat. rate
0.537
0.752
0.450
0.575
0.759
0.288

TWP
0.339
0.330
0.316
0.358
0.308
0.477

Taxes/total
wages (%)
0.57
1.23
0.77
1.31
1.09
0.66

4.30
3.95
3.90
3.30
5.50
4.25

3.81
2.70
2.76
2.07
5.44
2.71

0.887
0.684
0.708
0.627
0.989
0.638

TWP
0.396
0.445
0.373
0.385
0.394
0.471

2.95
3.90
4.15

1.93
2.29
2.30

0.654
0.587
0.554

0.465
0.406
0.714

0.90
0.93
1.64

3.25
3.90
4.05

1.32
1.99
1.27

0.406
0.510
0.314

0.365
0.333
0.686

0.48
0.66
0.87

2.75
2.85

1.90
1.84

0.691
0.646

0.421
0.590

0.80
1.09

2.75
2.83

0.92
1.54

0.335
0.545

0.326
0.579

0.30
0.89

3.26
4.05

0.82
2.98

0.252
0.736

0.408
0.456

0.33
1.36

3.28
4.00

1.01
2.53

0.308
0.633

0.308
0.458

0.31
1.16

1.51
1.20
1.03
0.80
2.14
1.28

3.15
4.95
5.45
6.35
4.65
4.80

1.69
3.72
2.45
3.65
3.53
1.38

3.15

1.98

0.629

0.549

1.09

4.05

1.33

0.328

0.541

0.72

North Carolina3

3.85
3.48

3.25
1.85

0.844
0.532

0.322
0.515

1.05
0.95

3.25
2.85

4.41
0.22

1.357
0.077

0.213
0.455

0.94
0.10

North Dakota3

3.85

2.86

0.743

0.567

1.62

2.95

0.83

0.281

0.548

0.45

New Mexico3
New York

Ohio
Oklahoma3

4.40
4.75

3.61
2.34

0.820
0.493

0.390
0.462

1.41
1.08

3.30
4.75

2.27
0.87

0.688
0.183

0.334
0.457

0.76
0.40

Oregon3
Pennsylvania
Puerto Rico

3.80

3.11

0.818

0.629

1.96

3.80

2.10

0.553

0.607

1.27

6.15
4.18

5.03
5.34

0.818
1.279

0.402
0.588

2.02
3.14

5.35
3.95

4.26
3.34

0.796
0.846

0.297
0.466

1.27
1.56

Rhode Island3
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas

5.35
3.35
4.55
5.08
4.36

3.73
2.01
1.44
1.72
2.04

0.697
0.600
0.316
0.339
0.468

0.554
0.436
0.465
0.414
0.377

2.07
0.88
0.67
0.71
0.77

5.20
3.32
5.50
5.25
3.00

3.68
1.90
0.55
1.63
1.53

0.708
0.572
0.100
0.310
0.510

0.556
0.327
0.364
0.306
0.337

2.05
0.62
0.20
0.50
0.52

Utah3
Vermont
Virginia

4.15
4.85
4.55

1.80
3.98
1.29

0.434
0.821
0.284

0.576
0.469
0.392

1.04
1.87
0.51

4.15
4.85
3.35

0.87
2.60
1.16

0.210
0.536
0.346

0.575
0.351
0.315

0.50
0.91
0.37

Virgin Islands3

3.15

3.44

1.092

0.778

2.68

4.55

2.83

0.622

0.590

1.67

3.94
6.00
5.20

4.03
4.52
4.62

1.023
0.753
0.888

0.532
0.423
0.500

2.14
1.91
2.31

3.88
4.50
4.59

1.88
2.97
2.02

0.485
0.660
0.441

0.584
0.357
0.392

1.10
1.06
0.79

1.49
2.28
1.60
2.51

0.327
0.592
0.405
0.657

0.485
0.342
0.519
0.306

0.72
0.78
0.83
0.77

Washington3
West Virginia
Wisconsin
5.00
Wyoming3
3.96
U.S. total
3.94
Indexed states
3.97
Nonindexed states
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Labor,
3 State with indexed tax base.

0.680
3.40
0.700
2.77
0.696
2.74
0.701
2.78
Comparison of State

4.55
1.73
0.508
3.85
1.13
0.408
3.94
1.43
0.523
3.82
1.08
0.386
Unemployment Insurance Laws.
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and overall averages are shown for both indexed and nonindexed
states.
Two comments are needed. First, the average statutory rate is mea
sured as the simple average of the minimum and maximum rates for
the year and includes solvency taxes if they were activated. Second,
the ratio of the average effective rate to the average statutory rate is not
constrained to fall below unity. The ratio shows where the central ten
dency of the actual tax rate distribution falls relative to the center of the
statutory tax rate schedule. As the distribution of actual rates moves
downward towards the minimum rate, this ratio will decrease.
Three contrasting patterns for indexed and nonindexed states are
apparent in Table 3-3. First, the overall averages for the statutory rates,
the effective tax rates, and the ratio of the effective rates to statutory
rates were quite similar in 1986; the latter ratios were 0.696 and 0.701
for indexed and nonindexed states, respectively. However, because the
TWP was systematically higher for the indexed states in 1986 (0.523
versus 0.386), taxes as a percent of total wages were considerably
higher in the indexed states (1.43 percent versus 1.08 percent).
Second, the average statutory rate did not change much in either
the indexed (unchanged at 3.94 in both years) or the nonindexed states
(decreasing from 3.97 to 3.82 percent). However, during the same
period, the effective tax rate for indexed states dropped sharply (from
2.74 to 1.60, or by 42 percent), while the decrease was much smaller in
nonindexed states (from 2.78 to 2.51, or by 10 percent). As a result,
the decline in the ratio of effective tax rates to statutory tax rates in
indexed states was 42 percent (from 0.696 to 0.405), while in nonin
dexed states it was only 6 percent (from 0.701 to 0.657). The effective
tax rate distribution moved significantly towards the minimum rate in
the indexed states, while it was little changed in nonindexed states. On
average, employers in indexed states were being taxed at much lower
rates along their tax schedules in 1996 than were employers in nonin
dexed states.
Third, as noted previously, the average TWP was roughly stable in
the indexed states, while it fell by 20 percent in nonindexed states
(from 0.386 to 0.306). Because the TWP was so much higher in
indexed states, average taxes on total wages were higher in those states
(0.83 percent) than in nonindexed states (0.77 percent). This repre
sents a much smaller average effective tax rate differential than in
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1986. The key difference between the indexed and nonindexed states
in 1996 was that indexed states had a much higher capacity for increas
ing revenues. That increase could be accomplished within their experi
ence-rating systems, which allowed a greater range for moving the
average effective tax rate towards the maximum statutory rate (as
reflected by the lower ratio of the average effective tax rate to the aver
age statutory rate in indexed states). As shown in Table 2-5, the tax
capacity for experience-rated taxes in indexed states was much greater
than that tax capacity in nonindexed states in 1996 (2.05 percent versus
1.17 percent of total wages).
Maintaining Reserves in the Long Run
In assessing the impact of indexing on UI financing, it is important
to move beyond the focus on tax rates in Table 3-3. A state©s ability to
build and maintain adequate reserves is the main indicator of success
ful program funding.
The reserve ratio multiples for individual states in 1989 and 1996
are shown in Table 1-4 of Chapter 1. Weighted averages of those mul
tiples for 1989 and 1996 were computed for indexed and nonindexed
UI programs. The 1989 and 1996 national averages for those multiples
were 0.87 and 0.64, respectively. The corresponding averages for
indexed states in 1989 and 1996 were 1.18 and 0.88, each about onethird above the national average. For nonindexed states, the corre
sponding averages were 0.81 and 0.59, respectively. As indicators of
reserve adequacy, these multiples show that indexed programs were
more adequately financed than nonindexed programs in both years.
When the individual RRMs are examined for the 18 programs with
indexed tax base, the expected patterns emerge. None of the 10 pro
grams with the lowest multiples in 1989 had an indexed tax base. In
1996, only one of the bottom 10 (Rhode Island) had an indexed tax
base. Of the top 10 multiples in 1989 and 1996, numbers five and six
were from programs with indexed tax bases. 7 When states were ranked
from bottom to top, the average rankings for indexed programs in 1989
and 1996 were 34.3 and 32.6, respectively, while the corresponding
averages for nonindexed programs were 21.7 and 22.6, respectively.
The high average multiples for indexed states reflect a generalized pat-
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tern, not just the effects of high multiples in a few programs with
indexed tax bases.
As noted, reserve ratio multiples declined generally between 1989
and 1996, for both indexed and nonindexed programs. However,
because indexed programs had higher multiples in 1989, the declines
for those programs had less serious implications for future borrowing
and indebtedness.
A cautionary comment about interpreting the differences in the
average reserve positions: some states may be more proactive in accu
mulating substantial reserves (placing greater emphasis on advance
funding as opposed to pay-as-you-go). These states may also be proac
tive in a second area, that is, in instituting and maintaining an indexed
tax base. With indexing, however, the need for other proactive mea
sures for maintaining large balances is reduced, for the tax base auto
matically grows with average wages in the state.
Distinguishing between a proactive public policy that leads to
larger trust fund reserves and indexed taxes bases that also lead to
larger reserves might not be easy, but that indexed states have higher
reserve ratio multiples is clear. In both 1989 and 1996, the average
reserve ratio multiple for indexed states was almost 50 percent above
the average multiple for the nonindexed states. 8
Maintaining Reserves During Recessions
An indexed tax base can help states compensate for recessionrelated losses in reserves. The automatic growth in taxable wages per
employee helps to offset the revenue losses caused by the lower levels
of employment.
Appendix B reports the results of a regression analysis of the effect
of indexing on trust fund reserves. The analysis examines recessionrelated drawdowns for 1974-1976, 1981-1983, and 1990-1992. Mul
tiple regressions were fitted for each period to test for the partial effect
of tax-base indexing on the size of trust fund drawdowns.
The results support the hypothesis that tax-base indexing has a
positive effect on trust fund reserves during recessions. States with
indexed tax bases (identified with dummy variables) had significantly
smaller losses in reserves for each of the three recessions. The size of
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the dummy variable coefficients, 0.16 to 0.54 in 10 of 12 regressions,
suggests that the effects of tax-base indexing are significant.
Nonetheless, caution is advised in interpreting these results. States
with indexed tax bases may generally be taking a proactive approach to
trust fund management and may want to maintain large reserves. Thus,
from a more general perspective, the underlying cause may be that a
proactive policy leads to larger trust fund balances, and tax-base index
ing may also serve to indicate a proactive approach to trust fund man
agement.

SUMMARY

Tax-base indexing has been consistently used in 18 UI programs
since 1986. Those programs have significantly higher tax bases and
much higher taxable wage proportions when compared with other UI
programs. The indexed programs maintained their average taxable
wage proportions during 1986-1996, but those proportions dropped
markedly in nonindexed programs.
From the comparative analysis of indexed and nonindexed states
come three conclusions:
1. UI programs with indexed tax bases were more successful than
nonindexed ones in maintaining their tax capacity (potential
taxes as a percentage of total covered wages). The differences
in average tax capacity for indexed and nonindexed programs
(as measured in Table 3-2) grew from 24 percent in 1986 to 38
percent in 1996.
2. Tax-base indexing is associated with higher trust fund
reserves, as measured by reserve ratio multiples. In both 1989
and 1996, the average RRM was about 50 percent higher in
indexed than in nonindexed states.
3. A regression analysis found that tax-base indexing signifi
cantly helped states maintain trust fund reserves during reces
sions. Clearly, tax-base indexing offers both short- and longterm advantages in maintaining trust fund reserves.
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Notes
1. Respectively, the TWP increased by 0.002, 0.017, 0.001, and 0.003 in those four
years.
2. It should also be noted that average wages grew very slowly, less than 2.2 percent,
during both 1993 and 1994.
3. Some states with indexed maximum WBAs have frozen those provisions to pre
vent insolvency. Of the even-numbered years between 1986 and 1996, the year
with the highest incidence of such limitations was 1988, when 10 states overrode
the indexing provision of their maximum WBA.
4. California and Texas accounted for 46 percent of covered employment in the West
in 1995.
5. Puerto Rico, a low-wage jurisdiction with a 1996 tax base of $7,000, ranked 16th.
6. Seven states use array allocations: Alaska, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, North Dakota,
Vermont, and Washington. All but Washington have employment levels below the
national average.
7. States were assigned numbers from 1 (the lowest reserve ratio multiple) to 53 (the
highest multiple). Simple averages of the ranks were then computed for the 19
indexed and for the 35 nonindexed programs.
8. In 1989, the reserve ratio multiple for indexed states averaged 1.180, while in
nonindexed states the multiple averaged 0.807. The corresponding average multi
ples in 1996 were 0.883 and 0.591, respectively.

4 Financing Unemployment
Insurance Debts
This chapter examines methods of financing state UI trust fund
indebtedness. 1 The two main options are the traditional method bor
rowing from the U.S. Treasury and a recent innovation, the direct
issuing of bonds by debtor states. The chapter describes the two
options, assesses their strengths and weaknesses, reviews the history of
state borrowing and bond issuing, and compares costs.
It is important to state at the outset that, as in many other public
policy debates, there is no single answer about whether it is better to
issue state debt instruments than to borrow from the U.S. Treasury.
The specific circumstances of a debtor state need to be assessed, and
the issuing of state debt itself entails a number of options. The ques
tion is thus not either/or, but rather one that considers a number of
alternatives in issuing state debt.

BACKGROUND
The recession of the early 1990s was mild by history©s standards,
both in terms of the peak-to-trough decline in real output and in the
level of overall joblessness. The unemployment rate peaked at 7.7 per
cent of the civilian labor force in June 1992 and fell steadily after that
date. The annual average unemployment rate fell from 7.5 percent in
1992 to 5.4 percent in 1996 and reached even lower levels in early
1997.
Because state UI trust funds had grown substantially between 1984
and 1989, and because the recession was comparatively mild, state
trust fund reserves were generally high enough to meet the increased
demand for benefits during the recession of the 1990s. Only seven UI
programs needed loans from the U.S. Treasury, and only Connecticut
and Massachusetts experienced substantial indebtedness. Connecticut
and Massachusetts borrowed in 1991, the District of Columbia and
Michigan in 1992, and Maine, Missouri, and New York in 1993. All
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loans were fully repaid by June 1995. Borrowing during 1991-1995
totaled $4.8 billion, with Connecticut ($1.66 billion) and Massachu
setts ($1.72 billion) accounting for 70 percent of the national total. The
experience of the 1990s contrasts sharply with that of the mid 1970s
and of the early 1980s. Between 1980 and 1987, 32 UI programs bor
rowed a total of $24.2 billion.
Traditionally, UI trust fund debts have been financed by loans from
the U.S. Treasury. After these loans started to carry interest charges in
the early 1980s, states began to repay their loans much more rapidly. 2
This pattern of rapid loan repayment continued in the 1990s. During
1991 and 1992, for example, $2.2 billion was borrowed, but $1.4 bil
lion was repaid.
Another change in debt repayment dating from the 1980s was
direct bond issuing by debtor states to repay their U.S. Treasury loans.
Louisiana and West Virginia issued tax-free bonds for that purpose.
Those bonds were later retired using the proceeds of state payroll
taxes.
Several states explored state bond financing during the recession of
the early 1990s. Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, and Maine
held discussions with potential underwriters. The lower interest rates
associated with tax-free bonds was a major point of emphasis in those
discussions. In June 1993, Connecticut authorized a bond issue of
about $1.0 billion as one element of its UI solvency legislation. Mas
sachusetts considered a bond package during its 1992 legislative ses
sion but did not enact it.
Because state bond issues will undoubtedly be considered in future
recessions, the following analysis may be useful to states considering
issuing bonds.

FINANCING WITH U.S. TREASURY LOANS
Title XII of the Social Security Act sets the legal requirements that
states must satisfy when borrowing to finance UI trust fund debts.
Essentially, loans are available on an "as needed" basis, with interest
charges accruing if advances still remain outstanding after certain
dates. Repayment of the principal can be made on a voluntary basis,
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but if a minimum rate of repayment is not achieved, automatic repay
ment is accomplished through special taxes added to each employer©s
federal UI tax.
Several legal requirements are imposed on debtor states by Title
XII, by other parts of the Social Security Act, and by the Federal
Unemployment Tax Act. A useful starting point is to look at the trust
fund withdrawal standard. Each state maintains a trust fund account at
the U.S. Treasury. Inflows come from two sources: state UI taxes and
interest earnings on account balances that are invested in specialized
U.S. Treasury debt instruments. Outflows are reserved for a single pur
pose: to pay benefits to UI claimants.3
The withdrawal standard and associated regulations limits the
choices available to a debtor state. Monies in the state trust fund
accounts cannot be used to pay interest on outstanding debts. 4 Also,
although the proceeds of a bond issue can be used to repay outstanding
Title XII debts, they cannot be deposited into a state©s UI trust fund
account in anticipation of future debts. In other words, a debtor state
owing $500 million on September 30th but expecting to borrow
another $100 million during October-December can deposit only $500
million from a bond issue on September 30th. Additional proceeds
from a bond issue can be deposited only as new trust fund debts accrue.
Interest charges on Title XII debt are calculated as the product of
average daily indebtedness times the interest rate on long-term U.S.
Treasury debt. The average daily balance is a simple average of
indebtedness at the end of each business day in the year. Debtor states
can minimize that balance by following a daily debt management strat
egy. The optimal strategy is to borrow each day that withdrawals
exceed receipts and repay on days that receipts exceed withdrawals.
The strategy minimizes the average daily balance and leaves the fund
balance at zero at the end of each day. The interest rate charged on
debt is the average interest rate earned by states with positive UI trust
fund balances during the fourth quarter of the previous calendar year
and is subject to a maximum rate of 10.0 percent.5
States that borrow after January 1st of a given year can avoid inter
est charges altogether if the loans are fully repaid by September 30th,
the last day of the fiscal year. Loans taken and fully repaid within a fis
cal year are commonly referred to as "cash-flow" loans. If, however,
there is additional borrowing between October 1st and December 31st,
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the state is then subject to full interest charges on the earlier
borrowing6 as well as interest on the October-December borrowing.
Interest payments on loans for a given fiscal year are due on Sep
tember 30th, but interest payments for loans received after April 30th
can be deferred until December 31st of the following year. Additional
interest continues to accrue, adding to the state©s interest liability; for
example, under an annual interest rate of 10.0 percent, a state that bor
rowed during May-September and owed $12 million in interest on
September 30th would owe $13.5 million if it deferred all repayments
until December 31 of the following year.
States also need to consider monthly patterns of trust fund receipts
and expenditures. Benefit payments in most states exhibit a pro
nounced seasonal pattern because the average number of beneficiaries
during January and February is typically much larger than during July
and August. The normal seasonal variation in claims can cause Janu
ary and February benefit payments to be 40 to 50 percent higher than
July and August payments.
Trust fund tax receipts are also highly seasonal, but their month-tomonth patterns are much more irregular than those of benefit pay
ments. Employers© tax obligations accrue in each quarter, with pay
ments usually due early in the following quarter. 7 Thus, tax receipts
are heavily concentrated in February, May, August, and November.
Also, because of the low taxable wage base, receipts in May (based on
first-quarter taxable wages) are by far the largest, followed in descend
ing order by receipts in August, November, and February of the next
year. In states with tax bases close to the federal tax base of $7,000 per
worker, receipts in May can be four to eight times the receipts of the
following February.
These seasonal patterns are generally predictable, even though tax
receipts and benefit outlays can both be quite volatile in the short run.
Since the patterns of receipts and outlays are so different, a debtor state
will typically make substantial loan repayments in some months and
borrow large amounts in others. Borrowing during January and repay
ing during May are to be expected, even for a state whose annual
receipts fall substantially short of its annual withdrawals.
The experiences of Massachusetts and Connecticut during 1991
and 1992 vividly illustrate this point. 8 Connecticut started borrowing
in January 1991, and Massachusetts secured its first loan in August
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1991. During 1991 and 1992, benefit outlays substantially exceeded
tax revenues in both states. Connecticut©s year-end debt totaled $354
million in 1991 and $653 million in 1992; the corresponding levels for
Massachusetts were $234 million and $380 million. Yet, both states
made sizeable loan repayments during the two years. Connecticut,
which had the more serious funding imbalance,9 repaid $148 million in
1991 and $202 million in 1992, while borrowing about $500 million in
each year. Massachusetts borrowed $732 million in 1992, while repay
ing $589 million. In both states, loan repayments were concentrated in
months of high tax receipts. However, because receipts arrive irregu
larly during the month, borrowing occurred even in these months.
To summarize, after a state exhausts its trust fund and starts to bor
row, it typically borrows in every month and makes loan repayments in
at least four months, for example, in February, May, August, and
November. This pattern of borrowing and repaying is rational, because
it minimizes the average daily level of debt.
Connecticut and Massachusetts addressed their funding problems
through legislation. In January 1992, the taxable wage base in Massa
chusetts increased from $7,000 to $10,800, and new tax rate schedules
came into effect. Tax receipts in May 1992 reflected the effects of
Massachusetts© higher tax base and higher scheduled tax rates. Large
loan repayments occurred during May 1992 ($319 million) and May
1993 ($334 million). A repayment of $257 million in May 1994 fully
eliminated the debt.
Connecticut, on the other hand, had a serious funding imbalance
which it did not address until June 1993. Its 1993 legislation raised the
taxable wage base (to $9,000 in 1994 and eventually to $15,000 in
1999), increased the maximum solvency tax (from 1.0 percent to 1.5
percent), and made modest benefit reductions. It also authorized bor
rowing through a state bond issue. Roughly $1.0 billion in state bonds
was issued during August-September 1993, both to repay its outstand
ing Title XII loans and to cover possible later borrowing. This bond
issue is discussed below.
Title XII also specifies debt repayment requirements. As noted, for
any period when receipts exceed outlays, the excess can be used to
retire the outstanding debt instead of remaining in the state©s trust fund
account. If debt has been outstanding on January 1st of two consecu
tive years and has not been fully repaid by November 10th of the later
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year, automatic repayment begins. On January 1st of the following
year, 0.3 percent is added to the federal part of the tax obligation (the
FUTA tax) for each covered employer in the state. In other words, the
rate rises from 0.8 to 1.1 percent of federal taxable wages (the first
$7,000 of annual earnings). 10 The proceeds of this "penalty tax" 11 go to
repay the oldest portion of the state©s outstanding debt.
If a state continues to carry outstanding debt, additional FUTA
penalty taxes are imposed in subsequent years. The proceeds are used
to retire debt, always starting with the oldest remaining debt. The rate
of the penalty tax increases in the second and subsequent later years. 12
Thus, if a state does not take steps to repay its debt, an automatic
mechanism will eventually bring about full repayment.
FUTA penalty taxes for each year are imposed at a single flat rate
on all covered employers. A state may prefer to make loan repayments
by using taxes for which rates vary across employers. To do this, it
may either divert part of its regular tax receipts into voluntary repay
ments (if receipts exceed outlays by a sufficient margin) or impose
additional taxes (as a fixed proportion of regular state UI taxes). Vol
untary repayments of either kind may be made in lieu of mandatory
FUTA penalty taxes, but they must at least equal the yield of the FUTA
penalty tax.

STATE BOND ISSUES

Another method for financing UI debts is to issue state-backed
debt instruments, with the proceeds primarily going to repay outstand
ing Title XII loans. State debt instruments are free from federal
income tax, so the interest rate on state instruments is usually much
lower than on Title XII loans. Debt repayment takes place in later
years, typically using the proceeds of a separate payroll tax on UI cov
ered employment. 13
State debt issues are usefully seen as a generic alternative to Title
XII borrowing. There are, however, many variations. Louisiana and
West Virginia issued state debt in 1987 and Connecticut in AugustSeptember 1993. Those issues covered only part of the range of poten
tial borrowing arrangements. States must decide the volume of needed

Topics in Unemployment Insurance Financing

105

borrowing, the breakdown between immediate and anticipated needs,
the maturity structure, and the source of repayment. Arrangements that
are appropriate for one state may not be appropriate for another.
In deciding whether to issue its debt, a state will be influenced by
the costs of different borrowing arrangements. Cost comparisons must
consider both the future interest rate spreads between Title XII loans
and state debt and the costs of issuing state debt. Moreover, once a
state issues its debt, there can be no forgiveness of interest costs (unlike
Title XII loans fully repaid by September 30th). Finally, there are
questions about the appropriate, or optimal, lag between the date that
the need for borrowing is recognized and the date that the debt should
be issued.
Proponents of state debt issues note that interest rates on state
bonds are typically at least 100 basis points lower than interest rates on
long-term U.S. bonds. 14 Table 4-1 provides summary data for selected
short- and long-term interest rates from 1975 to 1996. It also shows
differences in interest rates, or spreads, for these years. The table
begins with 1975 because that was the first year of substantial Title XII
borrowing during the 1970s. Even though loans were interest-free
until 1982, covering a longer period provides a more complete picture
of the variability in interest rates and of the spreads between selected
pairs of interest rates. The table gives the interest rates for Title XII
loans, 15 the rates for Aaa municipal bonds, and two short-term rates.
Aaa municipal bonds are the highest-grade state and local govern
ment long-term debt instruments. They carry lower interest rates than
bonds in higher risk categories (such as Aa, A, and Baa). From 1975
through 1996, the average spread between the rates on Aaa bonds and
A bonds, for example, was 48 basis points. The ratings to be expected
for Ul-related debt would generally be in the Aaa to A range. A lowerrisk (and thus a higher-rated) issue would be expected if the bonds
were insured or supported by a bank letter of credit, and if the state©s
overall finances were judged to be strong. Another factor influencing
the rating for a state©s debt issue is whether the state©s regular method
of collecting its UI taxes can also be used to collect the state taxes
designed to repay the principal of a bond issue.
In each year from 1985 to 1996, the Title XII rate exceeded the
Aaa municipal bond rate by more than 100 basis points. During that

Table 4-1 Selected Interest Rates and Interest Rate Spreads, 1975-19963

o

OS

Interest rates:

Year

Title XII
loans

1975

5.92

1976

4.68

Basis point spreads:

Moody Aaa
1 mo. tax6 mo.
munic.
taxable
free comm.
bonds
comm. paper
paper
NAb
6.42
6.32
5.66

5.34

NA

Title XII
less bonds
-50

Title XI
Title XII
Bonds
Bonds
less taxable less tax-free less taxable less tax-free
comm.
comm.
comm.
comm.
paper
paper
paper
paper
^0

NA

-98

-66

10

NA

NA

32

NA
NA

1977

5.26

5.20

5.61

NA

6

-35

NA

-41

1978

5.56

5.52

7.99

NA

4

-243

NA

-247

NA

1979

6.25

5.92

10.91

NA

7.85

12.29

NA

NA

^99
-444

NA

7.17

^66
-512

NA

1980

33
-68

-596

NA

1981

8.80

10.43

14.76

NA

-163

1982

10.00

11.33

11.89

NA

-133

-189

1983

10.00

8.80

8.89

NA

120

1984

9.78

9.51

10.16

NA

27

111
-38

NA

140

199

NA
NA

NA

^33
-56

NA

-9

NA

NA

-65

NA

NA

59

NA

NA

1985

10.00

8.60

8.01

1986

9.96

6.95

6.39

4.25

301

357

571

56

270

1987

9.33

7.14

6.85

4.45

219

248

488

1988

8.54

7.35

7.68

5.28

119

86

326

29
-33

207

1989

8.33

6.99

8.80

6.23

134

-41

210

-181

76

269

1990

8.70

6.96

1991
1992

8.60
8.05

6.56
6.09

1993
1994

7.45
6.90
6.83
6.71

5.38
5.77
5.80
5.52

7.95
5.85

5.77
4.21

174
204

3.80
3.30
4.93

2.62
2.19

196
207

2.60
3.62
3.19

113
103
119

75
275
425
415
197

293
439

-99

119

71

235

543
526
430

229

347
319
317
218

208
84
-13

321
90
10
352
129
Co.
and
Sachs
SOURCE: Table B-71 of the Economic Report of the President, January 1997; the UI Service; and Goldman,
rate.
interest
an
of
point
percentage
each
in
points
basis
a All data are annual averages. There are 100
b NA = data could not be obtained for 1975-1986.
1995
1996

5.93
5.42

233
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time, the spread ranged from 103 basis points (1995) to 301 basis
points (1986) and averaged 169 basis points.
Note that the spreads between Title XII and Aaa interest rates
spreads were much smaller before 1985 and that the Aaa rate exceeded
the Title XII rate in five of the earlier years. The average Aaa rate was
actually higher by 32 basis points from 1975 through 1984 (7.66 per
cent versus 7.34 percent). In years of high interest rates like 19801985, the 10.0 percent ceiling on Title XII loans is an important con
sideration.
Assessing future interest rate spreads between Title XII loans and
Aaa municipal bonds involves a number of uncertainties. From the
data shown in Table 4-1 ("Title XII less bonds" column), it is clear that
spreads in favor of Aaa municipal bonds were especially large in 1986
and 1987 and again in 1990 through 1993.
However, there are several other factors to keep in mind when eval
uating future interest rate differentials. First, spreads between shortand long-term interest rates can also be large, such as during the early
1990s. Both short-term rates were less than 4.0 percent in 1992 and
1993, and neither exceeded 6.0 percent between 1993 and 1996. Note
that the interest rate for one-month tax-free commercial paper is con
sistently the lowest short-term rate (Table 4-1). That rate was more
than 200 basis points below the rate for Aaa municipal bonds for every
year between 1991 and 1996. States with short-term and intermediateterm needs can take advantage of very low short-term interest rates.
Second, states needing to finance UI debts during the 1980s and the
1990s typically paid off their debts quite rapidly. 16 Clearly, the need
for long-term financing must be carefully evaluated. Issuing debt
instruments with, say, 10-year maturities would not be prudent if state
indebtedness were to last only two or three years. Third, a comparison
of the costs of state bond issues and Title XII loans must factor in the
costs of underwriting fees (commissions and insurance) along with
interest rate spreads.
A state that issues its own debt instruments would be motivated
primarily by the prospect of reducing its debt-related interest costs. 17
Key to a state©s deliberations are its expectations about the time-pattern
of its borrowing as well as Title XII loan repayment rules. Finally,
since spreads between short- and long-term rates can be large, the cost
advantages of short-term debt issues also need to be considered.
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The following strategy could prove very useful for a state that is
starting to need loans:
Borrow and repay Title XII loans on a daily basis.
Pay off all outstanding Title XII loans obtained between Janu
ary 1st and September 30th by issuing tax-free commercial
paper on September 30th.
Issue additional paper as needed during the period from Octo
ber 1st to December 31st. (At 1996 interest rates, the annual
rate of interest on such borrowing would be about 3.2 percent,
about 230 basis points lower than the 1996 Aaa municipal
bond rate of 5.52 percent.)
As short-term debts mature, consolidate the borrowing into
tax-free six-month commercial paper.
The strategy takes advantage of both the interest-free feature of
Title XII loans in the first year of the debt and the interest rate spread
favoring short rates in the first and subsequent years (for as long as
short-term rates are considerably lower than long-term rates). The
costs of the issue need to be factored into the calculations, but they are
comparatively modest for short-term commercial paper. Brokerage
fees and insurance combined would probably add less than 50 basis
points to the annual interest rate. In other words, the issue and re-issue
of six-month tax-free commercial paper would have an annual cost
(including underwriting fees) of 4.0 to 4.5 percent at 1996 interest
rates.
In structuring a debt-issuing strategy, a state needs to consider gen
eral obligation bonds, revenue bonds, fixed maturity bonds, callable
bonds, notes and commercial paper. 18 All are free from federal income
taxes when issued by states. States can achieve flexibility in repaying
their debt by issuing short-term instruments (commercial paper and
notes) and/or by having a portion of the long-term debt (bonds) be call
able.
The underwriting fees (commissions plus insurance) associated
with various debt instruments are roughly as follows (all measured at
annual rates): fixed bonds and callable bonds with 10-year maturities,
80 to 100 basis points; three-year notes, 50 to 60 basis points; and

110

Financing Unemployment Insurance Debts

commercial paper, 35 to 50 basis points. 19 Typically, interest rates are
higher for callable bonds than for fixed maturity bonds (30-50 basis
points) and higher for revenue bonds than for general obligation bonds.
To achieve flexibility and minimize costs, it would seem that a
state should issue a mixed portfolio of debt instruments. States with
substantial debts (for example, Connecticut in early 1993), would
probably need different portfolios than states just starting to borrow.
Whether a state is likely to enact solvency legislation to improve the
balance between its revenues and benefit payments is also important. 20
Finally, the spread of interest rates by maturity that favored short-term
debt issues in 1992 and 1993 cannot necessarily be expected in the
future. The "best" package would depend heavily on the structure of
interest rates at the time of the issue.

STATE EXPERIENCES WITH BOND ISSUES

During the mid 1970s and the early to mid 1980s, many UI pro
grams received Title XII loans. Between 1980 and 1988, state borrow
ing totaled $24.2 billion, of which $19.4 billion secured after April 1,
1982, was interest-bearing.
As noted, repayment patterns changed sharply in 1982 after new
loans started to carry interest charges.21 For each year between 1984
and 1988, annual loan repayment rates (repayments as a fraction of
new loans plus interest-bearing debt at the start of the year) exceeded
0.50. Rapid repayments also occurred for loans secured during the
1990s.
After emerging from the back-to-back recessions of the early
1980s, most states experienced a long and sustained economic recov
ery that lasted through 1988 or 1989. However, states dependent on
energy extraction (petroleum and coal) suffered another downturn in
the mid 1980s. The unemployment rate in Texas, for example,
increased from 5.9 percent of the labor force in 1984 to 8.9 percent in
1986 and remained substantially above the national average through
1989.
Three states still having interest-bearing debts at the end of 1986
were energy producers: Louisiana, Texas, and West Virginia. All three
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strongly considered issuing state bonds to repay their Title XII loans,
and Louisiana and West Virginia did issue bonds in 1987. The third
state to issue bonds was Connecticut, which did so in 1993. Louisiana
and West Virginia have fully paid off their bonds. An analysis of the
comparative costs of bond issues versus the use of Title XII loans is
undertaken later in this chapter.
Both Louisiana and West Virginia had very high unemployment in
the early 1980s and then a second downturn associated with the energy
glut of 1985-1986.22 Following the 1985-1986 downturn, both states
issued municipal bonds to fully repay their Title XII advances in 1987.
The bonds were subsequently repaid by payroll taxes on Ul-covered
employers in Louisiana and by payroll taxes on both employers and
workers in West Virginia. West Virginia completed its repayments in
1991 (two years earlier than initially anticipated), and Louisiana com
pleted its bond repayments during 1993.
Table 4-2 shows the summary data for Louisiana for 1979 to 1994.
Note how benefit payments increased sharply to $482 million and $596
million in 1982 and 1983, respectively. The state©s net trust fund bal
ance dropped from $210 million at the end of 1981 to -$476 million
two years later. Borrowing during 1983 alone totaled $427 million.
Although taxes increased following the 1982-1983 trust fund draw
down, they remained below benefit outlays until 1988. There was not a
single year between 1980 and 1987 that taxes exceeded benefit pay
ments.23
Because unemployment and benefit outlays remained high after
1983, Louisiana did not make substantial inroads into its debt. In fact,
its net indebtedness continued to rise during 1984 and 1985. High
unemployment remained a problem and unemployment rose again dur
ing the energy crisis of 1985. The annual unemployment rate for the
civilian labor force age 16 and older, which never fell below 10.0 per
cent between 1982 and 1988, rose during 1985 and 1986 and peaked at
13.1 percent in 1986. Benefit outlays also rose during 1985 and 1986,
and Louisiana©s borrowing during 1986 totaled $423 million, nearly
equaling its borrowing during 1983.
Louisiana©s bond issue of-1987 fully repaid its outstanding Title
XII loans. Since 1987, the state has gradually rebuilt its trust fund.
Fund accumulations were rapid from 1993 through 1996, reaching
$869 million at the end of 1994 and $1,131 million at the end of 1996

Table 4-2 Summary of Louisiana©s UI Trust Fund Activities, 1979 to 19948 ($ millions)
UI trust fund flows

UI trust fund reserves
U.S.
Gross
Net
Treasury
reserves reserves
debt
238
238
0
223
223
0
210
210
0
-102
0
102
0
^76
476
-521
0
521
-577
0
577
-787
0
787
1
1
0
154
154
0
306
306
0
456
456
0
560
560
0
601
601
0
689
689
0
869
869
0

Title XII loans

State bonds

Repay
Scheduled Bond
Year
Taxes
Interest Benefits
Loans
ments
Debt
repayments taxes
NAb
250
1979
12
140
0
0
0
NA
178
1980
20
208
0
0
NA
0
NA
1981
192
21
227
0
0
0
NA
NA
1982
182
482
6
102
0
102
NA
NA
1983
288
0
596
427
53
476
NA
NA
1984
357
397
0
132
521
88
NA
NA
1985
362
446
0
252
196
577
NA
NA
1986
315
0
538
423
213
787
NA
NA
1987
306
0
355
184
971
0
0
130
1988
315
205
7
0
0
0
49
192
1989
285
20
151
0
0
0
56
197
1990
236
34
120
0
0
0
59
207
1991
216
43
158
0
0
0
63
211
1992
200
45
204
0
0
0
67
209
1993
193
46
158
0
0
0
72
212
1994
208
54
145
0
0
0
77
0
1995-2002
872
SOURCE: Data on trust fund transactions including Title XII activities from the U.S. Department of Labor. Data on the scheduled repay
ment of the state bonds is from the state of Louisiana. Estimates of state bond taxes are made by the author.
a Reserves and debt are measured at the year end.
b NA = not applicable, as state bonds were issued in 1987.
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(see Table 1-4). Louisiana©s trust fund balance, however, did not reach
a reserve ratio multiple of 1.0 until the end of 1995.
Louisiana issued $1,315 million in serial revenue bonds in Septem
ber 1987, with maturities in each year from 1988 through 2002. The
issue consisted of $921 million of fixed maturity bonds (with due dates
from 1988 through 1999) and $394 million of callable bonds (with due
dates from 2000 through 2002). Even the fixed maturity part of the
issue had call options that could be exercised as early as 1994 for
bonds with later maturities.
To finance the bond issue, Louisiana levied a flat-rate employer
payroll tax of 1.4 percent on each employee©s annual earnings, up to a
maximum of $15,000 for each year between 1988 and 1993. 24 The
tax, called a "special assessment for debt service," generated about
$200 million in annual revenues from 1988 through 1993.
Tax collection and debt management services were performed by a
trustee bank. There were three main trust accounts: a benefit transfer
account (originally established to cover possible additional borrowing),
a reserve fund (mainly a hedge against unexpected tax shortfalls), and
an interest fund. At the time of the initial issue, $780 million was used
immediately to repay Title XII loans. The rest of the $1,315 million
was used to defray issue costs or was deposited into the trust
accounts.25 The three trust accounts were managed with the objective
of paying off the bonds as soon as possible so that the special employer
tax assessment could be discontinued. To cover the costs of collecting
the special assessment tax, the trustee transferred $250,000 to the Lou
isiana Department of Labor each year.
Louisiana discontinued its special tax assessment after 1993. By
that year, its bond liabilities were fully covered. Repayment of the
bonds was accomplished by retiring the serial bonds, exercising
options on the callable bonds, and establishing an escrow account for
serial bonds that became callable in September 1994. Repayment of
callable bonds was completed in 1994.
To summarize, Louisiana repaid its Title XII loans with a bond
issue in 1987. The total transferred to the state©s UI trust fund account
was approximately $820 million. Louisiana borrowed a total of $1,315
million in the bond market, with bond maturities spread from 1988
through 2002. In fact, all bond obligations were met in 1993, nine
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years before the last of the original maturity dates. Debt repayments
were completed in 1994.
Table 4-3 gives summary data for West Virginia©s trust fund from
1979 to 1994. The state began with low reserves at the end of 1979
($39 million), first borrowed in 1980, and did so in every subsequent
year through 1987. The maximum borrowing, $152 million in 1983,
coincided with the high benefit outlays of the 1982-1983 recession.
In the three years after 1983, the state©s net reserve position im
proved somewhat. However, net reserves were still negative, -$225 mil
lion, at the end of 1986, a three-year improvement of only $62 million.
The time series of taxes and benefits in Table 4-3 shows that both
remained around $150 million per year from 1984 through 1986. The
excess of taxes over benefits during that period remained too low to
restore the trust fund balance.
West Virginia considered issuing bonds during 1987 and issued
$259 million in serial revenue bonds on September 1st. The issue
completely repaid the state©s outstanding Title XII loans. Subse
quently, its trust fund was rebuilt somewhat. The balance reached
$146 million at the end of 1989 and remained near $150 million
through 1996.
At the time of the bond issue, West Virginia planned to repay the
bonds over a six-year period. The bonds for the final two years, 1992
and 1993, were all callable. Financing came from two sources: a flatrate employee payroll tax of 0.35 percent on the total Ul-covered
wages and an equivalent-yielding flat-rate employer payroll tax levied
on the first $21,000 of annual earnings. Those taxes yielded sufficient
revenues between 1988 and 1991 to complete West Virginia©s repay
ments by July 1991, two years earlier than anticipated. The adminis
trative costs of collecting the taxes were paid from the state©s UI
administrative allocation, which it received from the UI Service.
West Virginia©s trust fund balance in recent years, roughly $150
million, is not large when compared to the state©s past rates of benefit
payouts. Note the 1982 and 1983 levels of benefit payments: $234 and
$259 million, respectively. The level of the state©s trust fund is not
high enough to prevent renewed borrowing. The 1996 level of reserves
was $157 million (see Table 1-4). The associated 1996 reserve ratio
multiple was only 0.33, the fifth lowest in the United States and
roughly half of the national average.

Table 4-3 Summary of West Virginia©s UI Trust Fund Activities, 1979 to 1994a ($ millions)
State bonds
Title XH loans
UI trust fund reserves
Scheduled
U.S.
repay
Repay
Bond
Treasury
Net
Gross
ments
Debt
taxes
ments
debt
Loans
reserves reserves
Taxes
Year
Interest Benefits
NAb
NA
0
0
0
101
39
39
0
81
3
1979
-44
NA
NA
47
47
0
47
158
79
0
1980
3
-71
NA
NA
100
0
53
100
150
29
131
0
1981
-144
NA
NA
144
1
45
144
234
166
0
0
1982
-288
NA
NA
288
8
152
288
259
142
0
0
1983
-275
NA
NA
17
37
308
308
146
150
33
0
1984
-256
NA
NA
44
256
96
256
149
145
0
0
1985
-225
NA
NA
225
132
102
225
143
0
150
0
1986
0
0
265
0
40
114
65
1
65
0
152
1987
60
30
0
0
0
133
133
0
157
98
1988
9
37
62
0
0
146
0
91
146
0
100
1989
12
67
43
0
0
0
153
153
0
92
13
86
1990
46
68
0
0
0
157
146
12
157
0
104
1991
49
0
0
0
0
141
0
138
11
141
112
1992
0
53
0
0
117
0
155
155
0
119
1993
11
0
0
0
0
0
162
162
122
125
1994
10
0
SOURCE: Data on trust fund transactions, including Title XII loans, is from the U.S. Department of Labor. Data on the scheduled repay
ment of state bonds is from the state of West Virginia. Estimates of state bond taxes are made by the author.
a Reserves and debt are measured at the year end.
b NA = not applicable, as state bonds were issued in 1987.
UI trust fund flows
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Connecticut entered the 1990s with a small UI trust fund balance
of $274 million. Its reserve ratio multiple, 0.22 at the end of 1989, was
the second lowest in the United States. The state©s unemployment rate
had dropped below 4.0 percent in every year between 1986 and 1989
but rose to 5.2, 6.8, 7.6, and 6.3 percent from 1990 through 1993.
While its unemployment rates were not noticeably higher than the U.S.
national average, increases in unemployment in the late 1980s were
greater in Connecticut. Annual UI benefit payments from 1990
through 1993 averaged $519 million, compared with $196 million
from 1986 through 1989.
The state©s UI trust fund was exhausted at the end of 1990. Bor
rowing from the U.S. Treasury totaled $502 million in 1991, $502 mil
lion 1992, and $363 million in 1993. Total indebtedness was $760
million at the end of July 1993.
In mid 1993, Connecticut enacted solvency legislation that
increased employer taxes, reduced benefits, and authorized the issuing
of state revenue bonds to pay its outstanding debts to the U.S. Treasury.
The legislation included substantial increases in the taxable wage base,
an increase in the solvency tax associated with regular UI taxation, and
a special tax assessment, starting in 1994, to pay off the state bonds. 26
Benefit reductions included a change in the computation of the weekly
benefit amount, increased penalties for "willful misconduct" disqualifi
cations, broadened severance pay disqualifications, and a lower mone
tary threshold for "larceny" disqualifications.
The legislation established a new Unemployment Compensation
Advance Fund for revenues from the bond issues plus employer bond
assessments (taxes) and investment income. The fund pays the admin
istrative costs of bond issues and the costs of collecting bond taxes.
Connecticut issued a total of about $1.0 billion in revenue bonds
between August and September 1993. The issues included both fixedmaturity and callable bonds. The proceeds of the bond issues com
pletely repaid the outstanding debt to the U.S. Treasury. 27 Special bond
tax assessments started in August 1994, and bond repayments began in
November 1994. Scheduled repayments are to occur at six-month
intervals through the year 2001. However, the callable bonds may be
paid off earlier.
By the end of 1996, $154 million of the total issues had been
repaid. This included $115 million in scheduled repayments and $39
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million in repayments of callable bonds. 28 Fixed-maturity obligations
will continue to fall due through 2001, so a full evaluation of the suc
cess of the bond issue cannot be made at this time.
Connecticut©s bond issues were timed to avoid interest charges on
borrowing from January to September 1993. The state considered sev
eral options, but then issued a series of bonds and notes rather than
instruments of shorter duration, such as tax-free commercial paper.
There were three types of bonds: fixed-rate, synthetic fixed-rate, and
variable-rate, with the latter accounting for about one-third of the
total.29 Repayment of the fixed-rate bonds began in November 1994
and is scheduled to last through November 2001. Callable issues fall
ing due between 1998 and 2001 can be called earlier than their matu
rity dates.
The interest rates on Connecticut©s bonds and notes range from
2.75 percent to about 5.0 percent. As shown in Table 4-1, the 1993
interest rate on Title XII borrowing was 7.45 percent. Clearly, Con
necticut saved on the interest rate it actually paid. To this point, it
appears that the bond issues were over-financed, and revenues in
excess of the amounts needed to repay its fixed-bond obligations then
became available to repay its callable bonds. 30 However, it is not obvi
ous that Connecticut will realize a net saving on its total interest
charges. The question of savings on total interest charges can be more
fully addressed when all of Connecticut©s debt has been repaid.
Despite the bond issues, Connecticut has modestly rebuilt its UI
trust fund. The fund balance at the end of 1996 was $278 million (see
Table 1-4), and the reserve ratio multiple was only 0.18, or slightly
lower than it had been at the end of 1989, just before the downturn of
the 1990s. At the end of 1996, Connecticut had a substantial outstand
ing state-issued debt and only a modest UI trust fund balance. The fis
cal condition of the state©s UI program was not strong. 31
Three conclusions emerge from the experiences of Louisiana, West
Virginia, and Connecticut:
All had low levels of UI trust fund reserves when the reces
sions began. When high unemployment caused large draw
downs of their trust funds, all quickly developed large debts
and then resorted to an innovative form of financing bond
issues.
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Louisiana and West Virginia repaid their debts more rapidly
than either had anticipated at the time of the bond issues. This
was also true for Connecticut, at least through mid 1997. The
bond programs can be described as "over-financed," in as
much as the anticipated annual tax revenues exceeded the
annual retirement of the fixed-maturity debt contemplated at
the time the bonds were issued.
After issuing bonds to pay off UI indebtedness, the three states
had different experiences with UI trust fund accumulation.
Connecticut and West Virginia have not rebuilt their UI trust
fund balances to high levels. Both states may need Title XII
loans during the next recession. From 1993 through 1996,
Louisiana raised its UI trust fund balance substantially. The
state©s reserve ratio multiple stood at 1.10 at the end of 1996,
or 72 percent above the national average. It appears that both
Connecticut and West Virginia need to improve the basic bal
ance between UI program revenues and benefit payments.
Innovative borrowing arrangements are no substitute for
underlying financial soundness in UI program financing.

To help compare different methods of debt financing, this section
reviews four topics. Three deal directly with the costs of indebtedness,
and the fourth also has cost implications. The discussion repeats some
points made earlier but emphasizes a comparison of the alternatives.
Interest Rate Spreads
Many types of state debt can be issued. This discussion is confined
to the interest rates on the four types of debt discussed earlier (see
Table 4-1) and the associated interest-rate spreads. The four are Title
XII loans, Aaa municipal bonds, six-month taxable commercial paper,
and one-month tax-free commercial paper. The latter two are proxies
for short-term interest rates, but it should be noted that the gamut of
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short-term instruments runs from one-month commercial paper to
three-year notes.
As noted earlier, Title XII rates have consistently exceeded Aaa
municipal bond rates since 1983, with the spread being variable but
often larger when interest rates are lower. The spread between Aaa
municipal bonds and six-month taxable commercial paper also varies
widely, but it is generally smaller than the Title XII-Aaa spread.
Between 1989 and 1996, however, the spread ranged from -181 basis
points (1989) to 229 basis points (1992). Even larger spreads occur
between Aaa municipal bond rates and the rates on one-month tax-free
commercial paper. In 1992, the spread was 347 basis, but it exceeded
200 basis points in each of the six years from 1991 through 1996 and in
nine of the last eleven years (see Table 4-1). Even greater volatility in
interest rate spreads would appear if monthly data were examined.
For the foreseeable future, Title XII rates are likely to exceed Aaa
municipal bond rates. It also is highly likely that interest rates on very
short-term instruments will remain far below Aaa municipal bond
rates. Moreover, as shown in Table 4-1, annual interest rate spreads
vary widely. The differences are even greater and more varied in the
monthly data. If cost comparisons could be made solely on the basis of
interest rates, Title XII rates would clearly be the highest and shortterm tax-free rates the lowest.
The Costs of Issues
The costs of issuing affect the relative attractiveness of state debt.
There are no underwriting fees on Title XII loans from the U.S. Trea
sury. Underwriting fees vary according to the type of state debt instru
ment and are generally higher for longer-term obligations, higher for
obligations with call features, higher for smaller issues, and higher for
revenue bonds than they are for general obligation bonds. 32
An appropriate comparison of state debt and Title XII loans would
add issuing fees to the interest rate for each type of instrument. The
fees make state debt more expensive and raise the interest rate spread
required to save on the costs of state debt issues.
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The Costs of Debt Repayment
At present, states can treat the administrative costs of debt repay
ment identically under each of the four alternatives. Title XII loans
repaid by state payroll taxes have their administrative costs defrayed by
the administrative finance allocation from the U.S. Department of
Labor. According to current interpretations, administrative finance
allocations can also be used to defray the cost of collecting the state
bond taxes levied to repay state-issued debt instruments. There may be
small differences in the scale of the state-tax-related costs, but states
can treat this aspect of tax administration like any other UI tax collec
tion.
Of the three states that have issued state debt instruments, only
one, West Virginia, has used its UI administrative allocation to cover
the cost of collecting bond taxes. Connecticut©s reliance on its own
resources is especially interesting, given that it received a written inter
pretation that federal monies could be used to collect bond taxes.
Note, too, that the federal monies distributed to states for UI pro
gram administration can be used to pay for the administration of a
purely state tax. This suggests a question: if states can issue taxexempt bonds to minimize their interest costs, why should the federal
government pay for the costs of administering such state taxes? If the
current federal interpretation were to change, the cost of issuing state
debt would also have to include administrative costs.
Positions on the question vary, and at the end of 1996, that of the
UI Service differed from that of Louisiana officials in 1987. As noted,
Louisiana law explicitly provided for state financing to administer its
state tax, through an annual transfer from the trust account to the
state©s Department of Labor. West Virginia had no such provision.
Connecticut, despite having received written authorization to use its
federal UI administrative allocation to collect bond taxes, opted to use
its own resources.
Flexibility
Flexibility in borrowing and repaying clearly differs according to
the method of debt financing. Title XII loans and repayments can and
do take place daily. Essentially, the process operates on demand for
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debtor states, allowing them to maintain a zero balance, which mini
mizes the average amount of outstanding debt.
State debt issues, however, are inherently less flexible than Title
XII borrowing. States must plan for an issue and must have contin
gency plans, for unexpected developments can alter the projected time
paths for benefit payments, tax receipts, and/or interest rates. Unex
pected developments affecting receipts and expenditures (hence affect
ing the trust fund balance) can be addressed in two ways: by issuing
short-term debt and by issuing callable long-term debt. Most forms of
issuing debt require preparation time, but it is possible to issue com
mercial paper daily.
Another aspect of flexibility is the ability to call bonds. After
bonds have been issued to pay off Title XII loans, any excess in a
state©s annual bond tax receipts over its maturing fixed-maturity bonds
can be used to repay callable bonds.
Including callable bonds in a state debt issue gives the state the
ability to speed up its debt repayment if its economy performs better
than anticipated. Issuing callable bonds also provides flexibility when
performance falls below anticipation. Uncertainty can be addressed by
making the total issue larger than the state©s "best" estimate of its bor
rowing needs. However, this strategy has its costs, i.e., the interest
charges and costs of issuing for any "excess" bonds.
Alternatively, the state can resort to new debt issues as needed.
Following this strategy would mean the first issue would be smaller,
but the cost of a potential second issue would also have to be consid
ered.
Thus, while Title XII loans are clearly the most flexible, issuing
short-term state debt, issuing of callable bonds, and planning for a sec
ond debt issue also offer considerable flexibility.

UNCERTAINTIES FOR DEBTOR STATES
A state faces several uncertainties when it considers how best to
finance its UI debt. This section reviews some of the uncertainties
already noted and adds other considerations.
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The future performance of the state©s economy is an obvious
uncertainty affecting the volume and timing of borrowing. Unexpected
increases in unemployment raise benefit outlays and reduce tax
receipts. There are also uncertainties about interest rate spreads.
What has not been emphasized up to this point, however, is the
uncertainty associated with state and federal legislation. A state facing
debt or additional debt may enact legislation designed to improve sol
vency. In such situations, the volume of future indebtedness will be
reduced or eliminated. The three states that have used bond issues
enacted solvency legislation at the time the bond issue was authorized.
All three states were already substantially indebted to the U.S. Trea
sury.
Developments in Maine, a state facing first-time borrowing during
early 1993, are instructive. Actuarial projections made at the end of
1992 showed borrowing would begin in early 1993 and would be
chronic for the rest of the 1990s. 33 After some deliberation, Maine
crafted temporary legislation that included an emergency solvency tax,
an increase in the maximum tax rate, a continuation of a freeze on the
maximum benefit, and a reduction in weekly benefits for new claim
ants. The legislation, effective during 1993 and 1994, was designed to
avoid major indebtedness for that period, build a modest balance by the
end of 1994, and give Maine time to develop a long-term solution to its
UI funding imbalance. The temporary legislation became effective on
April 1st, but its tax provisions were retroactive to January 1st. A twoyear improvement in solvency was expected. The improvement totaled
$60 million, with tax increases accounting for about 80 percent.
Because of the legislation, Maine did not accumulate a large debt dur
ing 1993 and 1994. Subsequently, Maine enacted other solvency mea
sures in 1995, 1996, and 1997.
Experiences in Massachusetts in the early 1990s also illustrate how
legislation can affect the scale of future debt. Provisions of 1991 legis
lation that came into effect in 1992 included a higher taxable wage
base, a higher maximum tax rate schedule, and selected benefit reduc
tions. As a result, tax receipts grew substantially in 1992. Whatever
the previous prospect had been, Massachusetts anticipated that its debt
accumulation would be smaller following the 1991 legislation. The
bond issuance that had been considered before to the 1991 legislation
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did not take place. The state©s indebtedness to the U.S. Treasury fell
during 1993, and all loans were fully repaid in May 1994.
Federal legislation can also affect a state©s decisions about whether
to issue debt instruments. The uncertainties are of a different magni
tude, however. State preferences are not as influential in framing UI
legislation and/or administrative guidelines at the federal level. One
can argue that current federal guidelines favor state debt issues over
Title XII borrowing. There are three factors to look at here, each of
which could change.34
First, states can "game" the Title XII cash-flow borrowing proce
dures. Cash-flow loans were originally intended to cover low trust
fund balances, where tax receipts and benefit outlays are roughly equal
but differ in their seasonal patterns. Thus, borrowing and repayment
would roughly balance over the fiscal year, leaving no debt on Septem
ber 30th. Foregoing federal interest charges associated with cash-flow
borrowing can be justified. However, at present, a state may borrow
repeatedly during the fiscal year, accumulate a sizeable debt, and then
issue a state debt instrument to pay off all borrowing on September
30th. The state avoids all federal interest charges on the debt accumu
lated through September 30th and starts to pay interest on the state debt
issued on September 30th. This use of cash-flow borrowing differs
from the intended use.
Second, a state can use its federal grant for UI program administra
tion to defray the cost of collecting the state taxes used to-retire stateissued debt. If the debt is truly state debt and hence is eligible for taxfree status, why should a state be allowed to use federal monies to
administer the collection of a state tax?35 As noted, Louisiana and Con
necticut used state resources to defray these costs of tax administration,
but West Virginia used its federal UI administrative allocation.
Third, the current interpretation of the trust fund withdrawal stan
dard on repaying state-issued debt can be questioned. At present, if a
state issues debt and then deposits the proceeds into its trust fund
account, it may later make withdrawals from the trust fund to repay the
principal on the loan.36 The argument behind this interpretation is that
since the principal was used to pay benefits, repaying the principal is a
use of the trust fund for the same purpose.
In the three-areas outlined, the current federal administrative
guidelines confer financial and/or administrative advantages on states
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that issue state debt instead of using Title XII loans. Given the federal
budget deficit and the pressure to reduce it, it is conceivable that the UI
Service, the Secretary of Labor, or the Office of Management and Bud
get could change one or more of the guidelines. If there were changes,
the relative cost of issuing state debt would be higher in the future.
To summarize, though uncertainties about the economy and about
interest rate spreads are clearly important, the potential for changes in
both the state and federal legislation must also be taken in to account.
Further, current federal administrative interpretations could change.
Any of these uncertainties can affect a state©s decision about the best
way to repay its trust fund indebtedness.

SOME COST COMPARISONS
The main reason for issuing state debt is to save on interest costs.
This section compares the cost of state bond issues and Title XII loans
for Louisiana and West Virginia, the two states that have repaid their
state-issued bonds. The summary information presented is based on
annual spreadsheet models for the bond issues and for Title XII loans.
To keep the discussion focused, the comparisons involve states that
have long-term debts rather than states that are just starting to incur
debts. The comparisons are illustrative but do not attempt to convey
the full reality. The emphasis is on three factors: interest rate differen
tials, the duration of indebtedness, and the share of the bond issue
deposited in the state©s UI trust fund.
Each of the three factors deserves some elaboration. The interest
rates on a bond issue are fixed over the course of the debt, but Title XII
interest rates vary by year. The comparisons made here use a single
interest rate for both, the average rate applicable on the first year of
bond repayments. Because the Title XII interest rate can rise or fall
from its first-year level, a comparison based on constant rates might
violate reality, but it does not necessarily bias the results.
Two factors determine the duration of indebtedness: the size of the
state©s initial debt and the annual excess of its revenues (regular UI
taxes plus the state taxes used to repay the bonds, hereafter known as
"bond taxes") over UI benefit payments during the repayment period.
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The simulations for both methods of financing use past levels of UI
trust fund tax receipts plus estimates for bond taxes. 37
Any state issuing bonds must use some part of the proceeds to
cover interest charges, issuing fees, administration, and contingen
cies. Unlike Title XII borrowing, a part of the loan proceeds is not
deposited directly into the UI trust fund. Louisiana and West Virginia
provided information on those amounts.
The simulation follows certain assumptions for both states. Under
Title XII, the excess of tax revenues over UI benefits went first to repay
outstanding loans and then to build the trust fund. Thus, the debt was
paid off faster under Title XII, but because the trust fund balance was
zero in the early years, the fund did not start to earn interest income as
quickly. Both Title XII borrowing and state debt issuing eventually
resulted in positive trust fund balances and trust fund interest earnings.
Table 4-4 provides summary information for Louisiana and West
Virginia under the two alternatives. Louisiana borrowed $1,315 mil
lion and deposited only about $820 million directly into its UI trust
fund,38 with the remainder going to related trust accounts. The deposit
ratio (0.624) is low, but at the time there was great uncertainty about
the state©s need for additional loans.
As noted, the state©s bonds were fully defrayed during 1993, and
bond repayments were completed during 1994. The simulation indi
cates that Louisiana©s bond taxes generated a total of $1,357 million
between 1987 and 1993. 39 Thus, the simulation agrees with reality in
that the last of the debt was covered six years after the issue. Given
equivalent tax revenues during those years (including bond taxes),
however, the debt would have been fully repaid in 1990 under Title
XII, and the trust fund balance would have reached $740.8 rather than
$601.0 million by the end of 1992.
Note the interest totals for the two methods of financing. Bond
issues earned Louisiana©s trust fund $150.1 million, but total interest
costs on the bonds were $224.3 million and net interest costs were
$74.2 million. Under Title XII, the comparable totals were $116.5 mil
lion in Title XII interest charges, $89.9 million in trust fund interest
earnings, and a net cost of $26.6 million, or $47.6 million less than for
the bond issue.40
In the simulations, Louisiana had larger net interest charges and a
smaller trust fund end balance when it issued bonds. This result
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Table 4-4 Comparisons of Bond Issues and Title XII Loans for Louisiana
and West Virginia3
Louisiana
State
bonds
Total bond issues
Bonds deposited in
UI trust fund

1,315

West Virginia

Title XII
NAb

State
bonds

Title XII

258

NA

820

NA

226

NA

0.624

NA

0.876

NA

Issuance year

1987

NA

1987

NA

Year of full debt
repayment

1993

1990

1991

1989

0.0680

0.0933

0.0680

0.0933

Interest on borrowing

224.3

116.5

32.5

22.8

Trust fund interest

150.1

89.9

58.5

22.1

74.2

26.6

-26.0

0.7

601.0

740.8

141.0

119.6

Deposits/total issues

Interest rate

Net interest paid
Trust fund balance,
December 31, 1992

SOURCE: Based on simulations by the author.
a All dollar amounts are measured in millions.
b NA = not applicable, as the state already had Title XII debts and all borrowing had
been deposited in the state©s UI trust fund.

obtained even though the bond interest rate was 253 basis points lower
than the Title XII interest rate. The explanation lies in the combination
the low deposit-to-total-issuance ratio (0.624) and the longer average
time over which interest charges accrued on the bonds. Bond interest
was paid for six years (1988 through 1993), but Title XII interest was
paid only through 1990.
Different results were obtained for West Virginia even though the
simulations used the same interest rates as for Louisiana. The depositto-total-issuance ratio was higher (0.876) and West Virginia©s bonds
were paid off much more rapidly (in four years rather than six). The
interest paid on the debt was somewhat larger under bond issue ($32.5
million versus $22.8 million), but larger trust fund interest earnings
also accrued ($58.5 million versus $22.1 million). West Virginia paid
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net interest of $0.7 million under Title XII borrowing, compared to net
interest earnings of $26.0 million under bond issuance. Also note that
the December 1992 fund balance was higher under the bond issue
($141.0 million versus $119.6 million).41
Are interest costs lower under bond issues? It depends. For West
Virginia, the bond issue meant savings on interest costs and a higher
trust fund balance at the end of 1992. For Louisiana, the results were
the opposite. The two principal reasons for the contrast are that Louisi
ana deposited a smaller share of its total bond issue in its UI trust fund
and that it had a longer period of indebtedness.
It must be emphasized that the simulations assumed away certain
complications. The interest rate spreads are held to be constant. When
the states decided to issue bonds, in 1987, both states had long-term
trust fund indebtedness. Thus, the simulations do not take into account
cash-flow borrowing (and the associated interest-forgiveness under
Title XII) or decisions about the length of the debt instruments to issue.
The simulations also assume identical revenue streams for Title XII
loans and state bond issues within each state.

SUMMARY

The question of how to finance UI trust fund debts is complex, and
the appropriate route for a state depends on several factors. Two states,
Louisiana and West Virginia, issued bonds in the 1987 to pay off accu
mulated trust fund debts and used state payroll taxes to repay the
bonds. A third state, Connecticut, opted for a bond issue in 1993.
However, the experiences of these three states represent but a small
fraction of the possibilities for issuing state debt as an alternative to
Title XII loans.
There are eight factors that a state must consider in reaching a pru
dent decision about the best way to finance its UI trust fund debt:
1. Anticipated future state economic performance
2. The possibility of state solvency legislation
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3. Federal legislation and administrative guidelines on state debt
issues
4. The expected duration of indebtedness
5. The flexibility of daily borrowing and repayment under Title
XII
6. The availability of Title XII cash-flow loans
7. Interest rate spreads across various debt instruments, and
8. Underwriting fees and other costs of issuing state debt.
Four of these factors merit additional comment.
Factor 1: Both the anticipated rate of growth and the degree of
uncertainty about future growth affect debt financing. If strong
economic growth is anticipated, then the there is less need to
issue long-term bonds, for the state can anticipate a rapid
recovery of its trust fund balance through future revenues asso
ciated with economic growth. Large debts coupled with uncer
tainty about future growth, on the other hand, increase the
appeal of state bond issues.
Factor 2: If solvency legislation looks likely, the need to
address debt financing with long-term bond issues is less
pressing; the solvency legislation itself would provide most of
remedy for the state©s debt problem. However, the political sit
uation many make a sharp increase in experience-rated
employer taxes unattractive, thus increasing the likelihood of
long-term indebtedness. Bond issues might then have more
appeal. Note that this factor overlaps with the expected dura
tion of indebtedness. Solvency provisions were included in
the three state laws that provided for bond issues. Solvency
legislation was also a primary factor in obviating the need for
bond issues in Maine and Massachusetts.
Factor 7: The point here is that the range of potential debt
instruments extends far beyond a simple comparison of, for
example, the Aaa municipal bond rate and the Title XII interest
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rate. The term structure of interest rates, the tax treatment of
bond interest income, and the issuing costs for different debt
instruments are all important.
Factor 8: To the extent there are economies of scale in issuing
state debt, larger states and states with higher ratios of debt to
covered wages (more serious debt problems) would find debt
issues more attractive than would smaller states and states with
a smaller scale of indebtedness.
During the next recession, some states will undoubtedly seriously con
sider issuing the state UI debt.

Notes
1. This chapter is based on a report to the U.S. Department of Labor (Vroman 1993).
2. Details of the patterns of UI debt repayment in the 1970s and 1980s are given in
Vroman (1990), Chapter 1.
3. There are some exceptions to this statement for example, tax refunds for over
payments and small amounts originally deposited in state trust funds during the
1950s, under the Reed Act but they are minor.
4. The Secretary of Labor must be satisfied that the funds used to pay interest on a
state©s trust fund debts do not come, directly or indirectly, from the state©s trust
fund account. In making this determination, the Secretary requires debtor states
to identify the source of funds for interest payments and the statutory basis for the
establishment and use of funds for making interest payments. See U.S. Depart
ment of Labor (1988).
5. The fourth-quarter interest rate is the interest rate paid on investments in special
certificates of indebtedness issued by the U.S. Treasury to the Unemployment
Trust Fund. The interest rate for these special debt instruments is the average rate
for outstanding Treasury interest-bearing obligations with maturities of four years
or more.
6. This interest payment is due the day after the first day of borrowing during the
October-December period. The interest on borrowing between October 1st and
December 31st is due at the end of the next fiscal year, September 30th.
7. States typically require payments by the end of the month following the end of a
calendar quarter, a 30- or 31-day delay. Employers usually make tax payments on
the last day possible, and there are usually a few days before the trust fund
accounts register the deposits.
8. See Vroman (1993), Table 1 and the associated text, for added details on the two
states.
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9. The Massachusetts economy is about twice the size of the Connecticut economy.
Taxable covered employment in 1988, for example, was 2.53 million in Massa
chusetts, compared with 1.37 million in Connecticut. If the funding imbalances
were proportionate to each state©s economy, Massachusetts would be expected to
borrow about twice as much as Connecticut.
10. Debt repayments (including complete repayment) between November 10th and
the end of the year do not prevent the penalty. There is no avoidance feature anal
ogous to the interest avoidance feature of cash-flow borrowing repaid by Septem
ber 30th.
11. The technical phrase for the penalty tax rate is the "FUTA tax credit offset rate."
States with acceptable experience-rating systems may impose experience-rated
taxes on their employers in lieu of a flat 5.4 percent state tax. In the first year of
automatic debt repayment, the maximum permissible tax credit offset rate is 5.1
percent, hence a 0.3 percent additional federal tax rate.
12. Annual increases in the FUTA penalty tax rate after the first year of penalty taxes
depend on state-specific circumstances. The increase in the second year may be
an additional 0.3 percent (for a total federal tax rate of 1.4 percent) or larger.
13. An advisory directive from the U.S. Department of Labor indicates that the states
can use their financial allocation for UI program administration to collect both the
separate and the regular UI payroll taxes. The added administrative expenses do
not have to be financed separately.
14. There are 100 basis points per full percentage point in an interest rate.
15. Interest was first charged on U.S. Treasury loans after April 1, 1982. The Title XII
rates before 1982 have been calculated in the same way as the rates charged on
interest-bearing loans. The interest rate (specified in paragraph 904(b) of the
Social Security Act) is the average rate on public debt for the last three months of
the preceding calendar year.
16. See Miller, Pavosevich, and Vroman (1997) and Vroman (1990) for summaries of
borrowing and repayment patterns.
17. Of course, Title XII and other federal statutes governing Ul-related borrowing and
repayment must be satisfied. Administrative rulings by the U.S. Treasury make it
difficult for states to issue bonds in anticipation of future indebtedness.
18. General obligation bonds are backed by the full financial resources of the issuer.
Revenue bonds are backed by a specific asset or tax base. In borrowing to pay off
UI trust fund debts, a state would be expected to issue revenue bonds or other debt
secured by future payroll taxes on UI covered employment. Callable bonds have
a stated maturity date but, under stated conditions, allow the issuer to redeem
them earlier. A call could occur either because the excess of revenues over bene
fits surpassed expectations or because changes in interest rates favor the issue of
another type of debt instrument. The owner of callable bonds usually receives a
higher interest rate for those bonds relative to fixed bonds of the same maturity.
Notes often have maturities of six months to three years, while commercial paper
typically covers one to six months.
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19. To compare the issuing fees for different classes of debt instruments and of instru
ments of differing maturities, a state would need to make assumptions about sev
eral features of each instrument being considered. The issuing fees for bonds,
notes, and commercial paper shown in the text should be seen as illustrating likely
ranges.
20. The legislation in Maine that became effective April 1, 1993, is a good example of
state action motivated by a desire to avoid insolvency. A two-year emergency
package raised taxes retroactive to January 1, 1993, and reduced benefits, starting
in April 1993. This legislation is discussed below.
21. See Miller, Pavosevich, and Vroman (1997), Table 9.3.
22. From 1980 through 1983, the national unemployment rate averaged 8.5 percent of
the labor force. The corresponding four-year averages for Louisiana and West
Virginia were 9.3 and 13.0 percent, respectively. During the next four years, 1984
through 1987, the national unemployment rate averaged 7.0 percent, but Louisi
ana©s averaged 11.7 percent, and West Virginia©s averaged 12.7 percent.
23. The disparities between benefits and taxes for 1982 and 1983 are even larger than
suggested in Table 4-2. The benefit data do not include the state©s share of
extended benefit payments, which totaled $15 million and $53 million, respec
tively.
24. The tax was first collected in the last half of 1987. For that year, the taxable wage
base was $7,500.
25. Of the monies deposited into the benefit transfer account, only about $40 million
was used to defray additional borrowing from the U.S. Treasury. The bulk of the
account was eventually used to retire bonds.
26. The taxable wage base rose from $7,100 in 1993 to $9,000 in 1994 and was slated
to rise by annual increments of $1,000, reaching $13,000 in 1998, and then to rise
to $15,000 in 1999. The solvency tax rate rose from 1.0 percent in 1993 to 1.5
percent from 1994 through 1998, and then was scheduled to drop to 1.4 percent in
1999. The taxes to repay the bonds were to be levied as a portion of each
employer©s experience rate and were estimated to average from 0.75 percent to
1.05 percent on the taxable wages paid in the experience-year ending the June
30th prior to the tax year.
27. The bond proceeds were also used to pay benefits from late September 1993
through early April 1994, at which time first-quarter regular contributions became
available.
28. Repayments through July 1997 totaled $224 million, with $155 million in sched
uled repayments and $69 million in callable bonds.
29. Synthetic fixed-rate bonds can be described as fixed for the state but variable for
the underwriter. In other words, the underwriter undertook the risk of varying the
interest rates to be paid to bondholders. These bonds were refunded during 1996
and replaced with a true fixed-rate issue.
30. This was anticipated in planning Connecticut©s bond issues. Borrowing less
would have meant risking failing to meet the repayment schedule for the fixedmaturity debt.
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31. A factor that will inhibit future trust fund building is a tax provision that reduces
the solvency tax when the trust fund balance (the net of all borrowing) exceeds 0.8
percent of total wages. This threshold was $377 million at the end of 1996.
32. Issues that are not insured (or secured by some other means) have lower under
writing fees, but such savings are largely or totally offset by the higher interest
associated with a greater risk of default.
33. Like many states, Maine has an indexed weekly benefit maximum but a fixed tax
able wage base. During the 1990-1992 recession, which was especially severe
throughout New England, the state©s trust fund balance was almost exhausted. In
fact, Table 1-4 shows that the 1989-1992 decline in Maine©s reserve ratio multiple
was the largest for all 53 UI programs.
34. The discussion that follows represents the opinions of the author. To the author©s
knowledge, the U.S. Department of Labor has no plans to revise its administrative
guidelines for state debt issues. Some readers may consider the guidelines
entirely appropriate, but others may argue that the guidelines are not neutral in
their effect on decisions about state debt issues.
35. There are many points of view on this issue. One perspective (more sympathetic
to UI programs issuing state debt) can be expressed as follows. If issuing state
debt is an option, then the administrative costs of collecting the associated taxes
should be reimbursable, since the ultimate purpose of such taxes is to finance the
payment of UI benefits.
36. This interpretation was articulated in a letter dated March 29, 1993, from the UI
Service to the Director of Accounts of the Connecticut Department of Labor.
37. In effect, the assumption is that under the Title XII alternative the state levies
additional flat-rate payroll taxes. These taxes have an annual yield equal to the
bond tax receipts and remain in effect for the same number of years.
38. The $820 million consisted of $780 million deposited at the time of the bond issue
and another $40 million deposited to cover additional borrowing during the fol
lowing months.
39. The $1,357 million represents about 70 percent of the state©s regular UI taxes for
the seven years. Note the tax receipts for 1987 to 1993 in Table 4-2.
40. For both Louisiana and West Virginia, the interest costs for bond issues cover all
years that bonds were outstanding (through 1993 in Louisiana). The UI trust fund
interest earnings totals cover the years through 1992.
41. The summary for West Virginia is carried through 1992, even though it completed
its state bonds repayment in 1991. This was done partly to compare the results
with those for Louisiana. The general findings on bond issues versus Title XII
borrowing do not change for West Virginia when the analysis stops at the end of
1991. Under the bond issue, the 1991 trust fund end balance is higher ($157 mil
lion versus $137 million) and the net interest cost is lower (net interest earnings of
$14.5 million versus net interest payments of $10.8 million).

5 State Reserve Funds
State reserve funds are a recent UI policy initiative. 1 Reserve
funds are created by the partial redirection of employer UI taxes into
specially administered state accounts. The principal in these state
accounts is dedicated to the payment of UI benefits. However, the
interest income from reserve funds can be used in several ways: to help
unemployed workers find new jobs and to help finance UI and/or
employment service (ES) administrative activities.
A state©s financing situation can make the creation of a reserve
fund attractive and feasible.
1. Total reserves in the UI trust fund accounts at the U.S. Trea
sury are high in many states, not only in absolute levels but
also relative to the size of the state economies. Several states
judge these balances to be fully adequate for financing draw
downs in a future recession.
2. Under the UI trust fund withdrawal standard, monies held in
the U.S. Treasury accounts can be used only to pay UI benefits.
This standard applies to interest earnings on trust fund bal
ances, to the principal, and to new deposits.
3. States are increasingly recognizing that training and other
adjustment activities can speed the reemployment of unem
ployed workers. By easing the transition to new jobs, such
state-supported initiatives may also help UI trust funds to real
ize savings through reduced benefit outlays.
4. State Employment Security Agencies (SESAs) are finding it
increasingly difficult to cover their traditional UI and ES
administrative functions with only the federal allocations made
available for those purposes. Many states now supplement
their federal SESA administrative allocations with monies
from other sources. In some states, this supplement takes the
form of a supplemental payroll tax on Ul-covered employers.
Taken together, these situations make the establishment of a state
reserve fund attractive. By creating a reserve fund, the state can, in
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effect, gain access to interest earnings that would otherwise lie in its
U.S. Treasury account, earnings dedicated solely to paying future ben
efits.
This chapter addresses several questions about creating a state
reserve fund and how such a fund functions, including its relation to
the UI trust fund account at the U.S. Treasury and its effect on the sol
vency of a state©s UI program. The chapter does not offer definitive
answers to these questions. It does provide partial answers and also
provides, information important for answering other questions.
The chapter©s three main conclusions are
State reserve funds represent an alternative use for interest
earnings that would otherwise go only to paying benefits.
A state that creates a reserve fund and maintains its balance as
intended in subsequent years does not significantly increase its
risk of UI program insolvency. (This conclusion is based
partly on simulations using a model of Indiana©s UI program,
which evaluated a 1991 proposal to establish a reserve fund.)
Regulatory oversight does not, at present, ensure that state
reserve funds remain dedicated to paying benefits.

A DESCRIPTION OF STATE RESERVE FUNDS
State reserve funds are created by partially redirecting employer
taxes from their usual destination (the state UI trust fund account at the
U.S. Treasury) to a special fund set up and administered by the state.
The reserve fund accumulates assets for several years, until it reaches
the target level specified in the authorizing legislation. The principal in
the reserve fund remains dedicated to the payment of UI benefits, not
by directly issuing checks to claimants, but by acting as a reinsurance
fund that can make advances to the state©s account at the U.S. Treasury
should that account become depleted. In contrast to the current situa
tion, where UI programs borrow from the Federal Unemployment
Account (the FUA), a state with a reserve fund borrows first from itself
and then from the FUA. Borrowing from the FUA occurs only if the
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reserve fund is fully loaned out or has already reached an unacceptably
low level.
The reserve fund©s principal is invested in secure assets, for exam
ple, U.S. Treasury bonds that generate interest income. States adminis
ter these investment decisions and thus control the level of risk in
reserve fund financial assets. The interest income can be used in two
general ways: for promoting worker adjustments in the labor market
and for administering either the UI or the ES program, or both. Since a
new state tax is created, some monies must also be dedicated to collect
ing reserve fund taxes. The authorizing legislation therefore specifies
that some part of reserve fund interest income be used to defray the
cost of administering the reserve fund.
The uses of reserve fund interest for worker adjustments and for
administering UI and/or ES can vary. The potential range of training,
for example, is suggested by the following target groups: workers
recently unemployed or at substantial risk of unemployment; dislo
cated workers; UI benefit exhaustees and other long-term unemployed;
persons who do not qualify for other federal or state job training pro
grams; employers seeking to recruit workers in new and expanding
industries and occupations; employers facing critical skill shortages in
selected occupations; employers considering a plant closing unless the
costs of worker retraining can be at least partially covered by a public
program; and worker upgrading. Potential trainees would vary in
terms of their employability and their previous UI history. To the
extent that a state training program hastens the reemployment of its UI
claimants, the state may find itself with reduced UI benefit outlays. 2
Reserve fund interest income is also directed to administering UI
or ES programs, or both. Traditionally, both programs have been
administered with federal monies allocated to the states under the
Social Security Act and the Wagner-Peyser Act, respectively. Cutbacks
in federal allocations mean that states must either reduce SESA
employment and associated services or supplement federal grants with
state monies. During 1996, at least five states levied a state payroll tax
to increase monies available for UI and/or ES administration. Interest
earnings from a state reserve fund can be another source of supplemen
tal monies for administration.
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LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS
The legislation that establishes a state reserve fund can vary in sev
eral respects, depending on the goals of the state. A state reserve fund
can be set up to be tax- and revenue-neutral, or it can act as a flexible
tax that automatically generates less revenue when reserves are high
and more when reserves fall below a designated threshold.
For states that use the reserve ratio method of experience-rating to
assign tax rates, a state reserve fund can have a significant effect on the
total reserves. If a state has a reserve fund, the reserve calculation
based on the federal fund balance would yield lower ratios and higher
tax rates because part of the federal trust fund balance has been
diverted to the reserve fund. A state that creates a reserve fund and
continues to base its reserve ratio on the federal trust fund has an auto
matic tax rate increase. However, a reserve ratio based on total (federal
plus state) reserves does not change, because part of the revenue is
diverted to the state©s reserve fund but total revenue within the system
remains the same.3
During Indiana©s 1991 deliberations on establishing a reserve fund,
staff at the U.S. Department of Labor informed the state that legislation
defining a tax rate based on total reserves might not conform to federal
regulations. In other words, taxes designated for the federal trust fund
should not be based on reserves outside the federal UI program. How
ever, Indiana amended its proposed legislation and based its reserve
ratio on federal UI tax revenue multiplied by 1.25, which effectively
yielded a tax rate based on total reserves. This method for setting tax
rates for experience-rated employers was approved by the Department
of Labor. A state can also adjust the tax rate associated with each level
of the federal reserve ratio, but such an adjustment is never exactly rev
enue-neutral. Even if it is known that federal trust fund revenue will
decrease by a constant percentage each year (assuming that the federal
tax reduction remains in force in years when the state reserve fund tax
is inactive), future reserves will not decrease by a constant percentage.
For states that use benefit ratios, benefit-wage ratios, or declines in
payrolls to experience-rate UI taxes, the balance in the state©s reserve
fund does not affect the experience-ratings for individual employers.
However, many states using such experience-rating systems do use
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multiple tax rate schedules. In determining which schedule applies in
a given year, the reserve level should refer only to the balance in the
state©s federal trust fund account.
As noted, it can be assumed that drawdowns on reserve fund bal
ances would happen rarely, if at all. One way to define the maximum
value or ceiling for a state©s reserve fund is to peg it as a percentage of
wages and salaries. The state©s reserve fund tax would become inac
tive when state reserves reached that ceiling. Once the state reserve tax
is inactive, the tax revenues can be eliminated or be redirected to the
federal fund account. If revenues are redirected to the federal fund, the
program remains revenue-neutral because the total tax rate remains
unchanged: employers no longer have to pay the state tax rate, and they
no longer receive the federal tax reduction.
If, on the other hand, the revenue is completely eliminated, the
ceiling implies a tax reduction for employers in the years after the ceil
ing has been reached. Employers no longer pay the state reserve fund
tax, and they continue to pay at an unchanging rate into the state trust
fund at the U.S. Treasury. Lowering the ceiling level reduces total rev
enue and reserves and also generates earlier and more frequent tax
cuts. If inactive state taxes are redirected, lowering the ceiling does not
affect total reserves; it merely shifts the allocation between state and
federal trust fund balances.
The flexible tax reduction described above is similar to other flexi
ble tax features used by several states (discussed in Chapter 2). It gen
erates additional revenue when a state©s reserves (those not on loan)
fall below a specified threshold. A state©s reserve fund tax would be
even more flexible if the ceiling on real reserves were flexible, e.g., if it
were based on a minimum balance in the state©s federal account and on
a specified percentage of covered wages and salaries. A fund defined
in this way would accumulate higher reserves during a downturn.4 If
the state©s reserve fund tax were levied as a fraction of experiencerated taxes rather than at a flat rate, the fund would also accumulate
reserves at a faster rate as the state©s balance at the U.S. Treasury
declined to lower levels. Employer experience-rated taxes would rise
following an increase in unemployment and the associated increase in
UI benefit payments. The increase in UI tax rates implies a higher tax
rate for a state©s reserve fund contributions. However, the reserve fund
would not be subject to increases in benefit payouts and would accu-
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mulate higher reserves. Interest income generated by the fund would
then increase, as higher unemployment led to higher tax rates and thus
to larger deposits to the reserve fund.
There are few solvency implications for a reserve fund that specifi
cally dedicates its principal to UI benefits. Total reserves and taxes
(state plus federal) would remain nearly unchanged and would go to
largely the same purpose, with the majority of future revenue deposited
in the state©s account at the U.S. Treasury and a percentage deposited
in the state©s reserve fund. The decrease in interest income earned by
the federal trust fund account would depend on the percentage of
future revenue diverted to the state©s fund. 5 The state would, in turn,
gain the use of interest income generated by its reserve fund.
States are free to choose the percentage of future revenues to be
diverted to the reserve fund and to set the ceiling for the fund. The per
centage diverted determines the rate at which the reserve fund grows.
For a given percentage, the ceiling then determines the number of years
that the reserve fund tax would be active. If the intention is to leave the
level of total (federal plus state) reserves unchanged, the desired level
of reserves in the fund would be influenced by the level of interest
income targeted by the state.
However, if state tax revenue were not redirected to the federal
account after the ceiling had been reached, the ceiling would determine
the frequency of reductions in total taxes (more frequently with a lower
ceiling), and the percentage diverted would determine the size of the
reductions after the ceiling had been reached. In either case, future
state reserves might not be available for benefits, and it would be inad
visable for a state to accumulate a reserve fund in a way that measur
ably increased the risk of insolvency in its federal trust fund account.

CONFORMITY ISSUES

The discussion to this point has assumed that that principal in a
state©s reserve fund goes solely toward UI benefit payments. However,
there are no federal regulations governing this point. The use of state
reserve fund assets is not subject to federal conformity review, either at
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the time the legislation is enacted or if the state brings in legislation to
change the use.
It might be argued that the creation of a state reserve fund implies
diverting some tax revenue from the federal trust fund to the state
reserve fund and is, therefore, subject to federal conformity review; but
creating a state reserve fund is a two-step process. First, the state lev
ies a state reserve fund tax. Clearly, a state can levy any tax it
chooses no conformity issue here. Second, the state reduces the tax
rate on UI taxes designated for the state©s federal account also per
fectly within the bounds of conformity. Conformity requirements
would have to be tied to the solvency of the state©s federal trust fund.
Staff at the Department of Labor have indicated it would be difficult to
draft such a requirement, but the possibility should not be completely
ruled out.
Given the lack of conformity requirements, the establishment of a
state reserve fund could threaten the solvency of a state©s federal trust
fund and increase the need for future borrowing.6 The legislation cre
ating a reserve fund in a given state might be widely accepted if it were
based on the premise that the fund would change the amount of money
available for benefits but would generate extra revenue for state pro
grams. However, a change in state government could lead to a change
in policy and leave reserve fund assets vulnerable to a raid.
Thus far, conformity requires only that the reserve fund be com
pletely separate from the state©s federal UI account. For example, state
reserves cannot enter into the calculation of an employer©s UI tax rate.
As shown in the case of Indiana©s 1991 reserve fund deliberations, the
requirement can be easily satisfied.
Whether a state may use federal administrative grants to cover the
costs of collecting its reserve fund tax is not completely resolved.
General Administration Letter 4-91 specifies that Title III grants can be
used for the administration of taxes only to the extent that the associ
ated revenue benefits the UI program. As noted, how a state©s reserve
fund assets might be used in the future remains unclear. A state might
be tempted to use the fund©s principal for a purpose other than paying
UI benefits. If the federal government were to provide full administra
tive funding for state reserve fund tax collections, it would need to
recover part of that administrative allocation if the state reserve fund
were then used for a different purpose. On the other hand, if faced with
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a federal requirement to repay UI administrative grants, states might be
less likely to change the uses of reserve fund assets.

FOUR STATE RESERVE FUNDS
The first state to create a reserve fund was North Carolina, in 1986.
Its employers paid reserve fund taxes from 1987 to 1991. The princi
pal in the reserve fund remained at about $200 million from 1992
through 1996. Interest from the fund is deposited into the state©s
Worker Training Trust Fund. Between 1992 and 1995, expenditures
from the latter ranged from $12 to $14 million annually. The monies
have been used mainly to finance ES program administration and job
training. Other states with reserve funds have copied many features of
North Carolina©s legislation.
To highlight key aspects of state reserve funds, Table 5-1 compares
funds across the four states that have created such funds. The Idaho,
North Carolina, and Oregon reserve funds have met their target bal
ances. Nebraska, which started to collect reserve fund taxes in 1996,
expects to meet its target balance sometime between 1999 and 2001.
All four states finance the reserve fund by redirecting 20 percent of
employer taxes from the state©s UI account at the U.S. Treasury into a
state account. This percentage was originally used in North Carolina
and was copied by the other states. All four states also set a reserve
fund ceiling of 1 percent of taxable wages. If the reserve fund exceeds
this threshold on the computation date, the reserve fund tax is set at
zero for the next year. In all but North Carolina, the tax continues to be
collected in such years but is deposited in the state©s U.S. Treasury
account. North Carolina, in contrast, reduces total UI taxes by 20 per
cent in years that the reserve fund tax is not needed. 7
The employer taxes that finance the reserve fund are levied at rates
that reflect employers© experiences. After the taxes enter the reserve
fund, however, they are commingled, so the fund does not record indi
vidual employers© contributions. In effect, reserve fund activities are
financed by experience-rated taxes, not by flat-rate taxes. Flat-rate
payroll taxes finance many state training funds, including California©s
Employment Training Panel. 8

Table 5-1 Key Provisions of Reserve Funds in Four States
Provision

Idaho

Nebraska

North Carolina

Size of UI tax
20
20
20
redirection (%)
Reserve fund ceiling3
1
1
1
(% of taxable wages)
is
ceiling
after
Rediversion of taxes to U.S. Treasury
No
Yes
Yes
reached?
Yes
Yes
Yes
Reserve fund principal dedicated to UI benefits?
Reserve fund interest earnings deposited into separate
Yes
Yes
Yes
state fund?
Main use of state interest earnings
X
X
Job training
X
costs
Unemployment insurance administrative
X
X
Employment service administrative costs
X
X
X
costs
Reserve fund administrative
1 The computation used to deactivate the reserve fund tax also considers the balance in the state©s federal trust fund account.
the reserve fund tax can also be deactivated if combined taxes would put employers in the lowest tax schedule.

Oregon
20
1
Yes
Yes
Yes
X
X
X
X
In Nebraska,
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All four states dedicate the principal in the reserve fund to the pay
ment of UI benefits. Although the principal resides in the states, its
uses are limited to making loans to the state©s U.S. Treasury account,
serving as collateral for FUA loans to the Treasury account, or repay
ing the principal and interest on Title XII loans. In years when part of
the reserve fund©s principal is on loan, less interest income will accrue
to the state.
To establish clear accountability for the use of the reserve fund
interest earnings, the four states have created separate trust funds to
receive the interest earnings: the Special Administration Fund in Idaho,
the Nebraska Training and Support Trust Fund, the Worker Training
Trust Fund in North Carolina, and the Supplemental Administrative
Fund in Oregon. Each fund issues an annual report.
The bottom rows of Table 5-1 show the main uses of reserve fund
interest earnings. Each of the four states uses some monies to adminis
ter reserve fund taxes.9 Nebraska, North Carolina, and Oregon finance
worker training and skill-improvement programs with interest earn
ings. Reserve fund interest supplements the administrative budgets of
the UI and/or ES programs in Idaho, North Carolina, and Oregon.

STATE EXPERIENCES WITH RESERVE FUNDS
State experiences with reserve funds have generally been satisfac
tory. This section briefly discusses these experiences but is restricted
to a qualitative analysis.
While a state might be tempted to "raid" the principal in its reserve
fund, there have been no major diversions to date. 10 However, con
cerns about the potential for raiding can never be fully allayed. The
state law that created the reserve fund can be amended to divert some
or all of the assets to other uses; this is a fact of state-level politics. To
the extent that a state©s finances deteriorate under continued pressures
for low taxes, reserve funds could be tempting targets for raids.
The interest earnings of reserve funds are substantial. Once the
funds reached their targets of 1 percent of taxable wages, fund invest
ments in financial instruments yielding 6.0 to 7.0 percent have meant
$12-14 million annually in North Carolina and Oregon and about
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$3.0 million annually in Idaho. The annual interest yield is equiva
lent to a state payroll tax of 0.06 to 0.07 percent. This yield is simi
lar to tax rates in Alabama, Georgia, Hawaii, Nevada, and South
Carolina, where payroll taxes finance training and UI and/or ES
administrations.
Holding assets in a derivative fund also provides a state with a
margin for planning. Idaho, for example, has not spent all of its
reserve fund interest but has reinvested the assets of its derivative
administrative fund. This strategy partly reflects Idaho©s concerns
about future reductions in federal funding for UI and ES activities.
Holding assets in an administrative fund gives Idaho the opportunity to
offset federal funding reductions and maintain administration without
immediately having to impose a new tax. 11
North Carolina, Oregon, and Idaho, the three states with mature
reserve funds, have seen reductions in their trust fund reserves held at
the U.S. Treasury. From the end of 1989 to the end of 1996, North
Carolina©s federal balance declined from $1,471 million to $1,336 mil
lion. The associated reserve ratio multiple dropped from 1.26 to 0.77.
When reserve fund balances are considered, the drop in North Caro
lina©s total reserves over the same period was from $1,580 million to
$1,536 million, and the reserve ratio multiple dropped from 1.35 to
0.89. In Idaho, the combined sum of federal plus state balances rose
from $220 million at the end of 1989 to $323 million at the end of
1996. However, the combined reserve ratio multiple decreased from
1.37 to 1.15. Oregon©s combined reserve ratio multiple decreased from
1.35 to 1.24 over the same period. 12
All three states still had above-average reserve positions at the end
of 1996, when the national reserve ratio multiple was 0.64. These
states, even after declines in their combined trust fund reserve ratio
multiples, did not face the threat of insolvency at the end of 1996. At
the same time, the three used monies from state reserve fund interest
for purposes not permitted for the interest earned on federal trust fund
accounts.
An earlier report by Worden and Vroman (1991b) analyzed
whether having a reserve fund increases a state©s risk of insolvency.
The analysis used a state-specific trust fund model to simulate reserve
balances during various recessions. There is a slight increase in the
risk of insolvency, which directly reflects the diversion of interest earn-
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ings from the state reserve fund. However, the report concluded that
the increased risk of insolvency is very slight.

SUMMARY
A state©s reserve fund interest can have a positive impact on that
state©s economy. When designing a reserve fund, a state needs to con
sider both the amount of interest income to be diverted and the implica
tions that diverting that amount will have for the UI trust fund©s
solvency. The biggest threat to solvency comes not from the loss of
interest earnings from the federal account but from diverting the
reserve fund©s principal to another state-funded activity. To date, this
has not happened in any of the four states with reserve funds.
A state with a small federal trust fund account (for example, a
reserve ratio multiple below 0.75) should not consider establishing a
reserve fund. For a state with a small balance, the transition period
(when employer taxes are partially diverted into the reserve fund)
would further threaten the solvency of its federal trust fund account
while generating insignificant state interest income.
If, however, the state reserve fund principal remains dedicated to
paying UI benefits, the results of the simulation indicate a very slight
increase in the risk of insolvency. This finding is logical, for the state
would be, for the most part, merely shifting reserves from one location
to another.

Notes
1. This chapter draws on a paper by Worden and Vroman (1991b).
2. Evaluations of reemployment programs in Illinois, New Jersey, and Washington
suggest that paying reemployment bonuses may be a cost-effective way to reduce
UI benefit payments. See Woodbury and Spiegelman (1987), Corson et al.
(1989), and Spiegelman, O©Leary, and Kline (1992). There is less evidence about
the effects of training and retraining on UI outlays.
3. Tax rates are slightly affected if interest income enters the reserve ratio computa
tion, because part of total interest income is spent rather than being reinvested in
the reserve fund.
4. The higher level could come about in two ways. First, if a second condition also
had to be met, the balance would be higher than, say, 1 percent of wages and sala-
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ries. For example, the state might also require that its federal balance equal a cer
tain threshold before the reserve fund tax could be turned off. Second, if the state
reserve fund made loans to the federal account and the ceiling were based on the
total available reserves (state plus federal accounts), the state would continue to
levy a reserve fund tax for more years, causing the reserve fund to reach a higher
level.
Note that the amount of interest revenue lost to the federal trust fund would be
greater than the sum of annual state reserve fund interest income drawn out of the
system. State withdrawals do not reflect the lost compounding effects that would
occur if all trust fund reserves were kept in the federal account. The size of this
interest-on-interest loss is modest.
The threat of insolvency could also motivate states to enact legislation to restrict
future UI benefits.
In all four states, the computation of the reserve fund tax also considers the bal
ance in the state©s federal trust fund account.
If a state intends to use its reserve fund interest earnings primarily to finance
worker training, the distinction between a state reserve fund and other state pay
roll tax-financed training initiatives is not very sharp. A state facing reduced UI
taxes because of experience-rating can limit the reduction by simultaneously
imposing a training tax. This occurred in California when the Employment Train
ing Panel was first established. Perhaps the crucial distinction has to do with the
political environment at the time the state creates the fund. If a state wants to cre
ate a reserve fund but keep its UI tax rates stable, it must reduce its U.S. Treasury
account. Otherwise, employer taxes will rise.
The Employment and Training Administration©s General Administrative Letter
4-91 discusses the allocation of costs in states that levy both a reserve fund tax
and regular UI taxes. However, some issues concerning the use of federal
administrative grants to collect reserve fund taxes are not yet fully resolved. See
U.S. Department of Labor, Employment and Training Administration (1991) for
a discussion of those issues.
There were temporary diversions in North Carolina in the late 1980s, but both the
principal and the associated interest were fully repaid.
Of course, a large reduction in federal funding would cause administrative fund
assets to be quickly depleted. However, having such assets would give the state
more time to decide how to respond to the reduced funding.
Note the balances for the federal accounts and associated reserve ratio multiples
that appear in Table 1 -4.

6 Conclusions
Overall, the fiscal strength of state UI programs at the end of 1996
was weaker than it had been at the end of 1989, just before the onset of
the most recent recession. The national reserve ratio (high-cost) multi
ple dropped from 0.87 at the end of 1989 to 0.64 at the end of 1996.
The economic recovery of the 1990s has lasted several years, and it
appears that trust fund reserves will not be rebuilt to 1989 levels, or
that rebuilding will occur slowly over many years. States are more at
risk for insolvency in the late 1990s than they were in 1990. A repeti
tion of widespread and large-scale borrowing of the past is a distinct
possibility.
It might be argued that the states now have more flexible financing
than they had two decades ago. However, the research summarized in
Chapter 2 does not support such an assertion. UI programs continue to
need to maintain large trust funds in anticipation of recessions.
The literature review in Chapter 2 cites only three studies on flexi
ble financing. Clearly, more studies are required. Many states are
likely to have low reserve positions for the immediate future (even
without a recession in 1998 or 1999), making further study of flexible
financing all the more important. Support from the U.S. Department of
Labor on this important question would seem warranted.
States with indexed tax bases clearly show stronger trust fund posi
tions than nonindexed states. Between 1986 and 1996, the indexed
states maintained their taxable wage proportions and tax capacity, but
nonindexed states had declines in both. During the next recession, it
would be wise to note the borrowing patterns of states according to
their indexing arrangements. It appears that the states most at risk of
needing large loans are those with indexed maximum weekly benefits
but nonindexed tax bases.
Three states compensate for UI trust fund indebtedness by issuing
state debt instruments. The interest rates for such financial instruments
were lower than for Title XII loans, but it is not clear that these states
realized any savings on interest costs. For each of the three, the size of
the state debt issue exceeded the amount needed for repaying Title XII
loans. Each state later exercised call features for some of its long-term
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bonds. These issues were "too large" compared with Title XII loans,
but to some degree that is inevitable, since the amount needed cannot
be precisely known at the time a bond is issued. Moreover, the experi
ences with state bond issues to date represent only a sampling of the
potential variety of future state debt issues.
For states with large trust fund balances, state reserve funds offer
interesting potential. A state can use the interest earnings from stateheld reserves for activities not permitted when reserves are held in
accounts at the U.S. Treasury. The four states with reserve funds have
financed worker training and UI and ES program administration
through reserve fund interest earnings. Other states with healthy trust
fund balances might want to consider following their example.
Financing UI programs will continue to be a challenge to the
states, especially in an era of increasingly tight fiscal constraints.
Undoubtedly, individual states will experiment with setting the mini
mum acceptable fund balance and with flexible financing. More
research is needed on minimum adequate trust fund balances, UI tax
responsiveness, and alternative borrowing arrangements for debtor
states. If such research were done before the onset of the next reces
sion, the findings could help states pass more easily through that reces
sion.
The question of national leadership in defining and encouraging
large state trust fund balances continues to be important. Publicizing
state-level details about reserve adequacy (using standard indicators of
adequacy such as the reserve ratio multiple) could be helpful. Provid
ing financial rewards to states with large balances would seem useful.
Such rewards could take the form of higher interest rate payments on
balances above certain thresholds or reduced borrowing costs if prerecession balances satisfied common actuarial thresholds. Federal
leadership in this area could help to counter the political forces that
advocate reducing UI taxes. Success in rebuilding and maintaining
state trust fund balances would help UI programs better meet their tra
ditional objectives: maintaining the incomes of households with unem
ployment and improving the built-in stability of the macroeconomy.

Appendix A
A Simulation Analysis of Potential
Future Borrowing
A set of simulation projections helps to illustrate the risk of insolvency
posed by low trust fund balances at the start of 1997. All projections are based
on the state-level relationship between increases in unemployment and de
creases in the reserve ratio multiple during 1990-1992. A cross-section regres
sion with weighted state data was fitted to derive parameters for the
relationship. The resulting equation was then used to project counterfactual
trust fund drawdowns during 1990-1992 and 1997-1999. For both periods,
initial reserve ratio multiples were noted and alternative recession-related
drawdowns were simulated. The results show that many more states could
need loans than the seven that actually borrowed during 1991-1995.
The cross-section regression, with states weighted by the size of their labor
forces, was the following:
RRM92 - RRM89 = 0.3157 - 0.5526 x (TUR9092/TUR8789)
(2.65) (6.01)
Adj./?2 = 0.818
Std. err. = 0.249
where RRM89 and RRM92 are the reserve ratio multiples, TUR9092 and
TUR8789 are average unemployment rates for 1990-1992 and 1987-1989,
and t ratios appear in parentheses beneath the coefficients.
The regression shows a strong statistical association between the two se
ries, with larger decreases in reserve ratio multiples for states in which unem
ployment rate ratios were higher.
Chapter 1 notes that seven states needed U.S. Treasury loans during the
1991-1995 period. As shown in Table 1-4, Connecticut, Massachusetts, Mich
igan, and the District of Columbia had negative net balances at the end of 1992.
Maine, New York, and Missouri had positive net balances at the end of 1992,
even though they needed loans. Note, however, that the two states with largescale borrowing during 1991-1994 (Connecticut and Massachusetts) had neg
ative net reserves at the end of 1992, and their reserve ratio multiples were the
most negative of all state-level multiples.
A simulation that projects reserve ratio multiples at the end of hypothetical
recessions would not be expected to identify all states needing loans. Cash
flow loans would be expected for some states that ended the year with positive
trust fund balances. Further, the simulations do not attempt to measure the size
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of loans to individual states. However, the simulations would be expected to
identify states with substantial borrowing needs.
The simulations use actual reserve ratio multiples at the beginning of two
hypothetical recessions which started at the end of 1989 and at the end of 1996.
Reserve drawdowns then were simulated for three-year periods. Historic un
employment rate ratios were used along with Eq. Al to project the size of the
drawdowns. Subtracting the projected drawdown from the starting reserve ra
tio multiple yields the simulated multiple three years later.
Each state©s actual unemployment experiences are included in the simulat
ed trust fund drawdowns. There are four different recessions whose exact
years are shown in Table 1-2. The number of states with negative end balances
was then recorded for each of the four scenarios. The results for the 1990-1992
and the 1997-1999 periods differ due to differences in initial state trust fund
balances. For the 1990-1992 recession, the number of states with negative bal
ances at the end of 1992 ranged from 5 to 11. For the hypothetical 1997-1999
recession, the number of states with negative balances at the end of 1999
ranged from 7 to 17. Simulated borrowing was more widespread using reces
sion-related unemployment rate ratios from (1981-1983/1977-1979) and
(1971-1973/1967-1969) than using ratios from (1990-1992/1987-1989) and
(1974-1976/1971-1973).
Two inferences may be drawn from the simulations.
1.

That there were no widespread financing problems during 19901992 is attributable both to the mild nature of the recession and to the
comparatively large initial trust fund balances held by the states. The
states may not be as lucky in the next recession and may face
increases in unemployment of much greater magnitude.

2.

More states needed loans when they entered recessions with their
1996 reserves than with their 1989 reserves. Based on 1993-1996
rates of trust fund accumulation, several states will start the next
recession with smaller balances than they had at the end of 1989.
Other things being equal, these smaller balances will cause increased
borrowing.

Appendix B
Analysis of Trust Fund Reserves
During Recessions
The cyclical importance of tax-base indexing is examined with data from
the three most recent recessions. Three periods of recession-related draw
downs are examined: 1974-1976,1981-1983, and 1990-1992. These three re
cessions were selected because each had a measurable number of states with
indexed tax bases for at least part of the three-year period. 1 Changes in yearend reserve ratio multiples from the start to the end of the periods indicated
were the dependent variables. To ensure that small states did not unduly influ
ence the results, some regressions were fitted with data weighted by the size of
each state©s labor force (the 1976-1989 average).
The specifications use four independent variables:
1.

The growth in the unemployment rate (TUR) was expected to exert a
negative effect on the three-year change in reserve ratio multiples.
This is measured as a ratio of the average TUR for the three years of
heavy drawdowns to the average TUR for the three preceding years
(for example, the 1990-1992 average TUR as a ratio to the 19871989 average).2

2.

A dummy variable for the presence of an indexed maximum WBA
was used. This variable measures the fraction of the three recession
years when indexing was present and was expected to have a negative
coefficient. Larger reductions in RRMs would be expected in states
with indexed maximum WBAs, a reflection of continuing growth in
the average WBA.

3.

A dummy variable for tax-base indexing was also used, measured as
the fraction of the three-year period that an indexed tax base was
present. It was expected to have a positive coefficient, due to the
automatic positive effect that an increased tax base has on tax reve
nues.

4.

The level of the RRM at the start of the period was entered. It was
expected that states with low initial RRMs might enact more legisla
tion during recessions to avoid large-scale borrowing. This variable
was expected to have a negative coefficient, that is, larger reductions
in RRMs in states where RRMs were initially higher. Unfortunately,
there is also an econometric reason to expect a negative coefficient
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for this variable. Since the lagged RRM is part of the dependent vari
able with a negative sign of-1.0, the measurement also leads to an
expected negative sign for the lagged RRM. Because the interpreta
tion of a negative coefficient is ambiguous, results are shown both
with and without the lagged RRM.
Table B-l displays 12 regressions, the product of three recessions, two
specifications, and two weighting schemes for the state-level data. All regres
sions are based on the 50 states plus the District of Columbia. Overall, the
equations produce several of the expected results, with adjusted R2 values of
from 0.34 to 0.63 in unweighted data and from 0.70 to 0.92 in weighted data.
Generally, the four variables enter with the expected signs, and the majority of
coefficients are significant at the 0.05 or 0.01 level.3
In each regression, the unemployment ratio enters with the expected neg
ative sign and its coefficient consistently has the largest t ratio. Note that the
TUR ratio coefficients are largest for 1973-1976, intermediate for 1980-1983,
and smallest for 1989-1992. Higher unemployment rate ratios are associated
with bigger trust fund drawdowns. However, the size of the effect was consid
erably smaller for 1989-1992 than for 1973-1976.
Both indexing variables usually enter with the expected signs. The pres
ence of an indexed maximum WBA enters negatively in eight of 12 regres
sions, but the indexed tax base enters positively in all 12. Note, however, that
the indexed maximum positive coefficient is significant in weighted data.
All 12 of the tax-base indexing coefficients are positive; eight are signifi
cant at either the 0.01 or the 0.05 level, and a ninth just fails to be significant at
the 0.05 level. The size of the coefficients for the 1973-1976 data seems sur
prising in light of the small number of states with tax-base indexing during
those years. For 10 equations, the dummy variable coefficient lies in the range
of 0.26 to 0.54.
The lagged RRM variable enters negatively and significantly in the first
two recessions, but its coefficient is essentially zero for the most recent reces
sion. That the coefficients for the lagged RRM and for the indexing of the max
imum WBA both change size sharply for the 1990-1992 downturn suggests a
changed pattern of inter-correlation between the two variables. However, there
is no obvious explanation for the changed coefficients for this period.
The size of the dummy coefficients strongly suggests that tax-base index
ing contributes to maintaining trust fund balances during recessions. These co
efficients consistently fall within a narrow range, especially in the weighted
data, and suggest a measurably positive effect on trust fund balances.
While such a finding is plausible, a comment made in Chapter 3 bears re
peating: states with indexed tax bases may generally take a more proactive ap-
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proach to trust fund management. Even so, the regressions suggest that taxbase indexing helps to maintain trust fund balances during recessions.

Notes
1.
2.

3.

Two states had indexed tax bases in 1974, 6 in 1976, 13 in 1981, 14 in 1983, 18 in
1990, and 18 in 1992.
For the 1981-1983 period, the ratio was the average TUR for 1981-1983 divided
by the average TUR for 1977-1979. This period had two recessions, with the first
starting in 1980, but the TURs were highest in 1982 and 1983.
Under a one-sided test, the t ratio needs to be 1.68 to be significant at the 0.05
level and 2.41 to be significant at the 0.01 level.

Table B-l Regressions Explaining Recession-Related Changes in Trust Fund Reserve Ratio Multiples3
Summary Statistics

Constant

TUR
ratio

Max. WBA
indexed
(Yes=l)

Tax base
indexed
(Yes=l)

1973-1976

1.231
(3.41)

-1.675
(6.75)

-0.188
(1.45)

0.366
(1.66)

1973-1976

1.277
(4.21)

-1.348
(6.11)

-0.186
(1.71)

0.061
(0.31)

1980-1983

0.945
(3.47)

-0.864
(4.87)

-0.216
(1.66)

0.014
(0.10)

1980-1983

1.031
(4.26)

-0.792
(5.02)

-0.357
(2.96)

0.189
(1.39)

1989-1992

0.241
(2.36)

-0.418
(5.47)

0.007
(0.10)

0.167
(2.38)

1989-1992

0.217
(1.62)

-0.418
(5.42)

0.015
(0.20)

0.157
(1.97)

1973-1976

0.971
(4.26)

-1.451
(8.35)

-0.182
(2.04)

0.543
(2.84)

1973-1976

0.877
(4.18)

-1.148
(6.24)

-0.241
(2.90)

0.324
(1.74)

Change in
year-end RRM

Lagged
RRM

Mean
dependent
variable

Adj.
R2

Standard
error

0.485

0.410

-1.054

0.636

0.344

-1.054

0.341

0.389

-0.456

0.485

0.344

-0.456

0.441

0.211

-0.192

0.430

0.213

-0.192

0.899

0.346

-1.044

0.916

0.316

-1.044

Unweighted data

-0.343
(4.54)

-0.311
(3.76)

0.025
(0.29)

Weighted data

-0.252
(3.25)

1980-1983

0.631
(2.88)

-0.746
(4.47)

-0.288
(2.64)

0.478
(2.23)

1980-1983

1.039
(5.48)

-0.858
(6.42)

-0.565
(5.63)

0.501
(2.95)

1989-1992

0.155
(1.34)

-0.483
(5.81)

0.129
(2.81)

0.221
(2.76)

1989-1992

0.207
(1.27)

-0.489
(5.76)

0.108
(1.65)

0.250
(2.44)

-0.355
(5.39)

-0.049
(0.46)

0.703

0.439

-0.514

0.814

0.348

-0.514

0.875

0.206

-0.289

0.873

0.208

-0.289

SOURCE: Data on reserve ratio multiples (RRMs), indexed maximum weekly benefit amounts (WBAs), and indexed tax bases are from
the UI Service. Data on unemployment rates (TURs) are from the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
a Both indexation variables are measured as the fraction of the three years that indexing was in effect. TUR ratios are measured as ratios
of three-year averages. All regressions are based on 50 states plus the District of Columbia. Beneath each coefficient is the absolute
value of its t ratio.
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